236. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State1
WHY WE MUST HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS
There are some serious people who think we should not have a better relationship:
- —
- we should focus on strengthening our domestic economy and society and leave the Soviets in our wake;
- —
- to try to get a better relationship means “detente”, and detente is another word for appeasement;
- —
- we should not negotiate from a position of weakness (our situation in the 1970’s); and we need not negotiate from a position of relative strength (our position today), because negotiation just leads us to give things away.
Our answer should be:
- —
- we are building our domestic strength. Nothing can stop us;
- —
- we reject “detente”. It has been tried and it doesn’t work;
- —
- we have brought a new realism to our foreign policy. We are not going to give positions away in negotiations, nor sign on to flawed agreements as other Administrations did in the past. We do not have to have an agreement; we are not panting after a treaty. This self-confident attitude has worked to our advantage in the Middle East, in Central America, and with the Soviets. Indeed, it is a major reason why the Soviets have come back to the table.
So we are better placed and more prepared than any American Administration has been in decades to achieve a new basis for global stability. We have the beginning of a new Reagan Doctrine:
- —
- The Rand speech: a wholly new approach to dealing with the Soviets.2
- —
- The Commonwealth Club speech: drawing the lines in our own neighborhood, Central America.3
- —
- And we have taken the initiative to reverse decades-long trends in the Third World economies (march toward the market) and approach key regional issues creatively (southern Africa, the Pacific Basin).
To turn inward and isolate ourselves or stay aloof would be to repeat a mistake that the U.S. has made in the past.
Our job is to end the cycle of intervention/withdrawal that has characterized U.S. foreign policy historically—and to establish a new basis for global security and progress that can last well into the next century.
- Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meeting with the President (03/11/1985). No classification marking; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the talking points. Shultz met with the President and Regan on March 11 in the Oval Office from approximately 2 until approximately 2:30 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) In his personal diary entry for March 11, the President wrote: “Awakened at 4 A.M. to be told Chernenko is dead. My mind turned to whether I should attend the funeral. My gut instinct said no. Got to the office at 9. George S. had some arguments that I should—he lost. I dont think his heart was really in it. George B. is in Geneva—he’ll go & George S. will join him leaving tonight.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 434) In his memoir, Shultz wrote of the March 11 meeting: “I went to the White House to see President Reagan to go over ideas for the meeting our delegation would have with Gorbachev. There wasn’t a thought in his mind of going to Moscow. I recommended that Vice President Bush deliver a letter to Gorbachev inviting him to the United States. The president agreed.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 527) The March 11 letter from the President to Gorbachev, which Bush delivered in Moscow on January 13, is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 1.↩
- See Document 209.↩
- See Document 232.↩