118. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Wolfowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz1

SUBJECT

  • Some Differing Thoughts on Our Emerging China Strategy

Agreement on the Joint Communique between the United States and China marks the beginning of a new phase in US-China relations.2 This will not permit, however, a simple resumption of the US-China relationship as it existed before these negotiations began. In the interim, Chinese policy has undergone significant changes. In the last year Beijing has moved to distance itself from the US, and has become more openly critical of US positions internationally.

Despite the Communique (and in some ways because of it) the Taiwan question will continue to be a major irritant in US-China relations. Beijing clearly does not accept our interpretation of the Communique, and can be expected to sustain its pressure for an early termination to Taiwan arms sales and for an implicit right to consultation whenever future sales are made.

Under these circumstances, a close alliance or association with the Chinese is likely to be out of reach. It will be important, therefore, that future US initiatives be premised on balance and reciprocity in the relationship. If not, the Chinese may perceive us as suitors and, paradoxically, feel greater liberty to adopt a standoffish posture. We share many of the points of view of EA on this subject. But we favor a more cautious strategy, one which sets very modest expectations for the relationship. We might, for example, 1) pursue a consciously low-key [Page 449] policy, the pace of which is measured by the degree of positive interest which Beijing itself demonstrates in the US relationship; or 2) pursue a more forward-leaning—but still carefully modulated—policy aimed at extending incentives in return for concrete benefits.

I have attached as Tab A a more detailed elaboration of this issue and of possible policy alternatives. After reading it, you may wish to schedule a short discussion with John Holdridge, Jon Howe, Vernon Walters, Larry, Ken3 and myself. Once we adopt a basic style in the new relationship, we will have to live with it for a while.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff4

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA POLICY

The recent agreement to a joint communique opens the door for the resumption of a more positive U.S.-China relationship. Nevertheless a simple return to the relationship we enjoyed one year ago is improbable. The last year has been a sobering experience in U.S.-China relations. The Chinese have shown themselves to be hard bargainers, with a strong sense of their own interests and how to project them. Those interests often differ from our own. We can expect in the coming year and beyond that the Chinese will continue to take a tough line with the U.S., particularly on Taiwan matters, and will continue to act more from concrete self-interest than from a conceptual commitment to the benefits of cooperation.

Momentum to Where?

We will need to be no less hard-headed. If, as EA has pointed out, it is important to establish a sense of “momentum” and “steady growth” in the relationship, it will be no less important to identify from an early point the limits and the potential of that relationship and the goal that we want to establish momentum toward. This kind of analysis will be necessary if we are to properly determine the extent and limits of the investment in our Chinese ties.

In partial answer to that question, I believe that China—because of its size, location, and anti-Soviet orientation—offers a range of potential strategic benefits, both globally and regionally. It is also in [Page 450] our interest to encourage a stable China, constructively tied to the West and to the world community, since a hostile or instable China could move closer toward the USSR, and could threaten U.S. friends and interests in Asia.

We must, nevertheless, be cautious in our evaluation of the possible extent of “strategic cooperation” with the PRC. Already the basis for strategic cooperation has begun to contract. This is evidenced in part by the significantly curtailed nature of the strategic portion of our joint communique, and by the Chinese desire during the later stages of the negotiations to further restrict or to eliminate it entirely. Beijing has recently moved to publicly distance itself from the U.S., and has become more openly critical of U.S. positions internationally. In part, this was a reaction to the uncertainty of the Taiwan arms negotiations. More broadly, though, the PRC now appears to be moving away from a perceived partnership with the U.S. against the USSR, and toward a position less identified with uncompromising anti-Sovietism. Efforts are accelerating to cultivate Third World nations and even radical states close to the Soviets. While near-term detente between Beijing and Moscow remains unlikely, and while China will continue to oppose Soviet “hegemonism,” some relaxation of Sino-Soviet relations in the political, cultural and economic fields has already begun and can be expected to continue. Communist Party Chairman Hu Yaobang’s recent speech to the Twelfth Party Congress stands as only the latest indicator of the changing nature of the U.S.-China relationship.5 Based on this realignment, we can expect that Beijing will seek to avoid the appearance of either alliance or alignment with the United States, and while continuing to pursue policies “parallel” to our own, will in the future follow an increasingly independent policy.

A Modulated Policy

Overall, these developments indicate the need for a U.S. policy which is positive and cordial, but less expensive and more at arm’s length than was once anticipated. We should continue to encourage the pursuit and coordination of parallel interests wherever possible, but with a more limited set of expectations than in the past regarding the prospects for true cooperation. In particular, much greater attention must be given to the need to modulate future U.S. initiatives to the constructiveness of actual Chinese behavior. This will be necessary to ensure a proper balance in the relationship, and to avoid a situation in which the U.S. is cast in the role of suitor. The perception of a United States which is overly anxious to build a close relationship could serve to encourage those in the PRC who are inclined to leverage us on issues where differences [Page 451] still remain, and, paradoxically, those inclined to distance themselves from us in order to maintain an independent image. This suggests, among other things, the need to maintain appropriate restraint on the pacing and timing of future initiatives toward Beijing, including near-term high-level visits.

In this context, we need to ask not only how we can advance our China relationship by actions designed to meet Chinese demands or expectations, but also what concretely we ourselves want or expect to gain from the Chinese. While, as some have suggested, it may be desirable to loosen controls on technology exports to the PRC or to go forward in the area of peaceful nuclear cooperation (an enhanced focus on economic development, China’s principal national objective, may in fact be our best strategy for the moment), these actions should not occur in a vacuum. Instead they should be related to a clearly demonstrated Chinese desire for constructive cooperation. We should not give something for nothing. As outlined below, this could be measured by concrete indicia. In addition, we should also consider the possible negative sanctions available (such as the withholding of technology) should Beijing again threaten a retrogression or should Chinese policies turn in a direction decidedly hostile to U.S. interests.

Pressure and Firmness on Taiwan

We should, in addition, avoid focusing excessive attention on those areas where the U.S. and the PRC continue to disagree. Such a focus would detract from our objective of rebuilding a positive, broad-based relationship. The immediate issue remains Taiwan. Despite the communique, the Chinese have told us directly they do not consider this the end of the issue, and that they reserve the right to scrutinize our future sales. Since our agreement to the communique, we have continued to be pressured on this score. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the communique “only marks a beginning of the settlement of this issue,” and a through resolution “is indispensable to the maintenance and development of Sino-U.S. relations.” We have been told privately that Beijing expects that reductions in arms sales to Taiwan will not be “dollar-a-year,” but rather will be rapid and will lead to an early termination. We are currently being pressed for data on past sales levels, and it is clear that Beijing will attempt to use language in paragraph 9 of the communique calling for “appropriate consultations” to support their claim to a voice in our future arms decisions. China has publicly rejected the fundamental linkage between our willingness to reduce future sales and the PRC’s commitment to a peaceful resolution of the issue (Xinhua, August 29). Beijing has also continued to heavily criticize the Taiwan Relations Act, suggesting it will remain a specific target of Chinese policy. An authoritative editorial in the People’s Daily has predicted that the [Page 452] U.S.-China relationship will face a crisis if U.S. policymakers insist on adhering to this “internal law.”6

I do not believe these objections to U.S. policy are “pro forma.” Instead, it seems clear that even if these statements are made to some extent for internal consumption, they are no less indicative of the true Chinese position. While some are hopeful that the communique will allow us to put the Taiwan issue on the “back burner” for one or more years, if experience is any indication our respite will be short. Under these circumstances, we must be prepared to be very firm in adhering to the President’s desire to sell Taiwan the arms it needs for its legitimate self-defense, and must strongly resist pressure from Beijing to explicitly or implicitly accept a Chinese role in determining the pace of our movement on this score. Such pressure should be met, I suggest, not with discussion of the merits of proposed arms sales, but rather should be deflected by general reassurances of our commitment to the terms of the communique as we interpret it.

Implications

The analysis above suggests that the United States might move in a number of directions.

(a) Pursue a positive but low-keyed relationship. The U.S. can go forward with its relationship with China on a reserved basis, based on the judgment that current Chinese attitudes may restrain for the foreseeable future the extent of Sino-American cooperation. Under this strategy, U.S. initiatives should be undertaken at a measured pace related directly to the degree of reciprocity demonstrated by the Chinese. Specific steps might include initial restraint in near-term high-level visits (e.g., postponement of some high-level visits to Beijing until early 1983, or waiting for Zhao Ziyang to visit Washington before sending a delegation of comparable seniority), and shifting the primary focus of the relationship, if this should be necessary, in the direction of economic and commercial relations (e.g., enhanced technology transfer and credit extension).

(b) Expand the relationship, if possible, as a means toward achieving specific objectives. Pursue a more aggressive policy, aimed at achieving concrete benefits. Under this approach, we would seek to move the Chinese forward by offering up special incentives that may be of interest. Should Beijing prove unwilling to offer concrete, reciprocal benefits, we would need to fall back to a more restrained policy. Specific inducements the United States could offer might include stepped up [Page 453] technology transfer and the sale of selected defensive arms (consistent with the interests of China’s non-communist neighbors). Specific objectives the United States might hope to pursue (and concrete measures of Chinese interest in constructive cooperation) could include Chinese support or neutrality on third world issues in which we have an interest, a forthcoming position on Southwest Asian problems (such as support for Pakistan), aid to the non-communist resistance in Kampuchea, access to military facilities in China, port calls for US naval vessels, and restraint of Chinese criticism on Taiwan. Though far from certain, this approach could have the added benefit of drawing the Chinese closer to the U.S. strategic network.

In either event, S/P does not recommend an immediate acceleration of the China relationship in the absence of more clearly articulated planning for long-term strategy toward both China and Taiwan.

  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW Chrons to Secy SEP 1982. Secret. Bremer’s stamped initials appear at the top of the memorandum. Another stamped notation reads: “82 SEP 24 P4:44.” A notation in an unknown hand, presumably Kaplan’s, indicates that copies were sent to Holdridge, Howe, Walters, Dam, and Eagleburger. Also scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVIII, China, 1981–1983.
  2. See footnote 8, Document 117.
  3. References are to Eagleburger and Dam.
  4. Secret. Drafted by Randolph and Glassman on September 22.
  5. In telegram 12046 from Beijing, September 4, the Embassy transmitted a summary of the address. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820460–1101)
  6. In telegram 11030 from Beijing, August 18, the Embassy highlighted various aspects of the editorial. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820428–0525)