Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

275. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, April 23, 1979

SUBJECT

• VP’s Nordic Trip: Quick Highlights (U)

Having just returned from the Vice President’s 12-day tour of six Northern European countries (Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands),² I share with you the following highlights and impressions:

1. All of us who participated in the substantive discussions were struck by the commonality of interest and concern vis-à-vis major security issues. SALT, the Middle East, and Southern Africa led everyone’s agenda, with virtually the same questions asked at every stop (Will the Senate ratify SALT? How will the Palestinians be folded into the next round of negotiations? Is Botha stringing us along in Namibia?). There was little interest in China (only Sweden raised it, in the context of what-should-we-do-about-Kampuchea), and still less in Iran (raised in passing by Finland). (C)

2. Correlatively, we found broad and unambiguous support for a good many of our most important policies, including SALT, detente, energy, and U.S. initiatives in the world’s major trouble spots, especially the Middle East (Finland was the only exception: Kekkonen spoke contemptuously of Israel and called the follow-on provisions of the peace treaty a “joke”). (C)

3. We found no questioning of the need for a strong Western Alliance. Indeed, we saw many instances of tangible support in each of the four NATO member countries we visited (e.g., AWACS in Iceland, pro-prestockage attitudes in Norway and Denmark, F–15 ops in the Netherlands). By implication, Sweden and even Finland viewed NATO as a necessity (if only to ensure that SALT III would proceed from, and be spurred by, West European consensus). (C)

4. Three-Mile Island³ was a common discussion theme but with none of the emotivity, public or private, which some of us had anticipated (the VP’s press conferences were all pussycats; nobody asked any really tough or provocative question on any subject). There was recognition that we had responded to the near-disaster as responsibly as circumstances permitted and that the issues transcended U.S. national policy (Denmark and Sweden particularly appreciated the VP’s unequivocal promise of full access to our information on the accident). There was some sense that in an ironic way Three-Mile Island enhanced prospects for SALT II’s acceptance: if a single peaceful nuclear facility could cause such potential catastrophe, imagine the effect of nuclear weapons in wartime! (U)

5. TNF did not loom as large as we thought it might, although the Netherlands leg confirmed what we already knew: we still have a tough row to hoe with this issue (in a side meeting former Foreign Minister van der Stoel claimed we had two different groups to deal with in the Netherlands,⁴ those who were basically pro-NATO but ignorant of the magnitude of the Soviet threat, and those who were emotionally anti-nuclear; more information might take care of the former, and visible arms control activity might take care of the latter, but the problem is this: because each of these messages will be anathema to the other, how do we get them across to their intended recipients without a process of self-cancellation?) (C)

6. Few in the VP’s party were unmoved by the spontaneity, genuineness, and warmth of our reception in the six countries visited. The quality of that response convinced me that we can accomplish a lot through a simple display of interest in Northern European concerns. The fact is, although the Nordics are in a sense our natural constituency (same values, cultural antecedents, etc.), we have paid them relatively little attention prior to this visit. They need to feel that we have them in mind and are willing to consult with them on issues of mutual concern; this can be done through quick trips by appropriate NSC, State, and perhaps DOD personnel. Regular follow-up visits (perhaps modelled after David’s to Stockholm in February)⁵ will not only consolidate the good will generated by the Vice President’s trip but give us increased leverage on a variety of issues, some big (TNF, SALT II & III), some little (specialty steel, potato starch), where Nordic help will be highly useful. (C)

A summary rundown of main items from each of the countries visited is attached FYI. The final trip report⁶ will reflect that material. (U)

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council⁷

Washington, undated

Key Issues, Policy Points, Action Items in Northern European Countries Visited by Vice President April 10–23, 1979

1. Iceland

— expression of strong governmental support for NATO and NATO presence;

— need for better information on Soviet threat for public use in Iceland;

— desirability of acquainting Icelandic public with clearer idea of what exactly Keflavik base does to counter threat (while safeguarding sensitive features of Keflavik mission);

— strong support for U.S. role in Middle East, Southern Africa (C)

2. Norway

— staunchness of support for NATO;

— no public problem with prestockage; (while continuing firm adherence to policy on prohibition of foreign troops and nuclear weaponry in peacetime);

— warm appreciation for U.S. position on Svalbard;

— strong support for U.S. role in Middle East (including Lebanon), Southern Africa (C)

3. Denmark

— as in Norway, staunch support for NATO and confidence in U.S. leadership;

— favorable public attitude toward prepositioning despite Soviet pressure (and as in Norway, reemphasis on policy against stationing of foreign troops and/or nuclear weaponry on Danish soil in peacetime);

— deep concern over implications of 3-Mile Island accident;

— strong support for U.S. role in Middle East, Southern Africa;

— praise for President’s energy policy (C)

4. Sweden

— warmth of bilateral relationship now that Vietnam is behind us;

— strong support for SALT coupled with impatience at lack of speedier progress on CTB;

— concern over our arms transfer/export control restrictions (we will send Lucy Benson to discuss this subject in greater detail);

— concern with evolution of events in Indochina;

— strong support for U.S. role in Middle East, Southern Africa;

— praise for President’s energy policy (C)

5. Finland

— support for SALT, renewal of offer of Helsinki as venue for SALT II Summit;

— deep concern over Middle East situation and doubt that Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty was wise move;

— continuing strong attachment to Kekkonen’s Nordic NWFZ idea;

— importance of Nordic Council as a forum for Finland’s participation in the West;

— interest in President’s energy policy;

— desire to accelerate progress in UN disarmament matters (C)

6. Netherlands

— widespread opposition, public and private, to ERW;

— strong desire for change in NPG membership system from rotation to open-ended;

— government understanding on need for TNF modernization;

— essentiality of coupling TNF modernization with strong and publicly visible arms control component;

— support for strong human rights pitch in context of CSCE Madrid (which should produce something more than mere replica of Belgrade);

— praise for President’s energy policy (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 22, Europe, 1/79–1/81. Confidential. Sent for information. At the top of the document, Gates wrote: “DA—Does ZB need to see? R.G.”
2. From April 10 to 23, Mondale travelled to northern Europe, visiting Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands. See Documents 270, 271, 272, 273, and 274. Telegram 102979 to Homestead Air Force Base, April 24, provided a report on Mondale’s meeting with Dutch leaders. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840130–1482)
3. See footnote 5, Document 273.
4. Telegram 1764 from The Hague, March 22, reported that former Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel was scheduled to attend an April 21 reception at the Embassy in The Hague. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790134–0278) No other record of that meeting has been found.
5. Aaron visited Stockholm on February 3 and 4 for talks with senior Swedish Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. (Telegrams 553 and 633 from Stockholm, February 5 and 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790054–1233 and D790066–0153)
6. Not found.
7. Confidential.