Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

274. Message From Vice President Mondale to President Carter¹

Monto 12.

Air Force Two, April 21, 1979, 0635Z

SUBJECT

• Visit to Finland.² For the President from the Vice President.

1. President Kekkonen is a hearty soul, he has logged 1,050 kilometers of cross country skiing this winter and he was off for another vacation in Lapland shortly following our talks and luncheon. He was delighted to receive your letter³ and in a one-on-one session at the beginning of our talks he offered the following views:

— The Finns attach great importance to SALT and agreement between the US and USSR means a better life for Finland.

— Without trying to order his thoughts he offered the following impressions of developments in the Soviet Union, noting, as we have known, his special relationship with the Soviets personally. Since the 1940’s there has been a positive development in Soviet leadership over the years; now they approach issues “moderately and gently” where earlier they used harsh language.

— Kosygin is a man on whom you can rely, he honors his word. Brezhnev’s health is not good, he is not involved in day-to-day affairs but he has always been positive towards Finland.

— He said he was recently at an official session of the Soviet civil and military leadership; the civilians behaved with warmth and humor but the military did not crack a smile (i.e. we should be aware of the military’s hand in Soviet policy making).

— His overall impression of the Soviets today is that they approach important problems in international relations with care and with great consideration.

— In the expanded talks,⁴ Kekkonen expressed great interest about SALT II, in particular, the prospects for Senate ratification. I told him that I thought the debate would be rough but that the treaty would be ratified.

2. He raised his plan for a Nordic nuclear free weapons zone asking if the U.S. would participate in a meeting aimed at agreement on such a zone. This of course, is a non-starter given the fact that it does not include the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries—and our Nordic NATO Allies view it as a non-starter as does Sweden. I told him that I would convey his question of the U.S. participation to you, but that I felt that was really a question for the Nordic countries to decide.⁵

3. On the Middle East, for the first time in this overseas mission, I received no support for our efforts. Kekkonen clearly was toeing the Soviet line concentrating on Israel’s unwillingness to address the question of a Palestinian state.

4. On Southern Africa, where as you know, the Finns have a personal involvement with UN Representative Ahtisaari, we concurred on the eroding situation. In concluding on this point, Kekkonen said, “the issue is so difficult it should not be rushed unduly, it should be allowed a longer hatching period.”

5. In closing our talks, Kekkonen presented the long-standing and very deep-seated Finnish interest in selling the US one or more Finnish icebreakers for the Great Lakes. The Finns clearly have national pride caught up in this issue—given their competence—as well as economic interests. I noted the complexities and said we would continue to discuss this with them.

6. In a subsequent meeting with Prime Minister Sorsa,⁶ he conveyed Finland’s offer to serve as a site for your meeting with Brezhnev. I told him that it was our belief that the meeting should take place in the U.S.—and in my subsequent press conference, I made the same point, noting, however, that the first and foremost issue was a good SALT II agreement, not the site. Sorsa raised a number of lesser bilateral issues which I will be asking the State member of my delegation to report to Cy and follow up with the Government of Finland.⁷

7. My overall impression based on the day’s talks is that (1) Kekkenon is still very much running the show here (although he relies rather heavily on Ministry briefing papers, reading many of them clearly for the first time). Overriding this is Finland’s interest in a good relationship with the U.S. and in this context, their satisfaction with the understanding your administration has [of] their participation in the Nordic Council—a very effective cover for dialogue with our NATO Allies on the Northern flank.

8. Best regards, Fritz.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Cables File, Box 104, 4/79. Secret; Sensitive. Sent via privacy channels.
2. Mondale visited Finland from April 20 to 21. He met with both Kekkonen and Sorsa on April 20.
3. Mondale delivered Carter’s April 3 letter to Kekkonen during their private meeting. (Telegram 1490 from Helsinki, April 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790191–0258) Carter’s letter conveyed his “warm personal greetings.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 6, Finland: President Urho K. Kekkonen, 4/79–9/80)
4. Telegram 2402 from The Hague, April 22, provided another account of the expanded talks, which included Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Paavo Väyrynen, other Finnish officials, Ridgway, and members of Mondale’s delegation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790191–0258)
5. Telegram 1457 from Helsinki, May 11, 1978, reported: “Speaking in Stockholm on May 8, Finland’s President Urho Kekkonen suggested that the nuclear weapon-free zone proposal that he made in May 1963 should be used as a point of departure for arms control negotiations among the Nordic countries and the great powers. The objective of such negotiations, which Kekkonen called necessary ‘as the disarmament talks draw out and developments in military technology enhance the risk of nuclear conflict in northern Europe,’ would be a separate treaty isolating the Nordic countries from the effects of nuclear strategy in general and new nuclear weapons technology in particular.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780200–0419)
6. Telegram 2400 from The Hague, April 21, provided another account of Mondale’s April 20 meeting with Sorsa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790185–0089)
7. Telegram 175906 to Helsinki, July 7, conveyed responses to the issues raised by Sorsa, including: increasing contributions to the U.S.-Finnish educational exchange program, civil air negotiations, Carter’s decision to phase out quotas on imports of specialty steel, Finnish interest in selling icebreakers for the Great Lakes, cooperation in developing nuclear reactor safety standards, and cooperation in spurring new energy technology. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790309–0506)