276. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum1
NORDIC SECURITY2
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The key factor in the evolving situation in northern Europe is the keener recognition by both East and West of the growing importance of their respective interests in the area. From the Soviets’ viewpoint, the area has always been of major importance, and its strategic dimension has been increased by the buildup of their naval ballistic missile force. The area’s economic resources—particularly oil, minerals, and fish—loom ever larger with the prolongation of energy shortages and the worldwide constriction of fishing rights.
Because of the importance of these interests and the difficulty of reconciling them when and where they collide, both sides have been increasingly sensitive to possible threats to their positions in the area.
Typical of the resulting strains are the dispute between Norway and the USSR over the continental shelf boundary in the Barents Sea that culminated in the establishment in 1977 of overlapping 200-mile exclusive economic zones; the disagreements between the two countries over the exercise of Norwegian sovereignty in Svalbard; the uproar in Norway last year over Soviet intrusions into northern Norwegian waters; the Soviet proposal in July 1978 that neutral Finland and the USSR hold joint military exercises; and moves by both Norway and Denmark in the last few years to upgrade their military ties with NATO.
The growing political, economic, and military engagement in the area that these developments reflect is bound to continue. Moreover, it may take place in a climate of still greater uncertainty about the short-term intentions and perceptions of both sides—and of still greater complexity in the reciprocal interplay of the moves that each may make.
The complex question of Svalbard may prove impossible to resolve, not only because of the vagueness of the Spitzbergen Treaty3 (which established Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago), but also because of the conflicting interests of the USSR, Norway, and the other 38 signatories of the treaty. Even if Norway and the USSR should sort out their differences on overlapping economic zones in the Barents Sea, fisheries disputes in those waters will occur from time to time.
The introduction of offshore oil rigs into the Norwegian and Barents Seas will be a complicating factor. It will further extend the Western presence—both economic and technological for the exploitation of resources, and military and political for their defense.
In the context of the growing strategic importance it attaches to its northern access to the Atlantic and its long-term goal of establishing hegemony in the region, the USSR will look suspiciously on this greater Western involvement. For their part, the Nordic states will pay close attention to Soviet military and naval dispositions and will not be reluctant to ring the tocsin if they think support from NATO is lagging behind their expanding interests or is failing to respond to increases in Soviet pressure.
Changes in leadership in and outside the area will introduce still other uncertainties. A key component in the region’s overall balance has been Finland’s ability under President Kekkonen to adjust to changing Soviet leaders and policies without further compromising a neutrality that is already heavily qualified. How Kekkonen—approaching 80—is replaced and by whom will invite even closer Soviet attention, and Helsinki’s skill in reassuring Moscow is certain to be tested.
There is also a succession problem in Moscow. Northern Europe heretofore has largely escaped the brunt of the policy shifts that have followed previous changes in the Kremlin, but it now occupies a higher place in the Soviet consciousness. Soviet interest in the region is unlikely to decline in the post-Brezhnev period, and it is possible the Soviets will pursue their objectives more assertively when a new leadership is in place.
It is therefore likely that the assumptions on which Nordic security have rested will be more rigorously tested in the years ahead.
Characteristically, the assertion of national interests in the area has so far fallen short of direct challenge to the regional military and political balance, and reasons for restraint will probably be operative in the future. The Nordic states realize that their national interests cannot be pursued without regard to the interests of the superpowers. Both the United States and the USSR have more vital interests elsewhere, and both recognize that the situation that prevails in the northern area cannot be totally divorced from the global relationship that they wish to have with each other.
Nonetheless, it is evident that Moscow’s economic and military stake in that area is of sufficient import that it will hope to shape that situation more favorably to its interests.
It will watch for and protest any signs of a greater NATO presence in the area, whether through the introduction of non-Nordic troops, larger or more frequent military and naval exercises in the Norwegian and Baltic Seas, or more active efforts by Norway and Denmark to enhance their defense and NATO roles. And it will press for advantage, hoping not only to get its way on the immediate points at issue, but also in due course to achieve a more pliant Nordic grouping.
How determinedly Moscow will assert itself in the area will depend on the response it gets. The blend of the nonprovocative and the firm with which the Nordic countries have defended their interests has heretofore rested in part on the assumption that the northern regions were somewhat peripheral to the major interests of East and West. As this becomes progressively less so, the more important ingredient in the Nordics’ security policies will of necessity be confidence—confidence that, should Moscow mistake a low profile for weakness, their resistance will ultimately engage the broader Western interest.
We do not see signs that Nordic confidence is seriously eroding, but how to sustain this confidence is obviously an element that should be included in overall calculations of the adequacy of NATO’s military posture.
[Omitted here is an untitled map of the Nordic Area.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A. Secret; [less than 1 line not declassified]. A note on the second title page reads: “Information available as of 21 June 1979 has been used in the preparation of this report.”↩
- A note at the bottom of the first page reads: “Note: This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. It was drafted in the National Foreign Assessment Center by [less than 1 line not declassified], in the Office of Political Analysis, and was coordinated at the working level throughout the Intelligence Community. Alternative views appear in footnotes 2, 3, and 4 to paragraphs 13, 17, and 81.”↩
- Reference is to the Treaty Relating to Spitzbergen, which was signed on February 9, 1920.↩