Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

273. Telegram From the White House to President Carter¹

Washington, April 20, 1979, 0331Z

WH 91012. Deliver at opening of business. For the President from the Vice President. Subject: Visit to Sweden.²

1. The Swedes had given very careful preparation to the agenda for our two hours of talks. Additionally, their hospitality from moment of our arrival was extremely warm and cordial. The most prominent object on display in Prime Minister Ullsten’s office³ was the photograph of him taken with you earlier this year.⁴ While our two countries understandably take a very different approach to a number of issues, the Swedes—who had the biggest rupture in normally good relations because of the Vietnam war—are clearly glad to have that era behind both of us and to be again meeting at the political level as friends. As in Denmark, there was strong support for the basic outlines of your foreign policy, particularly as it relates to SALT, detente, the Middle East, human rights and Africa.

2. Sweden places heavy reliance on nuclear power for her energy. Ullsten and his colleagues were pleased to have me confirm that their specialists would be welcome to the U.S. and that we would want our experts to share with them our findings from the Three Mile incident.⁵ On a related issue, the Swedish Minister of Energy said that a year or two ago he had tried to enlist our support for a program of international cooperation on nuclear safety. I said I would pass this along to Gerry Smith and ask him to be back in touch with Sweden.⁶

3. On SALT, Ullsten and his government understandably back our efforts to reach the earliest possible agreement. The April 19 Swedish radio and newspapers had carried reports of Brezhnev’s wobbly performance the day before. Ullsten twice said that should you want a third country site for a summit with Brezhnev you would be very welcome to Stockholm. I said I would relay the invitation.

4. While SALT is important to Sweden, as you might imagine, the Swedes think we should be moving harder and faster in all fields of arms control and disarmament—e.g., CTB, no TNF modernization, greater restriction of use of conventional weapons including land mines, incendiary weapons and banning all new categories of atomic weapons. In replying, I noted the steady growth of the Soviet defense budget, the growth of Soviet theater nuclear forces and our requirement, together with our NATO partners, to manage arms control negotiations in a way that would not give the Soviets a unilateral advantage.

5. Somewhat ironically, the Swedish Government is uncomfortable with our regulations relating to sale of weapons to third countries—e.g. our veto of their sale of the Viggen aircraft to India—and our regulations of transfer of technology more generally.⁷ I suggested that it might be useful if Lucy Benson and one or more members of our Export Control Board pay a quiet visit to make sure that we both have clearer understanding of the policies that apply.⁸ Ullsten raised Sweden’s concern that you might extend quotas on Swedish specialty steel exports to the U.S.⁹ I reviewed the basic considerations you must take into account and said I would convey the statement of concern.

6. On the Middle East, the Swedish Government expressed much the same concern about the complexities of the next steps in the Middle East and the problems the Arab rejectionists may cause. I went over the steps you had taken to bring about the Camp David Accords and the Egypt–Israeli treaty, underlining that the only alternative we had seen to this process was the likelihood of a new war. Ullsten and his colleagues said they would continue to support your efforts. This lead to a discussion of your energy policy, for which there is also strong Swedish support.

7. We discussed developments in Africa. Ullsten spoke out strongly in favor of the Anglo–American plan for Rhodesia. On Uganda, he said it might be useful to offer assistance in the form of a coordinated international package. I said I would report his recommendation.

8. Tomorrow I will be in Helsinki for talks with President Kekkonen. He may have some useful insights on developments in the Soviet leadership.

9. With best regards, Fritz.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 122, White House In/Out, 3–4/79. Secret; Sensitive. Originally sent as telegram 507 from Stockholm. Sent to Susan Clough for Carter on Sapelo Island, Georgia.
2. Mondale visited Stockholm from April 19 to 20.
3. Mondale met with Ullsten on April 19. Telegram 1681 from Stockholm, April 20, provides another report of their meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790184–0021)
4. On January 18, Carter participated in a photo opportunity in the Oval Office with Ullsten, Mondale, and Brzezinski from 11:55 a.m. to 12:02 p.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of that meeting has been found.
5. Reference is to a March 28 accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Donald Janson, “Radiation is Released in Accident at Nuclear Plant in Pennsylvania,” New York Times, March 29, 1979, p. A1)
6. Telegram 175905 to Stockholm, July 7, noted that it appeared that under existing bilateral and multilateral arrangements the United States and Sweden had appropriate means for cooperation on nuclear reactor safety standards and continued: “we would always of course be willing to consider any further suggestions the Swedish side might offer.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790309–0505)
7. See footnote 3, Document 269.
8. Telegram 175905 to Stockholm, July 7, suggested that Benson visit in the fall of 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790309–0505) No record of a visit by Benson to Sweden has been found.
9. Telegram 175905 to Stockholm, July 7, reported that on June 12 Strauss announced Carter’s decision to phase out quotas on specialty steels over an eight-month period. The telegram continued: “We understand Sweden has some problems with the manner in which this decision is being implemented with regard to the alloy steel quota and this question is being addressed.” (Ibid.)