Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXVII, Western Europe

270. Telegram From the White House to President Carter¹

WH 90939.

Washington, April 13, 1979, 1306Z

SUBJECT

• Meeting With Icelandic Leaders.² For President from the Vice President.

1. The following points emerged from more than three hours of discussions with Prime Minister Johannesson, Foreign Minister Grondal, and separately, leader of the opposition Hallgrimsson.³ First, both the current coalition government and the Icelandic opposition are basically quite satisfied with the current state of US–Icelandic relations.

2. Second, the NATO relationship and the Keflavik base which is always a somewhat touchy political issue among Iceland’s anti-militaristic population, are fundamentally sound and in better shape than in the past. Johannesson’s coalition, which includes the People’s Alliance Communist Party, has to proceed carefully. Nonetheless, Johannesson made a point of saying that his government supports the NATO presence at Keflavik and that Iceland’s fundamental policy in foreign affairs and in particular its commitment to the Atlantic Alliance remains unchanged. Hallgrimsson, whose opposition Independence Party is more pro-NATO, was, of course, strong in his support of NATO and our presence at Keflavik.

3. Both Johannesson and Hallgrimsson expressed appreciation for the U.S. decision to assist in financing the dual-use terminal at Keflavik.⁴ Johannesson indicated that his government should be able to provide us with the information we require if there is to be a line item in the 81 budget. Of importance both Johannesson and Hallgrimsson expressed a degree of frustration over the fact that they cannot provide the people of Iceland with a fuller picture of Soviet military activities in the North Atlantic, a picture which would cause the Icelanders to have a better appreciation of Keflavik’s importance. They noted that they receive briefings from our Ambassador and base commander but that because of the classified information involved, they cannot make use of it in their Parliament or press. I believe it would be very useful if State and Defense were to look into this problem as a matter of priority and to come up with more information that can be declassified on Soviet air and sea activities in the region and the importance of Keflavik to the Atlantic Alliance.⁵

4. Civil aviation is the one real point of concern to both the government and the opposition. Iceland’s airline, Loftleidir, which for years flourished because of its cut-rate fares took a terrible financial beating last year with the new “open sky” low fares of other Atlantic carriers. The Icelanders are very worried that the airline may go under if it cannot find ways to develop more revenues. The government is formulating proposals. Without commitment I told the Prime Minister that we would give his proposals close and careful attention as soon as they are received.⁶

5. The balance of our discussions included a relaxed exchange on a number of international developments, e.g., SALT, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the international energy picture. It was clear that the Prime Minister and his colleagues were pleased to have the chance to consult on these topics.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 122, White House In/Out, 3–4/79. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Originally sent as Monto 3 from Commander Fleet Air Keflavik (COMFAIRKEF) to the White House for the Embassy in Iceland. Sent to Susan Clough for Carter, who visited Sapelo Island, Georgia, from April 12 to April 20. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary)
2. Mondale visited Iceland from April 11 to 13 as part of a trip to northern Europe that also took him to Norway (April 13–18; see Document 272), Denmark (April 18–19; see Document 271), Sweden (April 19–20; see Document 273), Finland (April 20–21; see Document 274), and the Netherlands (April 21–22).
3. Telegram 581 from Reykjavik, April 16, transmitted another account of this meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790204–0042)
4. See Document 268.
5. Telegram 175904 to Reykjavik, July 7, reported that the “Department of Defense is aware of the need to keep Icelandic authorities regularly and systematically informed regarding the Soviet threat, and is working out procedures to do so.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790309–0998)
6. On May 2, Iceland requested permission for Loftleidir to carry passengers directly from the United States to points in Europe without landing in Iceland. On September 6, the United States allowed Loftleidir, on a provisional basis until October 31, 1980, to offer direct flights to Europe provided that half of all scheduled flights touched Iceland. (Telegrams 113592, 215738, and 236662 to Reykjavik, May 4, August 17, and September 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790204–0439, D790374–0903, and D790412–1075)