91. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State1
1233. Subject: (S) Bulgarian Approach on Closer Relations With US. Ref: Sofia 1185.2
1. (S-entire text.)
2. Summary: Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov’s comments on Bulgarian-American relations reported reftel are regarded by the Bulgarian side as an important political approach to the US for closer relations. This approach was personally authorized by President/Party Chief Todor Zhivkov, and following the meeting Mladenov remarked to a senior MFA official that: “I hope the Americans realize that I have extended my hand, and grasp it.” While not intending to depart from close alignment with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria wishes to play a more [Page 263] independent role, and specifically would like to upgrade relations with the US. End summary.
3. Following the Ambassador’s meeting with Mladenov reported reftel, Ambassador Gotsev (Chief of MFA Fourth Department responsible for relations with US and Western Europe) arranged a private luncheon tete-a-tete with the Ambassador. In an unusually open and frank discussion, Gotsev emphasized the Bulgarian leadership’s desire to raise substantially the level and range of its relations with the US. He stated that Mladenov, himself a member of the Politburo, had in advance discussed with President Zhivkov his meeting with the Ambassador, and had been authorized to seek closer political and economic ties with the US. Mladenov considered the Ambassador’s return to Washington for consultations at this juncture as the best opportunity to make an authoritative probe of the American reaction, and he was awaiting with interest whatever the Ambassador would be able to bring back by way of a response. Following his meeting with the Ambassador, Mladenov had told Gotsev: “I hope the Americans realize that I have extended my hand, and grasp it.”
4. Gotsev commented that the US was of course the most important country in the world. Bulgaria enjoyed very close ties with the Soviet Union, and had no wish to change that relationship. At the same time, some of the Bulgarian leaders, including Zhivkov as well as Mladenov, wished to increase the role which Bulgaria herself plays in world affairs. They had no illusions as to the limited role which a small country could aspire to. Nonetheless, Bulgaria’s role in the Balkans could be of some significance to the US as well. Moreover, while Bulgaria had been extending its political contacts and economic ties with other Western countries, in particular the FRG and increasingly Japan, this had not so far developed with respect to the US.
5. Gotsev stated that some members of the Bulgarian leadership were frankly skeptical as to whether the US shared an interest in improving relations. Also, some members of the leadership through their own particular experience represented in effect “a (West) German lobby” and a “Japanese lobby”—there was no “American lobby” yet. He commented that whenever a major trade deal with a Western partner was being decided upon by the leadership, Zhivkov would ask about the quality of technology compared with that of the US; while differences obviously existed among various advanced countries, the basic benchmark was normally taken to be the US.
6. Gotsev stated that despite Bulgaria’s close economic relations with the Soviet Union, and with other members of Comecon, there is a potential for increased economic ties with the West—and preferably with the US. The Bulgarian leadership was not at all satisfied with the stagnation of Bulgarian-American trade at a relatively low level and limited scope.
[Page 264]7. Gotsev stressed Bulgarian interest in obtaining MFN treatment from the US. He expressed the hope which the Bulgarian leadership has that with SALT II and the development of American-Chinese political and now economic ties it would prove possible for Bulgaria to acquire MFN status. He stated that Bulgaria wishes to gain MFN before Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, he commented, Bulgaria in fact had no emigration problem with a Jewish minority or other group. Such essentially minor differences as divided family cases could rapidly be resolved.
8. Gotsev noted (as had Mladenov) that the Bulgarians had taken a number of concrete steps suggested by the American side, such as the settlement of the claims of American bondholders, and there were none of the other obstacles that might stand in the way: no Bulgarian gold in the US, no unsatisfied claims, or other such issues. Yet the American side had made clear last year that it was not prepared at that time to move on MFN.3
9. The Ambassador noted that Romania and Hungary had qualified for MFN on the basis of existing legislation. He agreed with Gotsev that there were no specific intrinsic obstacles in the way of reaching agreement. Was Bulgaria prepared and interested to seek an MFN solution on the Hungarian pattern?4 The Ambassador noted that he was of course aware that after the Morse report, and the visit by Deputy Foreign Minister Tsvetkov and Gotsev himself to Washington last fall, there had been a distinct falling off of Bulgarian private expressions of interest in taking steps toward MFN. The Ambassador then stated that he wished to ask directly an undiplomatic question: had Bulgaria consulted with the Soviet Union in 1978 before hiring an American law firm to investigate MFN prospects, and before expressing the interest which Gotsev himself and other Bulgarian officials had expressed to the Ambassador with respect to the “Hungarian solution” and Bulgarian interest in MFN?
10. Gotsev replied that the expressions of interest in MFN were based on the judgment of the Bulgarian leadership that obtaining MFN status from the US, for economic and political reasons, would serve Bulgarian interests. At the same time, they wished to proceed discreetly and deliberately. While prepared to justify their interest, they did not want to display this interest and then have it rebuffed by the US, in front of the other Socialist countries. Gotsev emphasized that Bulgaria also could not [Page 265] appear to be taking the initiative in raising the issue, although in fact they had done so. He said specifically some version of what he termed “the Hungarian variant” was not rpt not out of the question. Gotsev then continued by commenting that the Bulgarian reading from the Ambassador’s own statements after his return from consultations in the fall of 1978, and their assessment based on the conversations (with Tsvetkov and himself) in Washington, as well as the Morse report suggested the time was not ripe to pursue the matter. Now, they hoped the changed international circumstances to which he had alluded might make it appropriate—if not immediately, at least in some time frame they could take into account in making their own decisions.
11. Gotsev also noted the importance of decisions taken in the course of developing the next five-year plan. He said that if some projects and investments could not be undertaken with American firms, or with other Western countries, they would have to depend on Soviet assistance. (While not specifically stated, Gotsev implied both that heavier reliance on Soviet economic assistance was for one or another reason less desired, and perhaps not always forthcoming.)
12. Gotsev remarked that the Bulgarians had very little to offer the US in a concrete way. They had already made a number of steps, and frankly had little left to bargain with. But the specific matters which the Ambassador had raised with Mladenov, for example, could all easily be taken care of. There were, however, those in the leadership who felt that without reciprocal moves or signs of a more forthcoming American view that the Bulgarian side had already made perhaps more concessions in advance that it should have. In addition to MFN, Gotsev (as had Mladenov) stressed the importance of higher level political contacts and higher level American visits to Bulgaria. While the Bulgarians certainly did not expect, for example, a visit by the American President at any time in the near future, they would hope to have cabinet-level visits—perhaps first the Secretary of Commerce, and in due course the Secretary of State. More immediately, they very much hoped that the US would respond to their repeated invitations and expressions of interest in early visits and regular consultations picking up from the Tsvetkov visit. They very much hoped that Assistant Secretary Vest could visit Bulgaria this year. In addition, the Foreign Minister—and not he alone—was well aware that he was the only Eastern European Foreign Minister who had not yet had the opportunity to meet with Secretary Vance.
13. As to other possibilities for an American sign of interest in developing closer relations, Gotsev remarked that the one concrete step which would have some symbolic as well as intrinsic value would be an increase in the Bulgarian fishing quota in American waters. He hoped that the Ambassador could bring back some good news in that [Page 266] respect. The Ambassador replied that he would certainly look into the possibility further, but reiterated—as he had to the Foreign Minister—that regrettably this was a matter beyond the decision of the State Department and quotas were determined in accordance with available supply, conservation needs, and specific reciprocal tradeoffs with other countries responsible for waters of interest to American fishermen. Gotsev indicated that he realized this fact, but he hoped that nonetheless perhaps something could be done—perhaps reducing slightly the quota reserved for American fishermen. The Ambassador noted that would present a domestic political problem of some size.
14. Gotsev stated that Mladenov had expressed satisfaction with his exchanges with the Ambassador on other (than bilateral) world developments. Specifically, he said that he “got the message” (sic) on (the American view of) the Macedonian issue. Gotsev stressed that Mladenov scarcely ever had such frank discussions with Ambassadors, and never with an American Ambassador. He had high confidence in the Ambassador. In response, the Ambassador replied that he always found interesting and useful such discussions with the Foreign Minister, and this comprehensive recent one in particular. He appreciated the Minister’s other comments, and believed they do indeed have good rapport and mutual understanding. Gotsev said that the Minister was looking forward to talking with the Ambassador after his return.
15. Comment: Foreign Minister Mladenov’s three-hour review of the development of Bulgarian-relations with the Ambassador, followed by the evidently orchestrated informal elucidation by Ambassador Gotsev, is a clear signal and request for an American response. Gotsev said explicitly what a Communist Foreign Minister (and Politburo member) could not say in such a direct and open way. They do not expect far-reaching or immediate American moves on such major issues as MFN, but they do want to know whether the United States is receptive to the Bulgarian interest in enhancing our relations. They indicated (Gotsev explicitly) that one reason for Bulgarian interest is to establish a more independent, though not necessarily less Soviet-aligned, and albeit still modest, Bulgarian role in world affairs.
16. As the Ambassador is returning imminently to Washington, he will give his personal comments and recommendations on the questions posed by the Bulgarians reported above and in the reftel during his consultations.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790248–0379. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Sent for information to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw.↩
- In telegram 1185 from Sofia, May 25, the Embassy reported on the bilateral discussions between Garthoff and Mladenov during their May 23 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790240–0793) In telegram 1187 from Sofia, May 25, the Embassy reported the international issues portion of their discussion, including SALT II, China, and the Middle East. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790240–0762). For the account in his memoirs, see Raymond Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War, pp. 319–321.↩
- See Document 89.↩
- PD–21 established the yardstick by which improved relations, including extension of MFN, would be either an independent foreign policy from the Soviet Union (i.e. Romania and Yugoslavia) or a policy of internal liberalization (the Hungarian model). See Document 16.↩