90. Memorandum From the Chief of the National Foreign Intelligence Center, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified]) to the Deputy Director of the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State (Gilmore)1
SUBJECT
- Could Bulgaria Go the Way of Romania? [classification not declassified]
Dear Harry,
1. The notion that Bulgaria might strike out on a course independent of the Soviet Union is a titillating one. Geographically separated from the USSR and with no Soviet troops stationed on its soil, the country would seem to be in a felicitous position to do so. One can further argue that, economically faring no better and receiving no greater economic help than Moscow’s other East European allies, Bulgaria would seem to have been ill-rewarded for its fealty to the USSR over the years. Its current disagreement with the USSR over the future direction of its economic development would be a motive for striking out on its own now. [classification not declassified]
2. A number of factors, nevertheless, argue that the Zhivkov regime would have less inclination to dispute the Soviets than had the three Balkan communist states who now shun Soviet hegemony. The Bulgarian leadership was placed in power by the Soviets; it did not assume power by virtue of its only military prowess (Albania & Yugoslavia), nor did it achieve power only after purging those leaders the Soviets imposed upon them (Romania). The Bulgarians have no latent territorial disputes with the USSR (Romania). To the contrary, Russia has usually been seen as a protector of the Bulgarian state against its traditional enemies (Romania, Turkey, Greece). The USSR is now probably viewed as its protector against the Serbs who—when viewed from Sofia—are probably seen as coveting Pirin Macedonia. [classification not declassified]
[Page 261]3. The advice the Soviets are giving the Bulgarians—to devote greater attention to agriculture and light industry—is good advice. And it may be recognized as good advice, even though it would not have been so seen in 1961 when it was offered to the Romanians. In the early 60s, we should recall, it was an article of ideological faith that every communist state should go through a process of forced industrialization comparable to that which the USSR went through. When the Soviets then counseled the Romanians not to seek all-round industrial development, they seemed to be saying that Romania should not aspire to the developed-nation status that the Soviets were willing to accord almost all the other states of Eastern Europe. Romania had a good raw materials and energy resources base, which must have made the advice seem all the more ill-intentioned. [classification not declassified]
4. Autarchic economic development has long since been recognized in Eastern Europe as a goal too expensive to be pursued. Bulgaria, with its poor resource base, must appreciate that it is among the least qualified to pursue it. Bulgaria has already attempted a speedy industrialization on the basis of Soviet support and of heavy borrowing in the West. It must now appreciate that there are limits to what the Soviets can, or should, be expected to do in support of Bulgarian industrialization, and it is deeply in hock to the West. In sum, the wellsprings of the Bulgarian drive for industrialization are probably not nearly as strong as those that impelled Romania into a confrontation with the Soviets in the early 1960s. [classification not declassified]
5. We must, finally, face up to the circumstance that it is the Bulgarians, not the Soviets, who are currently the demanders. Does it follow that, because the Soviets will not give the Bulgarians all they want, the Bulgarians will basically modify their policy on alliance with the USSR? Is there no chance that the Soviets will yet make concessions of the sort that have satisfied the Bulgarians before—e.g., the third metallurgical complex? To whom would the Bulgarians turn instead of the Soviets? Have they not done about as much as they can in terms of borrowing and trading with the West? Does it not make more sense that what we are witnessing is a negotiating process in which the Bulgarians are presenting maximum demands and are prepared to settle for considerably less? [classification not declassified]
6. This line of analysis, of course, places me in that group of American analysts “satisfied with the eternal status quo,” and I do not feel comfortable there. But as I survey the balance sheet of possible stimuli for Bulgaria’s standing pat or striking out on a more independent course, the bottom line favors the former, in my judgment. We must also remember, I think, that, as not all the peoples of the Balkans were dissatisfied with Ottoman rule, so it may just be that some now see [Page 262] their primary interests as being served through close alliance with the USSR.2 [classification not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 82T00150R, Production Case Files, Box 6, Folder 63, Could Bulgaria Go the Way of Romania?. Confidential. The salutation is handwritten. Telegram 555 from Bucharest, January 27, is attached but not printed. In the telegram, the Embassy reported on a meeting between the Deputy Chief of Mission and the French Counselor. The French diplomat, discussing the results of Brezhnev’s visit to Sofia, suggested that Bulgaria might be in position similar to early 1960s Romania, when increasing disagreements with Moscow over the direction and pace of development led Bucharest to distance itself from Soviet policies. The Embassy concluded that, if disagreements between Sofia and Moscow existed, they would be evident in Bulgarian policy toward the Balkans.↩
- In telegram 1244 from Sofia, June 4, the Embassy observed: “Bulgarian-Soviet relations lie at the heart of Bulgarian foreign—and internal—affairs.” The Embassy concluded: “close Bulgarian-Soviet relations stem from a very substantial congruence of perceived political and economic interests, ideological and personal leadership ties, all resting on a long tradition of historical and cultural association. The Bulgarian leaders establish their own internal and external policies based on Bulgarian interests as they see them—and in most cases they see such interests best served by close association with the Soviet Union and support of Soviet policies. This fact gives a greater strength to their cooperation and alliance than is true of the bilateral relations of most if not all of the other Soviet allies with the USSR.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790252–0784)↩