4. Executive Summary of a Paper Prepared by the Policy Review Committee1
Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC–9
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF EUROPEAN ISSUES
[Omitted here is discussion of U.S.-West European relations, NATO, economic issues, and East-West security issues (MBFR, SALT, and CSCE).]
V. Eastern Europe
This PRM response analyzes four possible options for US policy toward Eastern Europe:
A. Differentiate more sharply in favor of Eastern European countries which demonstrate greater foreign policy independence from Moscow. In effect this means increasing the preferential status of Romania at the expense of Poland, Hungary, and the others. Since there are limits to how much further we can go with Romania, and given the unlikely prospect that the others will soon show foreign policy independence, this option by itself could result in US immobilism toward Eastern Europe.
B. Be more forthcoming toward Eastern European countries that are relatively more liberal internally. In effect this option favors Poland and Hungary over Romania and the others. While this approach would be the clearest signal of our belief in human rights, it would inhibit our flexibility to pursue a close relationship with countries (e.g., Romania) which do not meet our human rights criteria but whose activities serve our interests in other ways.
C. Give preference to Eastern European countries that are either relatively liberal internally or relatively independent internationally, but limit our ties [Page 10] with those that are neither. This option widens the range of favored countries to all but Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Bulgaria. We would seek to “reward” the more liberal and independent countries and to encourage further development of those trends. With the three retrograde regimes, our aim would be to encourage liberalization and autonomy by holding out the carrot of an advantageous relationship with us; the problem is that U.S. leverage with them is minimal.
D. Abandon any implicit rank-ordering, and seek to expand contacts and relations across the board in Eastern Europe to the extent possible and feasible. This approach would seek to cut the link between certain basic US actions—e.g., the extension of most-favored-nation trade status and access to credits—and Eastern European behavior. It is based on the assumption that greater internal liberalization and foreign policy autonomy in Eastern Europe are more likely to come about as a result of increased contacts with the US than because we have made greater liberalization and/or autonomy preconditions for expanding contacts. This approach is designed to set a firm basis for increased US influence over Eastern European policies over the long term. But it is vulnerable to the criticism that we would be “rewarding” and “legitimizing” repressive regimes.
On two unique cases:
—Our bilateral objective with the GDR over the next few years should be to increase our presence, our contacts, and our knowledge. This should be done in a way which is consistent with our broader policy interests concerning the FRG, Berlin and European security.
—Towards Yugoslavia our primary objective should remain to encourage Yugoslavia’s continued independence of the Soviet Union and to give the Soviet Union no reason to think that armed intervention or a bid for predominant political influence would not have the gravest effect on East-West and US-Soviet relations. And we should continue to reserve all our options in response to such Soviet action.2
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 27, PRM–9 [1]. Secret. Sent to Brzezinski under a March 1 covering memorandum from Borg. On March 2, Michael Hornblow, Acting Staff Secretary of the National Security Council forwarded the paper to the members of the Policy Review Committee. (Ibid.) On March 4, Treverton sent Brzezinski a memorandum analyzing the study paper. Treverton wrote that the full report was “long and loose” but that some parts, “for instance the section of Eastern Europe—is quite good.” Referring specifically to the Eastern Europe section and the four alternatives proposed by the paper, Treverton argued that “the difficulty with much of the discussion, even the four broad alternative approaches, is that it is very political in character. There is, for instance, little mention of the looming problem of Eastern European debt with Western financial institutions. That would bear on our ability to implement any approach.” (Ibid.)↩
- Not included in the Executive Summary, but included in the larger body of the paper, is an analysis of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The paper concluded that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are important to U.S. foreign policy, that their mission is consistent with the Helsinki Agreements regarding free flow of information, and that the radios have become “considerably more effective in responding to the interests of listeners in recent years.” A larger study on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America was prepared by the Ford Administration and submitted to Congress by the Carter administration. See Document 45.↩