Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

3. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Special Activities Working Group¹

Washington, February 4, 1977

USSR AND EAST EUROPE

SYNOPSIS: The Agency’s covert action program against the USSR and Eastern Europe is intended to sustain pressure for liberalization of the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, and to lessen Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. It is designed to complement broader overt U.S. government programs such as the broadcasts of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe as well as the educational, cultural, technical and scientific exchange programs; plus a growing number of activities in the private sector—both in the U.S. and Europe.

The program’s objectives are pursued by supporting the dissidents in the USSR and EE, specifically in their struggle for elementary civil liberties. Owing to the inherent intolerance of the communist regimes to any form of dissent, this struggle—whether over freedom of religion or freedom to emigrate—is inevitably a political one.

The program promotes the free movement of information and ideas through the publication and internal distribution of books and periodicals containing information denied Soviet and East European Bloc citizens by their regimes. During 1976 some 170,000 books and periodicals were infiltrated into the USSR or handed to Soviet citizens abroad. An additional 145,000 books and periodicals reached Eastern Europe. These items range from samizdat (writings which could not be published in the USSR which are smuggled to the West, published and clandestinely re-infiltrated into the Soviet Union) to translations of Western authors. They deal with a wide range of politically important subjects such as recent history (including the historical ‘fiction’ of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn), non-Marxist economics and sociology, as well as literary works.

The program also seeks to support the dissidents fighting for human rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe by generating publicity for their cause, and by exposing and protesting human rights violations in these countries. The dissidents themselves are unanimous that such publicity is essential to their survival. Examples of such activity in 1976 include publicity efforts conducted in support of Soviet dissenters Vladimir Bukovskiy, Yuriy Orlov (chairman of a small committee organized to monitor Soviet compliance with the CSCE accords) and Andrey Tverdokhlebov, the imprisoned secretary of the Moscow chapter of Amnesty International.

The eight activities which comprise the program are mutually supporting and inter-related. These are:

• 1. A book and periodical distribution activity which distributes proscribed literature (primarily in Russian and the Eastern European languages) to Soviet and Eastern European citizens, either in the West (to visiting diplomats, trade delegations, cultural groups, tourists, etc.) or in the East (where they are smuggled in by tourists or sent to exchange students and other resident Westerners who then pass them along to target personalities). (FY 77 $1,200,000)
• 2. A literary advisory activity which uses specialists in Russian literature to select materials meriting publication for subsequent distribution in the Soviet Union, and publish them through one of several proprietary outlets. Some 10–12 books in Russian and Polish are published annually. (FY 77 $250,000)
• 3. A Russian language newspaper published in Paris which seeks to support and stimulate dissidence among Soviet intellectuals. (FY 77 $350,000)
• 4. A human rights activity which uses a small number of activists in Western Europe to publicize Soviet and Eastern European abuses of human rights. (FY 77 $105,000)
• 5. A Russian emigre organization (National Alliance of Solidarists—NTS) which engages in procurement, publication and clandestine distribution of literature and socio-political commentary in the Russian language, and in some political activity in the USSR. (FY 77 $200,000)
• 6. A Czech-language quarterly magazine aimed at Czechoslovak intellectual dissidents. (FY 77 $125,000)
• 7. A literary institute in France which publishes a monthly Polish language magazine and selected books directed at Polish intellectuals and youth. (FY 77 $115,000)
• 8. A Ukrainian emigre group which in addition to promoting the cause of Ukrainian national identity, seeks to encourage the many national minority groups to unite with the Russian dissidents in their struggle for national and cultural identity. (FY 77 $245,000)

POLICY:

This program is consistent with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in recent years.

GAINS:

—The dissident movement in the USSR, whose prospects were viewed with considerable pessimism by many observers as recently as a year ago, has shown remarkable tenacity and vitality. The activity of dissidents fighting for greater civil liberties in Poland and Czechoslovakia, has greatly increased in the past year. Testimony is available from internal dissidents and from recent emigres interviewed in the West that the operations which publish and distribute literature and periodicals are effective in terms of reaching their targets and sustaining the existence and growth of democratic movements in the countries involved.

—Prominent dissidents such as Leonid Plyushch, Andrey Amalrik and Vladimir Bukovskiy who have been expelled or allowed to emigrate in the past year have been active and effective in dramatizing the situation of their fellow dissidents in the USSR, and in generating publicity and mobilizing public support in the West for the cause of human rights in the USSR and Eastern Europe. This activity, especially when done by professed Marxists such as Plyushch or the Czech emigre Jiri Pelikan has been a factor contributing to the strong stance taken by the French and Italian communist parties for the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

RISKS:

—The growth of dissidence in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, could reach crisis proportions insoluble by the regime and intolerable to the USSR. It has been argued that this could lead to Soviet intervention and repression. If such a crisis occurs, we believe it will be primarily owing to grave economic and other factors little affected by our covert action program to support human rights.

—Many of these operations are “covert” action in name only. U.S. Government, and indeed CIA, support for the instruments involved is widely known to or suspected by friend and foe alike. Nevertheless, cover mechanisms of private sponsorship are necessary fig leaves which permit other Western governments to tolerate the activity of these instruments on their soil. Accusations of CIA sponsorship have often been made by the East and have had a negligible effect on the effectiveness of the operations. Official U.S. Government acknowledgement of such sponsorship or authoritative leaks, however, would be embarrassing to our Western European allies and could well force dismantling of some of the publishing and distribution operations.

—The impact of these operations on bilateral relations between the U.S. and the USSR is negligible. As noted, the USSR already knows about most of them. More important, ideological warfare is consistent with the Soviet Union’s perception of detente.

—Operational activity intended to coordinate and sustain publicity and protests on human rights violations is much more discreet and selective. In this area, exposure of the role played by CIA assets could involve the loss of support from some segments of the Western public.

—Some of the publications and human rights publicity generated in West Europe filter back to the United States and are picked up by U.S. media. We see no impropriety here, since no false propaganda or deception is involved.

COSTS:

—The total budget for FY 1977 is $2,650,000. Of this amount, book distribution receives over [number not declassified] of the budget. Publishing accounts for approximately [number not declassified], and human rights publicity approximately [number not declassified]. In terms of targeting, approximately [number not declassified] of the funds go to the operations against the USSR, with the remaining [number not declassified] directed primarily to the Czech and Polish operations.

—In the past few years there has been a reduction in the resources available to this program (in FY 1974 the budget for essentially the same operations was almost $4,000,000). Despite cost economies, inflation is taking an inevitable toll on the level of activity possible on a fixed budget.

ALTERNATIVES:

—Some of the book distribution effort could be funded and administered openly by the U.S. Government, perhaps in the same manner as the radios. That should work well in the United States, and could be tried on a pilot basis to supplement the existing covert program. However, it would probably not be possible to continue or adequately replace the present covert distribution mechanism in Europe, which involves discreet contact with Soviet, EE, and foreign nationals, and the contravention of customs regulations in the East.

—The periodicals in Czech and Ukrainian which we publish or subsidize could receive overt U.S. Government funding. In such a case, the Ukrainian and Czech magazines could move to the U.S. if necessary, and would probably continue to be effective. The Polish journal and the Russian newspaper cannot be moved from [less than 1 line not declassified], and it is doubtful that they would be permitted to continue operation in [less than 1 line not declassified] if U.S. proprietorship were acknowledged.

—Activity to stimulate and coordinate publicity and protests of human rights violations could be left to the initiative of private organizations and individuals, but we believe this would involve a significant loss of momentum and continuity.

—There is no likely alternative U.S. funding for [less than 1 line not declassified]. If our covert subsidy was terminated, [less than 1 line not declassified] would survive on a reduced scale but its operational effectiveness would be greatly impaired.

CONSEQUENCE OF TERMINATION:

—Termination of the entire program would have a negative effect on the prospects and morale of the dissident movements in the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. It would probably be interpreted by the dissidents and by the regimes as a U.S. policy decision to subordinate support for human rights in those countries to bilateral policy considerations.

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–022, SCC Meetings 1977–78, SCC (i) 24 February 1977. Secret; Sensitive. The date is handwritten. Hoskinson forwarded the paper, which was prepared at the request of the Special Activities Working Group, to Brzezinski under a February 21 covering memorandum at Tab E of Brzezinski’s briefing book for the February 24 SCC meeting.