300. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State1
9712. Department for Under Secretary Newsom and Assistant Secretary Vest. OSD/ISA for Assistant Secretary McGiffert. Subj: Contingency Planning for Yugoslavia in the Event of Soviet Intervention in Poland.
1. (S) Entire text.
2. In the event of Soviet military intervention in Poland and the inevitable European security crisis this would generate, the Yugoslav leadership—although seeking to avoid “provoking” Moscow—will nevertheless welcome assurances of Western, specifically US, support. They may also seek concrete assistance in the economic and/or military area. This message outlines, in the event of Soviet intervention in Poland, what our objectives should be in dealing with the Yugoslavs; and what we may anticipate the GOY may ask of us. Circumstances will of course govern what they and we say and do, but these initial thoughts are provided as a basis for Department planning.
3. U.S. objectives: Our actions should reassure the Yugoslav leaders that we are prepared to support them—within reason—should they wish it; and provide early warning to the Soviets, lest in the turmoil and fear generated by intervention in Poland they be tempted—unlikely as that may be—to regard post-Tito Yugoslavia as equally beyond the reach of Western assistance.
4. Where we could relatively easily predict how Tito would react to a Polish invasion, we are less certain about the new leadership. They will be wholeheartedly opposed to the Soviet move, but they will also be scared and, initially at least, very cautious. A firm indication of support from the US, early on, could have an immediate steadying effect, and over the longer run, could influence GOY attitudes toward the US. In any event, how they react will influence what we do. We may find some actions on our part advisable before we have a chance to consult with them. But consultations should take place promptly. If 1968 is any guide, even if we do not make the first approach the GOY may. In our opinion, making the first move ourselves would be smart—letting the pace thereafter be partly set by the Yugoslavs but [Page 990] with us in a position, if need be, to hold their expectations within limits of the possible.
5. Unilateral steps which we ought to consider include:
—A restatement by the Carter administration, at no lower level than the Secretary of State, of US support for Yugoslavia’s independence, territorial integrity, and unity;
—A statement confirming continuity in this policy from a senior figure in the incoming Reagan administration, preferably Mr. Bush or the President-elect himself, but at no lower level than the Secretary-designate;
—A similar statement in the NATO context, by SYG Luns, might also be wise, particularly as a warning to the Soviets. But in Yugoslav eyes it would probably be regarded as more “provocative” than bilateral statements by Western powers.
6. Our statements should be measured, not too strident. We must not be seen to be contributing to heightened uncertainty about Yugoslavia’s future. A simple, straightforward reiteration of US support in the usual formulation, if made at the right moment and in a broader context, should accomplish our objective.
7. Joint steps: We may well find the Yugoslavs receptive to a visit by a senior US official (whether the President-elect should be represented in some way is beyond our ken). Such a visit would be described (properly) as consultations. The US visitor should neither be seen as a prelude to a US effort to “envelope” the Yugoslavs, nor should his presence be construed by the Yugoslavs as presaging a USG blank check. Some initial thoughts follow on what might be on the agenda during such consultations:
—An exchange of views on the situation in Europe, Soviet intentions, Western reactions, etc.
—In this context, we might offer to establish a joint exchange of intelligence with the GOY on the situation in Poland and Eastern Europe.
—The Yugoslav military may well seek to use the occasion to obtain further support, i.e., a speed-up of delivery of items already in the pipeline or under negotiation and/or more forthcoming responses to requests for state-of-the-art weapons and equipment. (Para 7 below describes what they could be looking for.)
—If a crisis in Poland occurs before the current balance of payments loan negotiations are completed, the GOY would wish to lock those resources in as fast as possible and might again approach us for assistance in this regard.
—It is also possible, depending on the circumstances, that the GOY, aware of the Polish request for substantial direct economic assistance [Page 991] from the US and also aware that this has not been publicly rejected in Washington, might also make a similar pitch. What we can do under existing legislation is sharply limited. What the Yugoslavs might ask of us could exceed those limits, but we should not be surprised should they approach us. Any Yugoslav request for direct financial assistance might be tied, directly or indirectly, to their military needs. For example, GOY hesitancy about FMS credits for military purchases might vanish.
8. The following is a list of US weapons, equipment and training that would most likely be found on a Yugoslav wish list. Rank order does not imply order of priority:
A) AN/TPS–63 radars. An FMS contract was signed earlier this year for the purchase of eight AN/TPS–63 radars. Delivery is currently scheduled to commence in June 1982. The Yugoslavs could seek earlier delivery.
B) F–5 aircraft. The Yugoslavs have expressed considerable interest in this aircraft. They would quite possibly ask the USAF to train pilots in the F–5, even though it is not yet in the YAF inventory. They might also propose to purchase a number of the planes.
C) TOW/Dragon. The US Army is currently preparing FMS cases for small quantities of TOW/Dragons to use for training purposes. The GOY might ask for accelerated delivery of these anti-tank weapons and additional urgent training.
D) Reconnaissance/EW equipment. Commercial contracts are currently being prepared for surveillance and countermeasures equipment. The Yugoslavs might seek accelerated delivery.
E) Mark–46 torpedoes. LOA’s for the Mark–46 have been delivered. The Yugoslavs might seek to accelerate acquisition.
F) Another priority would probably be AGM–65 A/B Maverick, 150 of which the GOY is seeking to buy. Congressional notification is being prepared. They might well seek to accelerate the acquisition process.
9. The GOY may also push us for some thing we have so far refused (Harpoon). We would, in the abstract, see no reason to reverse previous denials.
10. Deployment of units of the US Sixth Fleet for operations in the Adriatic and/or a highly visible ship visit should be considered as an option to demonstrate US strength and purpose. However, the GOY might find these in the “provocative” category and we should therefore not undertake such deployment without careful consideration of the pros and cons. The ship visit would require consultations; an operational deployment should at least be informally discussed with the Yugoslavs in advance unless there are overriding operational reasons not to do so.
[Page 992]11. The above is not an inclusive list—there may be other steps worth thinking about. The point is, we ought to have thought through, to the extent we can, how in the event of catastrophe in Poland we should deal with the one country in the area most likely to be shaken and most likely to be looking for reassurance—and one country where what we say (and are ultimately prepared to do) can make a difference.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800576–1044. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to DOD/OSD/ISA, USNATO, USDOCOSOUTH Naples, USCINCEUR, USCINUSAFE, and USNMRSHAPE. The telegram was sent at a time when the domestic situation in Poland was deteriorating fast and a Soviet invasion of Poland seemed imminent. See Document 42.↩