298. Letter From President Carter to Yugoslav President Mijatovic1
During my visit to Belgrade in June we agreed that it would be useful to continue the practice President Tito and I had of writing to one another on subjects of common concern. I would like to start the exchange with you by raising two issues of great importance for the further development of East-West relations: Afghanistan, and the deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in Europe. Both of these issues affect the interests not only of the countries directly involved, but of every country in the world.
Mr. President, I know of your own deep concern over the Afghan situation, and I appreciate Yugoslavia’s independent efforts among the nonaligned nations and hope they will continue. We support the diplomatic efforts of the Islamic Conference Committee on Afghanistan as the most productive approach to pursue at the moment, and will be urging our friends and allies to exert continued pressure on Moscow during this critical post-Olympic period.
I see little ground for optimism about the situation in Afghanistan. The June 22 announcement of limited Soviet troop withdrawals appears to have been simply an attempt to mislead. The Soviets redeployed across their border a relatively small number of troops unsuited to the type of military operations now being conducted in Afghanistan. The overall effect of these troop movements has been to increase the effectiveness of the Soviet combat presence in Afghanistan. The reorganized Soviet forces are being used ruthlessly to put down the Afghan national resistance.
Meanwhile, the Soviets continue to block any efforts to discuss a political settlement by insisting on preconditions that would legitimize the invasion and the present regime in Kabul and that would leave open the central question of withdrawal. This Soviet recalcitrance is [Page 983] as unacceptable to us as it is to our allies, to the Islamic Conference and to most genuinely nonaligned countries. Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard have told us that the Soviets have been equally inflexible on Afghanistan in dealing with them.
We continue to believe it is possible that the combination of continued international pressure and strong Afghan resistance may lead the Soviets to conclude that a peaceful settlement based on complete withdrawal is in their interest.
Yugoslavia has, quite understandably, taken a deep interest in the issue of the deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces. I do not need to recount the history of this issue, but I do want to inform you of the latest developments in our efforts to initiate discussions on long-range theater nuclear forces with the Soviet Union. Until recently, the Soviets had refused to engage even in preliminary exchanges and instead insisted that NATO should first revoke or suspend its TNF modernization decision taken last December. However, on July 10, the Soviets indicated to us that they had dropped this unacceptable precondition, and we are now preparing to engage in serious preliminary discussions. While it is premature to conclude that the apparent new Soviet willingness to discuss the issue indicates a genuine interest in arms control measures involving TNF and based on the principle of equality, we welcome the opportunity to sit down and discuss the issue.
Mr. President, the United States attaches great significance to the preservation of the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. We want to see a politically stable and economically prosperous Yugoslavia—one that will continue to play an important role internationally and within the Nonaligned Movement—and, as I stressed during our meetings in June, we stand ready to do what we can to help Yugoslavia achieve this goal. I discussed the Yugoslav balance of payments situation with Secretary Miller shortly after my return from Europe, and he and the Vice President subsequently met with Federal Secretary Kostic in Washington.2 We hope that our efforts [Page 984] with the U.S. banking community on your behalf will help you to meet your immediate financial needs.
In closing, I would like to express once again my deep satisfaction with the substance and the atmosphere of my recent visit to Belgrade. I feel the visit significantly contributed to the strengthening of bilateral relations, and I look forward to working closely with you in the months ahead to further deepen cooperation between our two countries.3
Sincerely,
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Yugoslavia: President Cvijetin Mijatovic, 5–9/80. No classification marking. Brzezinski forwarded the letter, based on a draft provided by the Department of State, to Carter on August 8. (Ibid.) According to the log sheet, Carter signed the letter on August 20. The Department instructed the Embassy in Belgrade to deliver the text of the letter to the Office of the President as early as possible. (Telegram 225967 to Belgrade, August 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800405–1287) Eagleburger delivered the letter to Acting Foreign Minister Pesic on August 27. (Telegram 6709 from Belgrade, August 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800409–0651)↩
- At Mondale’s request, no memorandum of conversation was prepared for the meeting with Kostic. In telegram 188947 to Belgrade, July 18, the Department reported that Larrabee described the meeting as mostly symbolic and that Mondale assured Kostic of U.S. Government willingness to help where possible. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800345–0666) Miller’s July 15 conversation with Kostic was reported to the Embassy in Belgrade on July 22. The discussion focused on the tactics that the Yugoslav Government might employ to reconcile its desire for a series of bilateral agreements with Western governments with the suggestion of Chase Manhattan Bank that they proceed with a worldwide syndication loan. Miller stressed that he did not have any authority to direct private banks to do anything, and recommended that the Yugoslav Government proceed with bilateral agreements in those countries that are willing to do so and accept a worldwide syndication for the rest. (Telegram 192951 to Belgrade, July 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800350–1032) See also footnotes 4 and 5, Document 288, and footnote 6, Document 292.↩
- In a meeting with Vest on October 17, Loncar delivered Mijatovic’s response to Carter’s letter. Mijatovic discussed Yugoslavia’s economic stabilization program, stressing the Yugoslav Government’s hope for continued administration support on the matter. He also addressed the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, CSCE, and the UN Special Session of the General Assembly on Development. When delivering the letter, Loncar stressed the Yugoslav desire to continue the letter exchanges between the two Presidents. (Telegram 280104 to Belgrade, October 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800501–0534)↩