297. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Military Supply Relationship with Yugoslavia
Attached at Tab A2 is Harold Brown’s response to your memo of July 7 which noted the dissatisfaction with the military supply relationship expressed by Defense Minister Ljubicic to the President during his trip to Belgrade3 and asked Brown for a status report of where we stand. In the memo Brown argues that progress in our military relationship over the last year has been “significant and solid” and suggests that the main problem is the inability of the Yugoslavs to pay for the equipment they want. He also notes that DoD is at work on a package to provide the Yugoslavs with weapons in case of an “emergency” (i.e., Soviet threat). (S)
Brown’s memo gives the impression all is well and that we basically have little to worry about. This is not exactly the case. According to Ambassador Eagleburger, who participated in the discussions at the Joint Committee meeting in June,4 the question of the training samples has become a political issue for the Yugoslavs, especially for Ljubicic (hence his remarks to the President). The main problem has been the question of leasing. DoD had originally offered to lease the Yugoslavs the training samples for a period of 90–180 days (because DoD feared that a longer lease would involve legal and legislative problems) and then simply to renew the lease. However, the Yugoslavs have been unhappy with this arrangement. They want assurances of continuity and they see DoD’s unwillingness to enter into a long-term lease as a weakening of US support for Yugoslavia. However, the Congress has been just as adamant in its belief that leasing should not be used to avoid congressional oversight of controversial sales, and the FY 82 [Page 981] foreign assistance bill contains a provision that will tighten leasing procedures. DoD is currently looking into ways to get around this problem and now feels that it can offer a 2–3 year lease for support equipment plus 5 TOW launchers that the Yugoslavs want. This would help to alleviate Yugoslav concerns somewhat—although probably not entirely. (S)
A second problem is the question of crisis support. At the Joint Committee meeting in June there was an implicit assumption on the part of the Yugoslavs that we would supply them with the weapons they need in case of emergency. DoD is currently working on a paper which will outline what we would be willing to offer the Yugoslavs—and in what quantities—in case of an emergency. This paper will be coordinated with the NSC and State and will be presented for discussion and approval at an upcoming MBB. The paper should be ready sometime next week. Once the paper has been approved, DoD proposes that General Bowman, our military representative to the Quad, and Bill Perry go to Belgrade in October to discuss with the Yugoslavs their requirements. (TS)
Personally, I think this strategy makes sense. It would give the Yugoslavs a sense of increased confidence that we are serious about our willingness to support them without formally committing us to anything. However, it would take us another step down the road in our military supply relationship, and before we agreed to commit ourselves to supplying the Yugoslavs with major quantities of weapons in an emergency we would have to consult with Congress.5 (S)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, Yugoslavia: 6/80–1/81. Top Secret. Sent for information. Kimmitt concurred with the recommendations. A copy was sent to Madeleine Albright.↩
- Attached at Tab A is a July 19 memorandum from Brown to Brzezinski.↩
- Telegram 5272 from Belgrade, July 3, reported Eagleburger’s conversation with Vujatovic, and also referenced the comments made by Ljubicic to Carter at the June 24 State dinner. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800320–0566)↩
- In telegram 4906 from Belgrade, June 19, Eagleburger summarized the discussions at the U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Military Committee meeting in Belgrade June 17–18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870123–0429)↩
- On July 29, Brzezinski wrote at the top of the memorandum “Next concrete steps?” Larrabee replied on July 31, stating that the next concrete step was discussing the paper the Department of Defense was preparing on weapons systems the United States would be willing to provide to Yugoslavia in case of an emergency. Following approval of the paper, a U.S. delegation would be sent to Belgrade to discuss Yugoslav requirements. Larrabee also stated that the NSC would “continue to monitor Defense-State deliberations on the issue of long-term leases of US military items.” According to a notation on Larrabee’s memorandum, Brzezinski saw it on August 1. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 87, Yugoslavia: 6/80–1/81)↩