256. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State1
5561. Subj: Tito and Harriman Meeting.2
1. Governor Harriman, accompanied by Ambassador Eagleburger, was received July 28 by President Tito at his private retreat on the island of Vanga. Following an hour and fifteen minute conversation between the Governor and the President, attended by Ambassador Eagleburger and Tito’s Chef d’Cabinet Bauderina, President Tito hosted a luncheon for the Governor and Mrs. Harriman, attended by Ambassador and Mrs. Eagleburger, Mr. Bauderina and a few other Yugoslav guests.
2. During the meeting preceding lunch the discussion included nonalignment, Soviet-US relations, China, and US-Yugoslav relations. Highlights of the conversation on each of these subjects follows:
3. Nonalignment. Governor Harriman complimented President Tito on his speech to the NAM conference,3 saying it showed what “real nonalignment is,” and asked for the President’s evaluation of the current state of the NAM, and Cuba’s role therein. President Tito said that the nonaligned are now faced with efforts to dilute the concept of nonalignment as established in 1961. The Cubans will be nominally at the head of the movement for the three years following the Havana Summit and Yugoslavia is working hard now to assure that Castro will not “dominate” the NAM during that period. He asked rhetorically [Page 842] “where was Cuba in 1961 when we began things?” and added that the effort by “some” to turn the NAM into a “third factor between the blocs, but supporting one bloc, could only make the world situation worse.” Yugoslavia did not intend to let that happen. Tito went on to say that Castro will not succeed in his attempts to split the movement into what Cuba describes as “progressive” and “reactionary” factions, and that Yugoslavia had strong allies in its battle against Castro’s attempts to take over the movement. These allies, he said, include Algeria, Tanzania, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Zambia, and “many others.” “We are not afraid,” he said, “and we are ready to do battle.”
4. In response to a Harriman question on Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa, Tito said that “some intervention” in African affairs may be a necessary evil, given the current state of relations on the continent. But no African country will let its policies be changed by the presence of foreign elements within the country. President Tito noted that he was particularly pleased that in the speeches given at the opening session of the NAM Conference this week in response to his address, the spokesmen from each of the four continents went out of their way to stress the need for NAM unity and to pay tribute to Yugoslavia for its leading role within the movement.
5. US-Soviet relations. Governor Harriman noted that US-Soviet relations had deteriorated in the period since the Governor had seen President Tito in Washington last March. The Governor said he wanted to reassure President Tito, however, that President Carter remains firmly committed to both SALT and a CTB. He added that Secretary Vance has developed a very good relationship of mutual confidence with Foreign Minister Gromyko and that he believes that this personal relationship will be a great asset in the months ahead. He went on to explain to President Tito the severe impact that the Shcharanskiy trial4 has had on Congress and public opinion in the United States and that as a consequence the President’s room for maneuver would continue severely restricted in the absence of some conciliatory move on the part of the Soviets. The Governor asked whether President Tito saw any way for the US and the Soviets to move to free themselves from their present difficulties.
5. President Tito replied that he had heard that there was a possibility of an exchange of the two Soviet spies arrested in New York for Shcharanskiy, and that if this exchange went forward it might at least serve to remove the case as a cause celebre. Governor Harriman said [Page 843] that he also understood that such an exchange might be a possibility but did not know whether it would in fact take place.
6. President Tito said “I continue to hope that the United States is ready to put the issue of human rights in its proper perspective and emphasize attempts to resolve the main issues that exist between the US and the USSR. That is the impression I got from President Carter when I visited Washington, and I hope it is still his intention.” Governor Harriman commented that the Shcharanskiy case—a direct Soviet provocation and personal insult to the President—has deeply provoked the American public. Did President Tito have any suggestions on how we might proceed now, given the impact of the Shcharanskiy case? Tito said that the United States must understand that Soviet prestige is intimately involved in the Shcharanskiy and Ginzburg cases.5 The Soviets are intent upon showing the US and the dissidents that the latter cannot be “used” in discussions of other issues. The Soviets are doing this for both internal and international reasons. They have decided to be “more determined” in their opposition to the United States; they intend to show that the Soviets will not, when pushed on the issue of dissidents, retreat. They mean to demonstrate to the United States that it must stay out of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.
7. Governor Harriman pointed out that despite the differences over human rights the Soviets continue to be ready to negotiate on SALT and have for the first time put forth a constructive MBFR proposal. Moscow is, in other words, indicating its desire to move ahead in the area of arms control, which is of interest to both countries. This is true, said Tito, but Moscow considers US involvement with the dissidents as interference in its internal affairs and will not accept it. Shcharanskiy, Ginzburg, and the other dissidents are, so far as Moscow is concerned, citizens of the Soviet Union, and only they can decide the manner in which they will be judged under their laws. “Personally I feel that the Soviets are not unrealistic in their view that no one can play in their internal affairs. Frankly, the administration’s most serious mistake was to have put such extreme emphasis on human rights at the Belgrade Conference” (CSCE). Every large country, said Tito, will always insist that it has the right to decide its own affairs. So far as US public opinion is concerned, Moscow believes that has always been anti-Soviet and therefore changes in degree are unimportant. The Soviets are not particularly impressed with administration arguments about its public opinion problems.
[Page 844]8. Governor Harriman said that President Carter has consistently and recently made it clear that neither he nor the United States Government wants to intervene in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. But, with regard to the Shcharanskiy case, there is no way that the administration can change its present position. The Soviets need to make some gesture.
9. President Tito returned again to his reference to the Belgrade. CSCE, saying that the administration’s initial approach to human rights was “unfortunate.” Washington failed to recognize that the Belgrade CSCE was to address issues of European security; those security issues should have been the focus, rather than the overwhelming emphasis on human rights. Tito said there is no question that human rights are important, but there should be some “balance.”
10. What is needed now, Tito said, is to find some way to “freeze the controversy” so that the US and the USSR can devote themselves to basic issues. Perhaps the administration, while continuing to maintain the importance of human rights, could emphasize the need to resolve basic differences between the two countries that affect the possibilities for peace.
11. China. Governor Harriman recalled that President Tito had once told him that the Chinese had called him a “revisionist bandit,” but relations now have greatly changed. He asked for the President’s view of China. Tito said he had some impressions from his recent visit to Peking, and would know more following Hua Kuo-feng’s visit to Yugoslavia in August. He indicated that as far as he was concerned there is no question that the new Chinese leadership is actively searching for ways to open itself to the world; they know they cannot develop without contact with the outside; they are a poor country and greatly in need of technological and industrial development and vast improvement in their agricultural situation. They are interested in Western technology to make up for their backwardness; additionally, they are intent upon creating a modern army since they recognize that numbers are no longer the “essential factor.” “The Chinese want—and they are absolutely right—maximum security. And they want to know the world better.”
12. Tito said that during his visit to Peking he had reproached the Chinese leadership with regard to their policy in Africa. He said that the PRC was so intensely anti-Soviet that it was prepared to support whatever African regime found itself threatened by the USSR or allies of the USSR. This is, said Tito, “unprincipled.” But at the same time he recognized that it was inevitable, since Peking views the USSR as its “first and main enemy.”
13. President Tito said that he would hold extensive talks with Hua Kuo-feng when the latter is in Belgrade. The Chinese have indi[Page 845]cated they are interested in studying Yugoslavia’s agricultural system, its industrial development and its system of self management. The Chinese may try to introduce at least some aspects of the self management system in an attempt to stimulate production.
14. Governor Harriman noted that he was sure that any thoughts President Tito might have on China following the August Hua Kuo-feng visit would be of great interest to President Carter. He hoped the President would pass anything of interest on to Washington. Tito replied that he would do so “gladly.”
15. US-Yugoslav relations. Governor Harriman said that it was his impression that our bilateral relations were at a new high point. President Tito said that was correct; they are very good and improving every day. President of the National Assembly Markovic had reported to him on his recent visit to the United States, and had indicated his great satisfaction with it.6 There are no major problems between our two countries and many small matters have also been settled. There are a few small issues (unspecified) still between us, but they are of no significance. Tito said that he had a very good impression of President Carter when he met with him. He recognizes that President Carter had initial problems with the Congress but considers him “a sincere, honest, devoted leader who wants to accomplish much.”
16. The President then said: “The United States must understand that if we sometimes are critical it is only because we mean the US well. We have learned to live together as friends despite the fact that one or the other may be critical on occasion. With some other countries, however, where on its face it appears that Yugoslavia has very good relations, it is a fact that in reality the relations are not good. And you know who I mean.” (This is obviously a reference to the Soviet Union.)
17. Tito recalled that in his first meeting with Governor Harriman when the latter was Ambassador in Moscow during the war, the Governor had told him of Stalin’s highly critical anti-Tito remarks. Tito said it is an interesting fact that whenever Stalin dealt with him, he was kind, he made a great fuss, etc. But he (Tito) knew the true reality. [Page 846] Governor Harriman replied that Stalin was a very insincere man. “You, Mr. President, were the first to expose him and that destroyed his ambitions for domination of the World Communist Movement.” Tito replied “Absolutely. Had we not said ‘no’ to him when we did, other difficulties would have arisen for us and the rest of the world, and God knows where we would now be.”
18. Governor Harriman then asked President Tito about his relations with Chairman Brezhnev. Tito replied that they were very good, “but I think many things are being done to us despite him.”
19. In reply to an observation by Governor Harriman that it was his feeling that Brezhnev appeared to be in the middle of opposing forces within the Politburo and not strong enough to contain them, Tito replied that that was his belief as well. Tito said that he believes Brezhnev to be well intentioned but clearly weakened by ill health. Suslov is the force that is difficult for Brezhnev to control.
20. Comment: It was Governor Harriman’s impression that, in comparison with the last meeting between the two in Washington in March, President Tito had deteriorated substantially in alertness and vitality. (This is a view that Ambassador Eagleburger shares from his own observation of President Tito during the March visit to Washington.) This was most evident in the early stages of the discussion, but the President became more animated as the conversation proceeded. In fact, at one point when Bauderina attempted to break off the discussion so that the participants could go to lunch, Tito remarked, “Not yet, I still have more I want to talk about.”
21. As the lunch began Tito was, again, quiet and detached. But as the conversation turned to reminiscences he showed an increasingly lively interest and a keen sense of humor.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780312–0778. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Eagleburger. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Under Secretary of State for Management (1967–1984), Lot 84D204, Box 9, Ambassador Outgoing Cable Chron, April–August, 1978)↩
- Harriman also met with Vrhovec to discuss the Non-Aligned Movement (telegram 5557 from Belgrade, July 29; National Archives, Central Foreign Policy File, D780312–0204) and the status of US-Yugoslav bilateral relations. (Telegram 5696 from Belgrade, August 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780319–0299)↩
- The Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned countries met in Belgrade July 26–30. In a July 21 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski recommended that the President sign a message to Vrhovec, who served as Chairman of the Conference. The message had been privately requested by the Yugoslavs earlier, to “strengthen the hand of the moderates in dealing with the Cubans and their friends during the meeting.” Brzezinski suggested that, while the message might not have much of an impact on the outcome of the meeting, it would “reinforce our position that we believe the Non-aligned [Movement] can be a constructive force in world affairs.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 4–12/78) Carter approved the message. (Ibid.) The message was transmitted to Eagleburger on July 24 in telegram 185993 to Belgrade. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780302–1013)↩
- Anatoly Borisovich Shcharansky, human rights activist and spokesman for the Moscow Helsinki Group was considered one of the founders of the Refusnik movement in the Soviet Union. In 1977, he was arrested on charges of spying for the United States and sentenced to 13 years in a labor camp. Released in 1986, he emigrated to Israel.↩
- Vitaly Lazarevich Ginzburg, Soviet journalist, author, and human rights activist. He was imprisoned several times in the 1960s and released and expelled from the Soviet Union in 1979.↩
- On July 19, Mondale met at the White House with Dragoslav Markovic, President of the Yugoslav Assembly, who led a delegation of Yugoslav Assembly members to meet with U.S. Government and legislative officials in Washington. Markovic and Mondale discussed the state of U.S.-Yugoslav relations. Carter briefly stopped by to greet the delegation. The Department informed the Embassy of the discussion in telegram 192091 to Belgrade, July 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780312–0046) Prior to the Mondale-Markovic meeting, Vance, joined by Harriman and Vest, met with the Djuranovic and Vrhovec in New York on May 25 to discuss the Non-Aligned Movement and exchange views on the state of the international system. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Nodis MemCons, 1978)↩