255. Editorial Note
On March 9, 1978, President Jimmy Carter and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito met again from 9:34 to 11:04 a.m. in the White House Cabinet Room. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) This time Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also joined the U.S. delegation, while Vice President Walter Mondale was absent. No transcript of the conversation has been found in U.S. archives. The Yugoslav Government prepared its own memorandum of conversation, available in the Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Serbia. A copy of the document and its translation are available in the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (CWIHP). The excerpts below are taken from the CWIHP translation.
Noting that the March 8 discussion between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milos Minic was successful, Carter suggested continuing their discussion of international issues, unless President Tito felt it necessary to clarify some of the remaining bilateral issues. Tito replied: “I would like to talk about the issues of détente as one of the key issues in the relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.” “I have been convinced,” Tito stated, “that you are making efforts from your side toward détente.” Noting that more trust was necessary to improve the relationship between the two superpowers, Tito assured Carter that he would “report to Brezhnev the general impression I got from you about the issues of international problems and détente, including my opinion that it would be necessary for the two of you to meet and have a dialogue among yourselves.” Informing Tito of the outstanding invitation to the White House he had extended to Brezhnev, Carter added: “I would be grateful, Mr. President, if you could influence him so that he accepts the invitation and visits the U.S.”
The two leaders discussed the developing situation in Somalia, as well as their respective positions vis-à-vis the situation in Rhodesia and Namibia. The United States and United Kingdom had carried out joint negotiations on the Rhodesia problem, Carter informed Tito. Carter continued: “There are good contacts with the presidents of the so-called Frontline States and with the members of the United Nations. We cannot recognize the so-called internal settlement of the problem if it is not in the line with the Anglo-American negotiations. We hope we will be able to help the national leaders to meet in the near future.” Carter expressed his hope that, when the new Rhodesian Government was formed and recognized, it “will refuse the involvement of the foreign forces, which should not interfere with the internal issues of Rhodesia.”
Turning to the upcoming Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers’ conference in Belgrade, Tito informed Carter that the Yugo [Page 839] slav Government remained very active in its preparation as well as the preparation for the NAM summit in Havana, which he hoped would contribute to a constructive conference. “Now we have a situation in which non-aligned countries are at war with one another,” Tito declared, making reference to the Horn of Africa and the situation in South East Asia. Tito continued: “There is an important issue for the Non-Aligned countries to deal with: preventing the split of the non-aligned countries into ‘right’ and ‘left,’ into ‘progressive’ and ‘non-progressive’ countries.” Tito concluded: “We all must work to prevent that from happening. There are such tendencies from several sides,” alluding to Cuba, “and we will not allow this to happen.” As Carter expressed his concern that Havana might not be the most appropriate venue for the next NAM conference, Tito replied: “We are concerned about Cuba too, but what can we do?” He continued: “If we allowed a split into ‘progressive’ and ‘non-progressive’ countries, we would face quarrels internally and externally.” “That is why the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Belgrade is important,” Minic interjected, “because many are concerned about how the Conference in Havana will proceed, because they are concerned that Havana may direct the Non-Aligned Movement in a different direction.” The Belgrade conference, Minic concluded, should “achieve a platform that cannot be changed.”
The conversation then shifted to the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Minic stated that “it seems that the Soviet Union has come to believe that U.S.A. is not in any hurry to conclude SALT, but is seeking to postpone [agreement].” “We hear” he continued, that the Soviet leadership believed that this is “a calculating move to prolong the arms race, and this is a great burden on the Soviet Union. Since the U.S. economy is far stronger than the Soviet economy, it is easier for the U.S. to endure the [arms] race and, according to President Tito’s talks with Brezhnev, there is a serious [Soviet] interest that race be stopped so that Brezhnev can focus on the internal problems, which are quite severe.” The Middle East situation, which the Soviet bureaucracy saw as a ploy by the United States to limit Soviet influence in the region, was described by Minic as another reason for Soviet distrust of the United States. Lastly, Minic suggested that U.S. policy on human rights added to Soviet apprehensions: “In talks with them, we see that they perceive it as a calculating move to destabilize the East European countries.” Minic concluded: “Much will need to be done to dispel Soviet belief that this action is aimed at destabilizing Eastern European countries.” Human rights, Carter responded, could easily be solved during a meeting with Brezhnev.
What “worries us tremendously,” Carter noted, “is the issue of enormous increase in armament of the Soviet Union, which is constantly increasing military expenditures, three to four percent above [Page 840] inflation, while our military budget is smaller than 18 years ago.” Carter continued: “This worries not only us, but also China and Western Europe. We believe that the Soviet commitment to increase its conventional and nuclear weapons [stockpiles] is much larger than what is required for self-defense.” Carter concluded that, while “there are world problems, world issues, which connect the United States with the Soviet Union,” these issues are “stronger than the disagreements, the differences that divide us.” He told the Yugoslav delegation: “We are very grateful that you are ready to relay our opinion to the Soviet Union, and that you have passed to us their opinions.”
The meeting ended with an appeal from Tito for a halt in the U.S. development of the neutron bomb. “I think the bomb is wrong,” Tito declared. “The Soviet Union and the U.S. have nuclear weapons, and these are very powerful weapons,” he continued. “Regarding the N bomb, the Soviet Union can make it within a short period of time, but it costs a great deal, it is a burden on its economy. I think that, if there was to be a war and the neutron bomb were to be used, nuclear weapons will be used immediately after. I am certain of that, because neither side will allow itself to be defeated. This all leads in the direction of mutual self-annihilation,” Tito concluded. Carter countered that the United States had not yet made the decision as to whether to produce the bomb, and that it was a weapon limited to a defensive character. “The Soviet S–20 bombs are much more dangerous,” Carter added, “and the S–20 also worries Western Europe, not just us.” Carter concluded: “The Soviet Union has a large number of various weapons which are much more dangerous and have a greater impact and range than the Neutron bomb.” The meeting ended at 11:04, when Carter escorted Tito to the South Lawn for his departure.
In the joint statement released by the two governments at the conclusion of the visit, the discussions were described as “extensive and useful,” held in “a spirit of mutual regard, candor, and friendship” and that the meeting reinforced “the already strong foundations of the US-Yugoslav relations.” The joint statement also referenced that the two Presidents had emphasized “the decisive importance of the development of energy for the economic growth of all countries, and of the developing countries in particular, and they believe therefore that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should be made accessible to all countries without discrimination.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pages 485–488)