Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

229. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State¹

Bucharest, June 16, 1980, 1415Z

4940. Budapest for Counselor Ridgway. Department please pass—upon concurrence of Counselor, who has not seen message and may wish to comment further—to AmEmbassies Amman, Belgrade, Berlin, Cairo, Damascus, Kabul, Madrid, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, Tel Aviv, Warsaw, USMission USNATO. Subject: Counselor Ridgway’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Andrei.

1. (C-entire text)

2. Summary. Counselor Ridgway’s meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei reviewed issues in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iran, European security and CSCE, East-West relations and general bilateral matters. Andrei informed Ridgway of the Islamic Conference committee’s desire to meet with anti-government forces in Afghanistan to work out a cease-fire with condition that Soviet troops withdraw and that a provisional government be formed from members of current government and insurgents. Little substantive change in Romania’s positions was indicated on any issue discussed. Meeting was cordial and candid.² End summary.

3. On June 13 Counselor Ridgway met for 90 minutes with Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei. Accompanying the Counselor were the Ambassador and Special Assistant John King. With the Minister were Constantin Oancea, Deputy Foreign Minister; Nicolae Turturea, Acting Director, Inter-American Affairs; Mircea Raceanu, OIC, North American Affairs; and Radu Matescu, interpreter.

4. At a separate introductory meeting earlier in the day, Counselor Ridgway and Minister Andrei exchanged letters from Presidents Carter and Ceausescu on the occasion of the centennial of US/Romanian relations.³ Andrei opened second meeting by expressing satisfaction with improvement in US/Romanian relations over past 15 years as indicated by large number of exchange visits by officials of the two countries and by progress in several fields, especially trade. He also expressed appreciation for Department’s support for MFN renewal.

5. Bilateral relationship. Ridgway noted growing tradition of exchange visits and regretted President Carter’s inability to stop in Bucharest during his forthcoming trip. Schedule permitted only one stop in Eastern Europe and Romania could appreciate importance of a visit to Yugoslavia at this time.⁴ After asking Andrei to convey President Carter’s “high esteem” to President Ceausescu, she said the former hoped to make a trip to Bucharest in the future to reciprocate Ceausescu’s April 1978 visit to Washington. She also noted that President Carter’s inability to visit Romania this time in no way should imply a lessening of the importance the US attached to relations with Romania or of Ceausescu’s role in European politics. Andrei made careful notes and said he would directly inform President Ceausescu.

6. Middle East. Drawing on the Secretary’s June 9 speech⁵ Ridgway reviewed US position on search for peace under Camp David aegis, stressing our continuing faith in success of the process. There had been progress despite difficulty of issues, especially Palestinian autonomy question. US believes any initiative to alter UN Resolution 242 or to undermine Camp David process must be opposed. The so-called “European initiative” can be useful if it meets all of our concerns and falls within the Camp David guidelines. The US is trying to get Israel and Egypt back to the negotiations on the remaining difficult issues with minimum delay to limit prospect of counterproductive outside initiatives. Andrei said Romania was happy to see Camp David process accomplish as much as it had, but that it seems to have exhausted its possibilities since it had not provided for a comprehensive peace involving Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory and had not provided a solution for the problem of the Palestinians. Romania believes an international conference should be called under UN auspices with the US and USSR as co-chairmen and bring together all parties to the conflict, including the PLO. As envisioned, the conference would not deal with problems solved by the Camp David process but only outstanding issues. A comprehensive solution should not be restricted by the guidelines of UN Resolution 242. Problems in the region must not be allowed to get out of hand in the wake of the raging conflict in Lebanon, conservative Islamic resurgence in IGCN and other disturbing developments. Israel must stop using the PLO excuse to resist solutions. Andrei said he recognized that the US could not look for solutions outside the Camp David process at least until after the elections in November, but did respond in that session to Ridgway’s question whether Romania contemplated any initiative now that the May 26th deadline had passed.

7. Afghanistan. Ridgway provided Andrei with current information on Afghanistan situation and reviewed US position. She expressed appreciation for Romania’s stand against Soviet invasion and hoped Romania would support efforts to find a solution. Andrei then reviewed deterioration in international relations and increasing world tension because of continuance of some problems and struggle for domination of one country over another. He said Romania considers Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as climax of this entire process. He reiterated Romania’s position that invasion was not justified on any grounds. “You can’t make a country happy by military force.” Noting the difference between Ceausescu’s and Gromyko’s recent statements on Afghanistan, he emphasized again that Romania remained categorically against the invasion since military action of any type endangered international cooperation. This applied to the doctrine of “limited sovereignty” and intervention by one Socialist country in another. The struggle for independence is a major aspect in international affairs and it must be accommodated. He said a quick solution in Afghanistan must be found by negotiation of Soviet troop withdrawal together with international guarantees of non-interference by outside states in Afghanistan. Romania thus welcomes formation of the special committee by the Islamic Conference as it could lead to a political solution. Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi told him during his visit to Bucharest June 9, that the committee had already tried to contact Soviets, Babrak government and the insurgents. In this respect, Shahi emphasized that contacting Babrak regime did not imply recognition of it. Shahi said the COEE hopes to arrange a cease-fire between government and anti-government forces based on condition of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Next step, in committee’s view, would be formation of a provisional government from members of present government and representatives of the insurgents, allowing Afghans to work out their internal problems free of outside influence. Andrei commented at this point that Romania considers it fundamental to get the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops and to guarantee non-interference in Afghanistan by all states, including Islamic countries, while internal decisions are being worked out. This should be done, he added, from the political base existing before the invasion. In this context, Ridgway noted Deputy Foreign Minister Groza’s statement in Washington that Romania would not only oppose the importation of revolution, but the importation of counter-revolution as well.

8. Iran. Ridgway expressed US hopes that Romania could support efforts to free the hostages, despite its known position that economic sanctions are not feasible. The US believes sanctions will have a constructive effect and open other opportunities for discussion of the hostage issue with Iran. All nations have an interest in freeing the hostages and creating safer conditions for their diplomats. She added that the US attempt to rescue the hostages was humanitarian in impetus, not military. Andrei reiterated Romania’s desire to see the hostages freed as soon as possible since it would lessen international tensions. He noted however that economic sanctions could be turned against the US by hostile forces in Iran.

9. European issues and CSCE. Andrei noted that the greatest danger to world peace lies in Europe, and that any war there would be nuclear. Romania wished to strengthen security and reach a balance between the two sides through reductions in armed forces and military budgets. The theater nuclear force deployment decision should be delayed and negotiations started immediately for reduction by both sides of medium-range weapons. Stressing the need for balance, Andrei said the negotiating process should seek ultimately to reduce tension and reestablish detente. This in turn would help the situation in Afghanistan and give impetus to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It would also create conditions for a successful Madrid CSCE review meeting, which in turn would revitalize the Helsinki spirit and improve the international climate. In this respect Romania believed additional bilateral consultations with the US might be helpful in preparing for the Madrid meeting. Andrei suggested such consultations in Bucharest in July or early August, with perhaps yet another consultation after the summer. Ridgway agreed to take his suggestion back to Washington. On TNF, Ridgway said NATO intended to go through with its decision, pointing to the fact that three offers to the Soviets to negotiate arms reductions had gone unanswered. Since NATO missiles had yet to be produced, the TNF decision had a built-in delay on deployment which could be used to negotiate. Ridgway confirmed the American desire to safeguard the CSCE process as the only one that brings all European nations together. The US would try to shape the Madrid meeting to achieve that objective and not destroy the process.

10. East-West relations. Describing US-Soviet relations as “poor,” Ridgway noted that this applied only to the Soviets and that the US pursues a different policy toward East European countries, particularly Romania. Andrei expressed appreciation for the wisdom of this policy but regretted the downward spiral of US-Soviet relations and the deepening of mistrust between the two nations over so many issues (Ethiopia, Angola, C[amp] David Agreements, NATO, TNF decision, and postponement of SALT process). Noting that the East-West framework was dependent on the world situation, Andrei again argued for the safeguarding of the CSCE process and the improvement of the international climate.

Aggrey

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800299–0016. Confidential; Immediate. Sent Immediate to Budapest. In telegram 4941 from Bucharest, June 16, the Embassy summarized the remainder of Ridgway’s visit to Romania, and described the atmosphere of the meetings and receptions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800294–1042)
2. In preparation for the visit to Bucharest, the Embassy submitted in telegram 4506 from Bucharest, June 3, a draft of the “substantive toast” Ridgway was to deliver at a reception on June 13, marking 100 years of diplomatic relations. The draft contained language celebrating “continued positive development of our bilateral relationship, to our common effort to see the spirit of human genius used for the betterment of mankind.” In reviewing the text, Ridgway highlighted this passage and wrote her Special Assistant, John King: “John—Check with someone other than [Romanian desk officer] Frank Tumminia about this. . . I’d hardly say that an essentially Stalinist society is one to which we ought to join our efforts to find something ‘common’ for the betterment of mankind. We somehow keep forgetting what we’re dealing with. R.” (National Archives, RG 59, Counselor to the Department, Subject Country Files and 1980 Briefing Books, Box 3, Pol 2—Romania)
3. In telegram 4475 from Bucharest, June 3, the Embassy reported that the Romanian Foreign Ministry had delivered an unofficial draft of Ceausescu’s message to Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800271–0597)
4. Carter visited Yugoslavia June 24–25. On June 10, Vest sent Ridgway a briefing memorandum indicating that the Romanians would seek assurances that the special relationship between the United States and Romania, and between President Carter and Ceausescu in particular, remained strong, especially in light of Carter’s decision to only travel to Yugoslavia. (National Archives, RG 59, Counselor to the Department, Subject Country Files and 1980 Briefing Books, Box 3, Pol 2—Romania)
5. Muskie delivered the speech, entitled “The Middle East: Outlook for Peace,” at the Washington Press Club on June 9. The speech was published in Department of State Bulletin, July 1980.