Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

228. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee and Robert Kimmitt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 10, 1980

SUBJECT

• VBB: Military Supply Relationship with Romania (S)

As you know, the Romanians recently raised with our Air Attache in Bucharest the question of establishing a military supply relationship with us.² Both State and Defense have completed internal studies of the issue. Defense favors moving ahead with a modest relationship, while State is divided. Nimetz and EUR feel we should let the Romanians down gently;³ PM agrees with Defense. Christopher also feels we should consult with the allies before making any decision.⁴ Defense, however, argues we should make our own decision and then talk to the allies. (S)

There are thus two issues:

• —do we wish to initiate a military supply relationship with the Romanians
• —do we consult with the allies before or after making our decision (S)

We strongly feel that we should not rush into this and that we need to better understand the political, legal and legislative implications of establishing any military supply relationship before we proceed further.⁵ There are a number of reasons for advocating caution:

• —the danger of technology transfer from Romania to the USSR is higher than was the case with Yugoslavia
• —the bulk of the Romanian officer corps was trained in the Soviet Union and, unlike the Yugoslav officer corps, they have no familiarity with US weapons systems or procurement procedures
• —despite Romania’s current independent stand, a return to a more pro-Soviet policy cannot be excluded if Ceausescu were to die, or be removed
• —Romania maintains a harsh internal system and has a poor human rights record, a fact which will provoke opposition in Congress (S)

We also think that it would be good to sound out our allies, particularly to determine if they have also been approached by the Romanians on this matter. However, given the delicacy of the matter and the danger of leaks, we strongly feel that this should be done only within the Quad framework. Vest is leaving for a Quad meeting on Monday,⁶ and the issue could be raised at that time. Based on his soundings—as well as the papers prepared by State and Defense—we could then proceed to hold an SCC. (S)

We recommend therefore that at the MBB, you

• —emphasize the need to proceed cautiously
• —weigh in for consulting the allies, but only within the Quad framework (S)⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Arms Transfers/Country File, Box 29, Romania: 6/77–10/80. Secret. Sent for action.
2. See Document 223 and footnote 3 thereto.
3. In a May 12 memorandum to Christopher, Nimetz recommended that the United States consult with its Western Allies before making a decision on establishing a military supply relationship with Romania. Nimetz cautioned that congressional opposition would be fierce given Romania’s human rights record and that establishing such a relationship with a Warsaw Pact country would “send very strange signals to the Western Europeans whom we continually exhort to increase their defense efforts to meet the Warsaw Pact buildup.” Nimetz cautioned that “Romania doesn’t have the dollars to buy very much; nothing we provide will change the scenario if the Soviets invade” and that “a Western European supply relationship might be more effective and less controversial for a start.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Chron Files, Speeches, and Papers of Lucy W. Benson (1979) and Matthew Nimetz (1980), Lot 81D321, Box 6, Matthew Nimetz, Chron, May 1980)
4. In a May 6 memorandum to Christopher, Vest and Bartholomew sought a decision on the Department’s position. Stating that Romanian motives for seeking a military supply relationship remained unclear, Vest and Bartholomew estimated that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and tension in the Warsaw Pact toward Bucharest might have increased Romanian anxiety. (Ibid.) Christopher decided on Allied consultations prior to responding to Bucharest.
5. Larrabee made a similar point in an April 23 memorandum to Brzezinski briefing him for an upcoming Vance-Brown-Brzezinski lunch. The resignation of Secretary Vance on April 28 forced the cancelation of the VBB meeting. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 32, Luncheon Meetings (BBV): 1–4/80)
6. June 16. The Quad refers to the formalized meeting of the political directors of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and East German Foreign Ministries.
7. The Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski meeting took place June 11. In a memorandum to Denend and Aaron later that day, Brzezinski informed them that the MBB had decided to “inquire what the Romanians have specifically in mind. No need for prior consultations with the Allies on this subject.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Freedom of Information/Legal, Arms Transfers/Country File, Box 29, Romania: 6/77–10/80)