Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

216. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 3, 1979, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of David Aaron’s Meeting with Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan, Director of the North American Division in the Romanian Foreign Ministry (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Stephen Larrabee, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
• Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan
• Ion Besteliu, Political Counselor, Romanian Embassy

Mr. Aaron opened the meeting by welcoming Amb. Bogdan ² and saying it was nice to see him again. (U)

Amb. Bogdan stated that Mr. Aaron presumably knew why he was here. He did not want to unduly bother Mr. Aaron, but hoped that he could receive the Administration’s support regarding MFN. (C)

Mr. Aaron underscored that the Administration supported MFN for Romania and had worked hard to obtain it. He emphasized, however, that there was a concrete problem which had to be resolved. He pointed out that to be successful with the Congress the Administration needed the support of the interested American groups. (C)

Amb. Bogdan stated he did not want to cover the same old ground. He was not certain why the groups had raised the issue. The fate of the Jews in Romania would not be affected by MFN one way or the other. (C)

Mr. Aaron stated that it was his impression that the groups were concerned that the numbers were dropping. Basically, he thought they wanted to support MFN but they were continually receiving reports about procedural problems, etc. (C)

Amb. Bogdan replied that the Romanians were going to propose a formula which they hoped would help. He insisted, however, that they could not accept any third party intermediary. Rabbi Rosen (leader of the Jews in Romania) would make a statement saying that the Jews who wanted to leave are not intimidated, etc. This statement would be publicized. Some sort of monitoring system, perhaps similar to that of SALT (i.e., national means), could be established. He pointed out that Senator Jackson had an entire office doing this type of work and that the Romanians were ready to do it as well. (C)

Mr. Aaron suggested that the best way to prove the present procedures were no bar to emigration was to reform them. He asked why Jews making an application could not notify the Israeli Embassy at the same time. (U)

Amb. Bogdan replied that it did not look feasible, but he did not elaborate why. He insisted, however, that there was no intention on the part of the Romanian Government to keep the Jews from emigrating. (C)

Mr. Aaron stressed in response that the Romanian Government would have to do something about the procedures. The Administration would work hard, but he pointed out it could lose if the groups interested in Jewish emigration failed to support MFN. (C)

Amb. Bogdan suggested that the concerns of the Jewish groups could be allayed by the formula he had outlined. (U)

Mr. Aaron returned to the question of procedures, insisting that some change had to be undertaken and that there was a need for some sort of real action. The groups interested in Jewish emigration had backed off from some of their original ideas, but there was a need to respond to their concerns. He felt that Rabbi Rosen’s statement might not be enough; something more would have to be done. (C)

Amb. Bogdan replied that he did not know what more the Romanian Government could do. He stressed, however, that the Romanian side was ready to try to meet the concerns of the Jewish groups. (U)

Mr. Aaron stated that he would not argue the case for others. This was not his role. He reiterated the seriousness of the situation and the need to find a way to resolve it. (C)

Amb. Bogdan said that he intended to stay in the States for the duration of the struggle rather than returning to Romania as he had originally intended. (C)

Turning to another subject, he noted that the Romanian Government was grateful for the briefing by Mr. Barry on the Summit.³ This had been highly appreciated. One point needed clarification, however. This concerned MFN for the Soviet Union. It looked like it would not be possible to give MFN to the USSR this year. At the same time the US might feel that it could not delay MFN for China. Bogdan felt that part of the Jewish preoccupation with MFN for Romania was related to this. (C)

Mr. Aaron replied that the President was still considering the question of MFN for the Soviet Union and had not made up his mind. At this point it was simply too early to tell what the President would do. The Administration had not linked the two (MFN for China and the Soviet Union). It wanted to proceed forward with both. However, the point of decision had not been reached. (C)

Amb. Bogdan stated that he believed some of the Jewish concern was related not just to Romania, but to the Soviet Union. He then turned to the question of MBFR, noting that it was his understanding that there had been no real progress in Vienna. He did not understand why the starting level of troops was such a problem. (C)

In reply, Mr. Aaron noted that at Vienna Gromyko had noted that the differences between the troop levels of both sides was 150,000. Defense Minister Ustinov had corrected him, saying that the difference was 180,000.⁴ (C)

Mr. Aaron noted that this was a large discrepancy. The problem was that we couldn’t agree on the starting point. If we couldn’t agree on the starting point, it would be hard to know how many troops had been withdrawn. In short, if we couldn’t agree on where we were, how could we agree on where we were going? He noted that SALT was easy to verify in comparison to MBFR. (C)

Amb. Bogdan stated that he had attended a 10-member conference in Geneva at which Jules Moch⁵ had said that the question of troops was not difficult to verify. (C)

Mr. Aaron replied that we might have agreed until we had run into this discrepancy. The Soviets hoped that we would set aside the question of data; however, this was an extremely important issue politically. (C)

Amb. Bogdan reaffirmed his intention to stay in the States until the question of MFN had been resolved. (C)

In closing, Mr. Aaron said that he hoped he would be able to see Amb. Bogdan again before he left. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Aaron, David: 1–12/79. Confidential. The meeting took place in Aaron’s office at the White House. Earlier that day, Larrabee sent a briefing paper outlining Romanian concerns and providing Aaron with talking points for his meeting with Bogdan. Larrabee recommended that Aaron stress the administration’s strong commitment to MFN for Romania, and that, irrespective of right or wrong, support of Jewish-American groups was vital for congressional approval. Aaron initialed the memorandum indicating he had seen it. (Ibid.) The memorandum of conversation was approved by Aaron on July 7. He instructed his staff to “Keep it here. Don’t send it out.” (Ibid.)
2. The meeting with Bogdan took the place of the previously scheduled meeting between Aaron and Ionescu. Bogdan, who had been Ambassador to Washington from 1967 until 1978, was sent by Bucharest to troubleshoot the MFN situation. On June 28 Larrabee informed Aaron’s office that Bogdan was coming and was seeking an appointment with Aaron to discuss the situation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: 4/79–3/80)
3. In telegram 4026 from Bucharest, June 26, the Embassy reported on Barry’s June 22 meeting with Andrei to brief the Romanian Foreign Minister on SALT II and the Carter-Brezhnev Summit in Vienna. The Embassy reported that, following the presentation of the U.S. position, Andrei told Barry that he wondered “if briefing which Soviets might provide would be as helpful.” The Romanians also raised GOR concerns regarding Soviet views of Chinese participation in SALT III, effects of SALT II on Western European disarmament thinking, and possibility of movement on other disarmament issues. Barry also met with Andrei on June 23, prior to his departure from Bucharest. At that meeting, the Embassy reported, “Andrei reiterated GOR support for SALT II Treaty as a good step toward other disarmament measures, goal of which is to stop arms race, cut military budgets, and effect troop reductions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790288–0202)
4. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 204.
5. Former French politician, and member of the French Government in the Fourth Republic, as well as former French Representative to the UN Commission on Disarmament from 1951 until 1960.