215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania1
171577. Moscow for DAS Robert Barry. Subject: MFN for Romania: Nimetz’ Meeting With Bogdan; Bogdan’s Meeting With Jewish Representatives, July 2. Ref: State 168581.2
1. (C-entire text)
2. Counselor Nimetz met July 2 with visiting MFA Counselor for North America Bogdan and Romanian Ambassador Ionescu (who cancelled planned return to Bucharest). Nimetz described the concerns of American Jewish organizations over declining emigration and urged the Romanian Government to face this as a practical problem. Nimetz said that Jewish organizations are concerned that Jackson-Vanik is not working.3 Trade has increased but the kind of emigration which interests them is not going up. Jewish groups believe that the problem is intimidation in the application procedures. Having raised these concerns, they are in a position where they cannot easily back off without some tangible results. Nimetz noted that he had told representatives of the Jewish groups that distribution of applications by the Joint Distribution Committee would prove very difficult for the Romanian Government. He asked Bogdan whether a Romanian could be at the JDC [Page 687] office to expedite applications. Nimetz urged Bogdan to be prepared to negotiate with the Jewish groups.
3. Bogdan said that he had come to the U.S. on a fact-finding mission and did not have instructions on how to resolve the problem which had arisen. He expressed puzzlement with motivation of American Jewish groups and their timing in raising emigration issue. Noting that he had spoken with Rabbi Rosen and with Romanian emigration authorities, Bogdan said he could see no Jewish emigration problem. He had been assured by Romanian officials that only in the case of German emigration are there any problems or attempts to spread out applications. Bogdan said that he had also spoken with the Israeli Ambassador and did not believe that the Government of Israel was prompting Jewish organizations to raise the emigration issue. As for using the JDC to distribute applications, Bogdan said personally he believes such an idea is unacceptable. No foreign or international organization could play such a role in Romania.
4. Nimetz offered two explanations for actions of Jewish groups: First, a heightened concern with general question of Jackson-Vanik in view of possibility of MFN for the Soviet Union; and second, the reports from Jews who have left Romania of intimidation at pre-screening process. He again urged Bogdan not to be overly concerned with the motivation of the Jewish groups and instead to focus on practical aspects of solving the problem.
5. Bogdan said he would try to find “a reasonable solution” but that he is troubled by the escalation of demands and what might be next. He mentioned possibilities of fact-finding trip by U.S. Jewish groups or presentation of lists through JDC or other bodies. Bogdan commented that, whatever happens to MFN, it will not have negative effect on the Jews in Romania.
6. In closing, Nimetz stressed the urgency of the situation and asked Bogdan to be in touch after Bogdan’s meetings later in the day with representatives of American Jewish organizations.
7. House Trade Subcommittee staff member David Rohr, who participated as “observer” in subsequent meeting at Romanian Embassy on July 2 between Romanians and representatives of American Jewish organizations, gave Department the following account of the meeting. (The Jewish organizations were represented by Al Moses of American Jewish Committee, Mark Talisman of Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Fund, and George Specter of B’nai B’rith International. Moses acted as spokesman in place of B’nai B’rith International President Jack Spitzer, who is now in Geneva.)
8. Rohr said Moses made following three-part proposal to the GOR to remedy their concerns re Jewish emigration:
[Page 688]9. (A) Rabbi Rosen would make a public statement in Romania similar to that which he made in synagogues in 1975 to the effect that those persons who wish to apply for permission to emigrate from Romania may do so. Statement would indicate where persons should go to initiate the process, how it works, etc. (Rohr said implicit in this was that application forms would have to be available to those desiring to fill them out.)
10. (B) GOR would agree that while applicants’ requests for permission to emigrate were being processed by GOR authorities, applicants were free to contact Israeli Embassy to begin visa application procedure. (Moses told Nimetz following meeting with Romanians today that this step was designed to provide permanent monitoring mechanism of number of pending cases. The GOI would maintain a list, which it would share with either the USG or directly with American Jewish groups. Moses said he already had discussed this aspect of the proposal with GOI Embassy in Washington.)
11. (C) Concurrent with its acceptance of steps (A) and (B), GOR would provide American Jewish organizations with numerical accounting of how many Jews it expected would be departing for Israel in the next few weeks and months.
12. Bogdan, who Rohr said did all the talking for GOR side, responded by saying he would have to transmit the Jewish organizations’ proposal directly to President Ceausescu. Bogdan said he was all too aware of the time pressures, and hoped to have a response for Moses in the nearest future. At one point in the discussion, Rohr said, Bogdan indicated it might be possible for the GOR to revert back to the procedures in effect in 1975 with regard to application for emigration (which presumably would mean dropping pre-screening).
13. Rohr said that Moses and Talisman were pleased by Bogdan’s reaction to their concerns and their proposal. They had indicated to Rohr after the meeting that they had dropped the notion of having the Joint Distribution Committee serve as a “good offices” intermediary because of the negative signals they had received in the past few days. He also said that Moses had promised the Romanians that if an understanding were reached as they had proposed, the Jewish groups would not publicize it here, which they recognized might embarrass the GOR in some fashion. Rohr said that at no time during the meeting did the subject arise of Jewish emigration to the United States per se.
14. At end of day Bogdan came by alone to brief Nimetz on developments. He confirmed essence of proposal reported by Rohr in paras. 8–11 above. While cautious, he said he would be reporting them favorably to Bucharest.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Commonwealth and Eastern Europe, Office Subject Files, 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box 3, MFN Waiver/Controversy 1979–80. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Budapest and Moscow. Drafted by Bradtke; cleared by Schmidt, Vest, and Larrabee, and in S/S; approved by Nimetz.↩
- In telegram 168581 to Bucharest, June 29, the Department reported Nimetz’s conversation with representatives from several Jewish organizations. Nimetz emphasized that the “administration views possible failure to renew MFN as very serious matter which would undermine a decade of effort to build up U.S.-Romanian relations.” He also stressed that failure would “mean that no other country would be willing to submit itself to uncertainties of waiver process.” Noting that “continued MFN for Romania is in grave danger unless the GOR is prepared to be cooperative,” the Department instructed Aggrey to seek an appointment at the earliest opportunity with Romanian officials, and “make clear that loss of MFN is now real possibility. Romanians should harbor no doubts that if Jewish organizations in the U.S. oppose MFN for Romania, there will be insufficient support left in Congress to prevent passage of Schulze’s disapproval recommendation.” (Ibid.)↩
- Nimetz was informed of Jewish-American concerns with the extension of MFN to Romania as early as June 7. Representatives of the American-Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, the B’nai B’rith and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, were particularly alarmed by what they saw as a cumbersome pre-screening process that led to intimidation of applicants. In telegram 147765 to Bucharest, June 9, the Department instructed Aggrey to meet with Pacoste and stress U.S. concerns regarding Jewish emigration. (Ibid.)↩