Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

211. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 10, 1978

SUBJECT

• Summary Report on Secretary Blumenthal’s Trip to Romania, December 8–9, 1978 (U)

Secretary Blumenthal is preparing a report for the President on his trip to Romania and his discussions while in Bucharest.² However, I thought it might be useful for me to give you a brief summary of the trip and some of my own impressions. (U)

Bonn, December 7–8

Shortly after arriving, I was called to the American Embassy to brief Secretary Blumenthal on the background and purpose of his trip to Romania. Initially he was a bit concerned about how the trip would be viewed in Moscow and its impact on the improved atmosphere in US–Soviet relations which had been evident during his talks with Brezhnev and Kosygin several days previously. He felt that some mention should be made of the economic aspects of his trip, as this was his main responsibility. Moreover, the Romanians themselves had suggested that the trip should be billed as an exchange on economic as well as political matters.³ He also suggested some changes in the text of his arrival statement, including the elimination of the word “independent” in the first paragraph of the text.⁴ I resisted this change, arguing that (1) it would weaken the initial impact of his statement; (2) the statement had been cleared by you and I therefore could not make such changes. He thereupon suggested calling you personally, which he did. You know the results. (C)

After briefing the Secretary on the purposes of his trip and giving him the general background to recent developments within the Warsaw Pact, I attended several meetings at the West German MFA, which the American Embassy had set up. The first was with Dr. Kuehn, Director for Soviet Affairs in the Foreign Office. The discussion, conducted in German, centered on Soviet-West German relations, their present state and future development. While useful, the conversation provided no new key insights but rather served to confirm already held impressions. The same was true of my meeting with Dr. Joetze, Director for East-West Affairs in the Foreign Office. That evening, I had dinner with Dick Smyser, the DCM at the Embassy and a good friend of Bill Griffith’s, who had served on the NSC twice under Kissinger. I departed the following morning for Bucharest. (U)

Bucharest, December 8

After making his initial arrival statement, which was well received by the Romanians, Secretary Blumenthal held a half-hour meeting with Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei. This was more of a protocol meeting than anything else and served essentially as a forum for Blumenthal to make some of the talking points, though in abbreviated form. (My notes of the meeting are at Tab C.)⁵ (C)

The real substantive discussions took place in a private tête-à-tête meeting between Andrei and Blumenthal during cocktails before dinner. The Secretary has prepared a report of this discussion for the President, which you should see. The Secretary showed this report to me, and with his permission, I have included the highlights here for you (Tab D). (C)⁶

During the pre-dinner cocktails, while Andrei was talking to Blumenthal, Mitran, the former DCM in Washington and now Andrei’s special assistant, pulled me aside for a private discussion. His main purpose was to hammer home the point that has been made by almost every Romanian official in the past two weeks: the need for a reconsideration of the NATO commitment to a 3 percent increase in defense spending, because this is being used by the Soviet Union to justify increases in the Warsaw Pact defense budget. In response to a question about Ceausescu’s reference in his December 1st speech to “counter revolutionary activity” of some socialist states—which many in the West saw as an indication of an attempt by Moscow to form a fifth column in Romania—Mitran said that this was a reference not to Romania but to the Soviet Union’s use of Vietnam as a proxy against China. He also voiced concern about “alarmist” Western press reports which only served to make things worse for Romania. This was not Czechoslovakia, he emphasized. The Romanians knew what they were doing; they were not about to commit suicide. They knew the limits. However, within these limits they intended to stand firm.⁷ (S)

It was obvious that our discussion, like Andrei’s conversation with Blumenthal, had not occurred by chance but had been carefully planned, and that as “your” representative, I had been singled out by Mitran for a message he hoped would be conveyed directly to you. (C)

The official meeting with Andrei was followed by another official meeting with Cornel Burtica, the Minister of Foreign Trade, and a team of financial experts.⁸ The discussion, much of it quite technical, revolved around economic matters. Burtica made a strong pitch for MFN on a permanent basis and more US credits, arguing that the best guarantee of independence was a strong economy. He also asked for expediting export licenses. Blumenthal made no commitments but simply reiterated the basic desire of the US to expand economic relations with Romania in areas where this was mutually beneficial. He also gave Burtica a briefing on President Carter’s inflation program and its relationship to the stability of the dollar—a matter of great interest to Romania since 70 percent of Romanian foreign trade is in dollars. The Secretary also gave Burtica a rundown of his recent trip to the Middle East and expressed his concern about developments in Iran. Interestingly, Burtica said that Romania agreed with the US position regarding the Shah. It did not want to see anarchy or a vacuum in Iran and favored a stabilization of the Shah’s position. In fact, they were trying to help by giving Iran some diesel oil, which it had requested. (S)

Meeting between Blumenthal and Ceausescu, December 9

The next day the Secretary met with Ceausescu for a discussion which lasted about one and a half hours. Besides myself, present were Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei and US Ambassador Aggrey. My notes of the discussion are at Tab B.⁹ After Blumenthal presented the talking points, Ceausescu made a long speech in which he: (C)

• —noted the improvement of Romanian-US relations recently, and expressed his strong desire to see relations further broadened, especially in the economic field. (However, he only obliquely referred to MFN, in part because this had been so extensively covered by Burtica in his talks with Blumenthal the day before); (S)
• —made a strong pitch for increased efforts towards disarmament both in SALT and MBFR. In this regard, he called for a re-examination of the decision taken at the May Summit to increase NATO defense expenditures by 3 percent; (S)
• —called for a global solution to the Middle East talks and appealed for a convocation of the Geneva conference with the participation of Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians. This would diminish the danger of Egypt’s isolation, which he saw as increasing; (S)¹⁰
• —noted Ethiopia’s willingness to grant Eritrea a degree of autonomy within the framework of a unified Ethiopian state, and the desire of the Ethiopian leadership to expand economic relations with the US; (S)
• —reiterated his country’s firm determination to continue to pursue an independent policy, while remaining a member of the Warsaw Pact. (S)

General Assessment

The visit was an important symbol of US support for Romania’s independent policy and was greatly appreciated by the Romanians. While the symbolic significance of the visit was in many ways more important than the substance of many of the meetings, the trip offered a useful opportunity to gain a clearer understanding of the dimensions of the dispute and the issues that contributed to it. (C)

Unfortunately, there was little time to discuss the events of the past weeks with the US Ambassador or the Embassy staff, whose substantive reporting has been of a generally high quality. Such discussions at some point would be quite useful. In fact the Ambassador expressed his desire for me to extend my stay for this purpose. While this proved impossible this time, a field trip at a later date—perhaps combined with stopovers in Warsaw and Budapest—is worth considering. (C)

The Romanians were obviously very appreciative of the trip and US support generally. (Indeed, as Blumenthal stepped off the plane on arrival, Mitran, Andrei’s Special Assistant, acted like a cheshire cat who had just swallowed a canary.) The visit received substantial press treatment, though the Romanians were careful not to overdo it. Despite his initial reservations, the Secretary proved to be an effective and skillful envoy. He was open and businesslike in his presentations and quickly established good rapport with all his discussion partners. I was particularly impressed with his quick learning curve and his intuitive political judgment. (C)

How the Soviets will react to the visit is difficult to determine at this point. While its symbolic significance will hardly be lost on them, I doubt that they will react too strongly publicly. Privately, they will probably take the Romanians to task for it. But whatever their irritation, it is hardly going to affect their basic attitude toward outstanding US-Soviet bilateral issues such as SALT. They will continue to give these priority while trying to paper-over differences with Romania. (C)

The Romanians clearly feel it is in their long-run interest to be able to demonstrate as broad a range of support as possible, even if this intensifies Moscow’s momentary ire. They have made a carefully calculated gamble and are confident that they can handle the situation. They do not, however, intend to push too hard. But they are determined to maintain, and where possible expand, the bounds of autonomy. (C)

Within this framework, they are likely to look to the US for concrete signs of support, especially in the economic field, as a means of reducing their dependence on Moscow and decreasing their vulnerability to Soviet pressure. We ought therefore to think carefully about the degree of support and encouragement we are willing to give them and its potential impact on other relationships, particularly those with Moscow. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: 6/78–3/79. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
2. Secretary Blumenthal’s report has not been found. Blumenthal did prepare a memorandum of conversation of his meeting with Andrei during the December 8 reception. Andrei discussed the Warsaw Pact meeting describing it as “extremely difficult” because of the differences between Bucharest and Moscow on defense budgets, relations with the PRC, and the Camp David Accords. Concerning Soviet pressure on Romania, Andrei told Blumenthal that the Romanians “judged the risk to be small. Militarily, he said, ‘we are not Czechoslovakia’ and ‘we have made certain preparations and would be ready.’ Economic pressures, if they occur, would cause some difficulty but Romania could handle them.” (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 308520 to Moscow, Bonn, and Bucharest, December 7, the Department forwarded cleared Bucharest remarks for Blumenthal. The statement stressed that he was visiting Romania at President Carter’s direction to reaffirm “the importance we attach to Romania’s independence and to U.S.-Romanian friendship.” The visit was also to highlight “the value we place on the constructive role that Romania plays in international affairs.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–1710) Blumenthal responded to the White House in telegram 22376 from Bonn, December 7, suggesting some changes. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850104–2477)
4. In telegram 30118 from Moscow, December 7, Ambassador Malcolm Toon reported urging Blumenthal to drop the words “Romania’s independence” from the opening paragraph of his Bucharest statement, since that phrase might strike the Soviets as “signaling US intent to split Romania away.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850061–1892)
5. Tab C is attached but not printed. The Embassy in Bucharest reported the conversation to the Department of the Treasury in telegram 8829, December 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780511–0990)
6. Tab D is attached but not printed. See footnote 2 above.
7. Responding to December 8 reports in the Austrian daily Kronen-Zeitung suggesting that the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Bucharest was engaged in an effort to overthrow Ceausescu at Soviet behest, the Embassy in Bucharest reported in telegram 8859, December 13, that there was no evidence to support the story. Nevertheless, the Embassy expected the story to continue to surface. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780517–1037)
8. In telegram 8890 from Bucharest, December 15, the Embassy reported on the meeting with Burtica. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780517–1167)
9. Attached but not printed. The Embassy reported on the conversation in telegram 8808 from Bucharest, December 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509–0095)
10. Ceausescu made the same points in his September 23 letter to President Carter which was delivered by Foreign Minister Andrei to Brzezinski on September 30. See footnote 2, Document 208.