Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

210. Editorial Note

On November 22–23, 1978, the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee (PCC) met in Moscow to approve a report by Unified Warsaw Pact Forces Commander in Chief Marshal Viktor Kulikov and adopt a joint declaration on several aspects of international affairs. The meeting in Moscow sought to reach agreement on increased defense expenditures by Pact members to countermand Soviet perceptions of an emerging imbalance of power between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact. Speaking at the meeting, increasingly frail Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev cautioned that “imperialism has now acquired an ally—today’s China.” Brezhnev continued: “They have already begun to feed today’s China, to supply it with weapons, and to push it toward hostile excursions against the socialist countries.” Setting out Soviet expectations for the meeting, Brezhnev added “The NATO countries coordinate their actions carefully in the military sphere. And it would be unforgivable if we did not do everything to ensure precise coordination among the Warsaw Treaty countries on defense issues.” (Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, pages 418–421)

Even before the meeting started, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu’s foreign policy goals came at odds with the consensus of the other Warsaw Pact leaders. In telegram 28013 from Moscow, November 16, the Embassy reported that, according to a Romanian diplomat, the documents to be adopted at the Moscow meeting were still being worked on and that if Bucharest had its way “any documents adopted will be relatively non-polemical, non-offensive, and generalized.” Disagreement, the telegram continued, “exists primarily between the Soviets and Romanians on a number of topics to be mentioned in the conference documents,” including “the Middle East, Vietnam, and relations between socialist states.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780475–0330) The declaration, the Embassy in Moscow reported in telegram 29052, November 27, focused primarily on disarmament and was “less polemical than has been case in recent Soviet commentary on these subjects.” The Embassy reported: The declaration was “also noteworthy for what it omits. This is particularly true of its failure to attack the Camp David Accords. If any doubt existed that Romania was responsible for this deviation from the Soviet line, it was removed when the other six PCC participants issued their supplemental declaration.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780488–0757)

After the end of the Moscow meeting, the members of the Warsaw Pact except Romania published a statement on the Middle East attacking the Camp David Accords and restating their support for the Bagdad Conference, the Arab League summit which denounced Sadat’s separate peace with Israel and excluded Egypt from the organization. Romania’s strong support for the Camp David Accords, despite Ceausescu’s previous reservations about a limited Egyptian-Israeli understanding without inclusion of the other parties, made it impossible to issue a unified Warsaw Pact statement. Its publication without Romanian support underscored the tensions between Bucharest and the other members.

A much stronger disagreement revolved around the presentation made by Kulikov on the status of Warsaw Pact forces, and especially on the proposal for agreement on increased rights of the Pact’s Supreme Commander in war time. Following Ceausescu’s return from Moscow, the Romanian Communist Party Politburo met on November 24 to discuss the results of the meeting. Describing for the Politburo the Moscow meeting, Romanian Prime Minister Manea Manescu portrayed Kulikov’s report as a result of Soviet “militarist circles” created “for the purpose of justifying the arms race, the so-called need to allocate high investments, to change the armaments in all of the sectors [of the economy] as soon as possible, and to involve the economic potential of all [Warsaw Pact] countries taking part in this arms race.” (Minutes of the Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, November 24, 1978; Romanian National Archives, CC RCP Chancellery Files, 89/1978. Published by the Cold War International History Project) While agreeing to continue living by its commitments under the 1955 Charter, the Politburo decided to continue to oppose what it saw as Soviet attempts to interfere in its internal affairs through demands for increased control, and to publicize its positions on military matters and increase of military expenditures, an unprecedented airing of Warsaw Pact internal disagreements.

Ceausescu “orchestrated public explanation and support from RCP Political Executive Committee and delegations from all social categories beginning with workers,” the Embassy in Bucharest reported in telegram 8461, November 27. “Amid cheering reminiscent of 1968 post-Czechoslovak invasion atmosphere,” Ceausescu’s performance, the Embassy wrote, “will do [him] no harm with Romanian population.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780488–0150) Ceausescu’s December 1 speech, reported by the Embassy in telegram 8603, December 1, “placed Romania’s differences with Warsaw Pact allies on formal public record in a context designed to demonstrate maximum national unity behind him.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780496–0373)

In telegram 8758 from Bucharest, December 7, the Embassy described Ceausescu’s actions as the result of “serious policy differences with Romania’s formal allies.” Ceausescu, the Embassy continued, was likely “under considerable pressure in the weeks leading up to the Warsaw Pact summit.” Ceausescu’s decision to go public, the Embassy reported, was a calculated gamble to elicit: “a) sympathy and support from the West, China, and others; b) genuine Romanian national unity around Ceausescu; and c) a chance to expand substantially Romania’s maneuvering room on foreign policy at one blow rather than by the usual small incremental steps.” The Embassy concluded that Ceausescu “may see an old and sick leadership in Moscow and the start of a succession struggle there, a Soviet Union deeply absorbed in SALT negotiations with the United States and profoundly concerned by a revitalized and outward-looking China, and a collection of East European states, who, to a greater or lesser extent, are reluctant allies of the Soviets and which may not-so-secretly share some of Romania’s points of view. In such a situation, small states can move decisively and successfully against big ones, and Ceausescu has moved.” “Any statement or other clear indication of U.S. support for Romanian independence would be especially effective and appreciated at this time,” Aggrey suggested. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780505–0012)

In the context of increasingly public disagreements between Bucharest and Moscow, the Carter administration faced the challenge of responding to the increased Soviet pressure on Romania at a time when its own relations with Bucharest were strained by the Pacepa affair in particular and human rights disagreements in general. While Corneliu Bogdan, Director of the Foreign Ministry Directorate for the Western Hemisphere, was in Washington to negotiate a new cultural exchange agreement, the idea of a high-level visit to Romania to underscore Washington’s support crystallized. Since Secretary of Commerce W. Michael Blumenthal was in Moscow as part of a European tour, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, informed him of President Carter’s desire that he visit Bucharest. (Telegram WH81569 to Moscow, December 5; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 7, Backchannel Messages: Europe: 12/78–5/78) The next day, Brzezinski notified Blumenthal by backchannel message that “the President very willingly approved my recommendation that you be asked to go,” and that “the Romanians understand and welcome the political point of your visit and will be receiving you as a Presidential emissary in this light.” Brzezinski also notified Blumenthal that Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff would be joining his party in Bonn prior to the departure for Bucharest. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: 6/78–3/79) In telegram 308284 to Bonn, Moscow, and Bucharest, the Department informed Secretary Blumenthal that his visit to Romania was a show of support for Bucharest’s “constructive role in international affairs,” and that the White House, would make a “low key announcement of visit at the regular press briefing Thursday, December 7.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–1696) For the announcement, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, page 2187.