Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

208. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 30, 1978, 7:30–8:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with Foreign Romanian Minister Stefan Andrei

PARTICIPANTS

• Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei
• Mr. Mitran, Secretary to Mr. Andrei
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• F. Stephen Larrabee, NSC (Notetaker)

After expressing his appreciation for Dr. Brzezinski taking the time to meet with him, Mr. Andrei noted that President Ceausescu had received the news of the meeting between Dr. Brzezinski and Andrei with pleasure. Mr. Andrei then handed Dr. Brzezinski a letter from President Ceausescu in answer to President Carter on the Middle East.²

Remarking that unfortunately time was limited due to the necessity of responding to Gromyko’s latest SALT proposal, Dr. Brzezinski stated that President Carter had asked him to transmit his greetings to President Ceausescu and to tell President Ceausescu how much he valued his relations with the (Romanian) President. President Carter recalled President Ceausescu’s perceptive comments on international issues.

Mr. Andrei then gave Dr. Brzezinski a book dedicated to Ceausescu’s visit to the United States and said he would convey to President Ceausescu President Carter’s remarks. He stressed that Romania was determined to work for the development of U.S.-Romanian relations in the spirit agreed at the Ceausescu-Carter meeting and that the RCP had highly evaluated the meeting between President Carter and President Ceausescu. Noting that his desire was to see an improvement in relations, Mr. Andrei said that it was in this spirit that he wished to raise three problems presently affecting bilateral relations.

The first was related to the defection of Ion Pacepa. This had created no little tension. Andrei noted that Romania had asked for Pacepa’s extradition, but that it understood the difficulties which this would present. Romania believed nonetheless that a decision not to allow Pacepa to remain in the U.S. would help U.S.-Romanian relations. Mr. Andrei stated that Pacepa had been working for some time for the CIA and that he had been involved in financial scandals in the Federal Republic. He repeated that Romania would like to see Pacepa’s stay in the United States voided.

The second problem raised by Mr. Andrei related to (unspecified) employees in the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest who he claimed had been inciting Romanian citizens not to return to Romania while they were abroad, particularly people in the field of science and technology. Mr. Andrei noted that Romania had not made these actions public nor had many party members been informed of details of the actions because the Romanian leadership did not wish to overcharge the atmosphere or create an incident. However, the Romanians would like to see such actions stopped.

The third issue raised by Mr. Andrei concerned economic relations, which he noted were generally developing quite well. However, it would be most helpful if the processing of export licenses could be accelerated. He also noted that President Carter’s letter had been well received.³

Dr. Brzezinski then responded to the points raised by Mr. Andrei. He began by stressing the importance that the U.S. attached to relations with Romania and the respect which the U.S. had for President Ceausescu. The U.S. considered Ceausescu an important international Statesman and a friend. Dr. Brzezinski emphasized that relations between Romania and the United States were good and that it was in this perspective that he wished to speak.

On the question of economic relations, Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that President Carter had ordered an acceleration of the processing of export licenses and he asked Mr. Larrabee to check on this. Dr. Brzezinski then raised the case of Dr. Vlad Georgescu, who had been invited to spend a year at the Woodrow Wilson Center but whose visa had yet to be approved.⁴ Mr. Andrei said that the case had been raised during his conversation with Counselor Nimetz the preceding day; he would discuss this with President Ceausescu when he returned to Romania.⁵

Regarding Mr. Andrei’s complaints about alleged agitation on the part of employees of the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, Dr. Brzezinski said he was skeptical of such reports and would be very surprised if they were true. It was possible they arose out of some misunderstanding. He promised to look into the matter.⁶ He assured Mr. Andrei, however, that this was not a deliberate policy on the part of the U.S. government, which he stressed does not engage in such activities as a matter of policy. He would check on it and asked Mr. Larrabee to investigate the charges and report his findings to him. If the charges proved to be true—which he doubted would be the case—he would call a halt to such activities.

Dr. Brzezinski then turned to the case of Ion Pacepa. He pointed out that Mr. Andrei could not be serious about the charges. The Romanians could not charge that Pacepa was a CIA agent and then at the same time ask for his extradition. They could not have it both ways. He was sure that Romania did not turn over its agents, and the Romanians could not realistically ask the U.S. to do something which they themselves would not do. Dr. Brzezinski stressed, however, that the U.S. was prepared to arrange for Pacepa’s resettlement in a third country with his family. He assured Mr. Andrei that the U.S. had not enticed Pacepa to defect. In his view, the best way to handle the case was quietly and he emphasized that the U.S. had no intention of exploiting the case, which should not be allowed to become an irritant in Romanian-U.S. relations.

Dr. Brzezinski next raised the case of several employees of Radio Free Europe (former Romanian citizens) in Munich who were beaten up under strange circumstances.⁷ Mr. Andrei replied that he knew nothing about the case. Dr. Brzezinski noted that as Foreign Minister, it was quite possible that Mr. Andrei did not know about such incidents which were normally carried out by other branches of the government, but that the U.S. nonetheless wished to see them stopped. Dr. Brzezinski stressed, however, that these issues were relatively minor points. The really important point was that U.S.-Romanian relations remain good and that both governments should not let subjective irritants affect relations.

Mr. Andrei replied that in the case of the agitation of the employees of the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, he had purposely not raised the issue with the U.S. Ambassador because he did not want to cause an incident and unnecessarily disturb relations.

Dr. Brzezinski then briefed Mr. Andrei on the recent SALT discussions with Mr. Gromyko, noting that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were very close to an agreement. The Soviets had made proposals and the U.S. had made counterproposals. While certain issues related to the Backfire and cruise missiles still remained unresolved, the two sides had significantly reduced differences and an agreement was close.

Mr. Andrei then briefed Dr. Brzezinski on the recent visit of Chinese Party Chairman Hua Kuo-Feng to Romania. He stressed that the visit was part of a general opening up on the part of China, not just economically but politically, militarily and scientifically. A PRC diplomatic offensive would be coming up. Hua realizes that China is lagging behind and that it must modernize. During the course of the visit Hua constantly asked Andrei detailed technical questions. How was this made, how much did this cost, etc. In regard to the Soviet Union, Mr. Andrei noted that the PRC’s policy toward the USSR had not changed.

Dr. Brzezinski remarked that Gromyko had been very concerned about the Chinese-Japanese Friendship Pact and had also been very concerned about Chinese contacts with Europe.⁸

Mr. Andrei replied that Romania had informed the Soviets about Hua’s visit; it was not discussed at the Crimea, however. The Soviet Union was particularly nervous because the visit had been preceded by the signing of the Chinese-Japanese Treaty. Mr. Andrei underscored the importance the Romanians attached to preserving their independence. They had not fought to exchange one master for another.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Hua had said anything about U.S.-Chinese relations.

Mr. Andrei said no, that the issue had not come up. If it had, the Romanians would have informed the United States. Relations with Albania, the non-aligned and Vietnam, inter alia, were discussed.

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether Mr. Andrei felt the U.S. should establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam. He noted that Vietnam had dropped all conditions. They were now ready to accept the U.S. position and establish relations in U.S. terms. How did Mr. Andrei think that the Chinese would react to the establishment of relations between the U.S. and Vietnam?

Mr. Andrei replied that he could not speak for the Chinese. In his (personal) opinion, the Chinese had not always acted wisely toward the Vietnamese. He did think, however, that Vietnam would eventually reach an independent position. He also noted that President Ceausescu had urged Vietnam to establish relations with the United States.

Dr. Brzezinski then asked about the situation in Cambodia and some of the stories of inhuman conditions there.

Mr. Andrei noted that many of these stories were true. The present leadership in Cambodia was not the leadership Vietnam had hoped for. The regime was strong, however, and an independent intermediary would be needed to help settle the dispute. In conclusion, he emphasized that the situation was very complex, both internally and externally.

Dr. Brzezinski again pressed Mr. Andrei about the establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Did he think it was a good idea?

Mr. Andrei replied yes, he did. While he could not speak for the Chinese, he felt they should realize that it was not good to have Vietnam dependent on one power. The establishment of relations with the U.S. was not an anti-Chinese move and the Chinese should recognize this.

Dr. Brzezinski expressed the hope that at some point he might be able to visit Bucharest. Mr. Andrei assured him he would be welcome. Mr. Andrei then stated that he had a request from President Ceausescu. The Romanians would welcome a short visit of Secretary Vance or the President when they were in Europe or the Middle East.

Dr. Brzezinski said he would bear it in mind and would support such a request. He then thanked Mr. Andrei for the opportunity to discuss the various issues in such an open and frank manner.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9/78–2/79, Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Larrabee. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office at the White House.
2. In a letter dated September 23, Ceausescu praised the agreements reached at Camp David between Egypt and Israel, but restated the Romanian position that peace in the Middle East could only be achieved by inclusion of all involved parties, including the Palestinians. Ceausescu noted that the accords did not oblige Israel “to withdraw not only from the Sinai, but from the West Bank, Gaza, and Golan [Heights] as well, respectively from all Arab territories occupied in the wake of 1967 war.” Ceausescu also called for resumption of the Geneva Talks on the Middle East and assured Carter that Romania would continue to “bring its active contribution to the instauration of a climate of lasting peace and full security in this area.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 16, Romania: President Nicolae Ceausescu, 2/77–12/78)
3. See footnote 2, Document 204.
4. Earlier on September 30, Larrabee sent Brzezinski a memorandum with talking points for his meeting with Andrei on the Pacepa case, export licensing, and Vlad Georgescu, a Romanian scholar and dissident who was invited by the Woodrow Wilson Center on a one-year fellowship in Washington and whose exit visa was being denied by the Romanian Government. The meeting with Brzezinski was intended to follow a meeting with Vance in New York the previous day but it had been canceled at the last minute. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 66, Romania: 6/78–3/79)
5. In telegram 257186 to Bucharest, October 11, the Department reported the discussions on bilateral issues between Nimetz and Andrei in New York on September 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780415–1130) The private discussion on Pacepa was reported in telegram 252848 to Bucharest. See footnote 5, Document 207.
6. In telegram 257771 to Bucharest, October 11, the Department reported allegations made by Andrei that U.S. Embassy employees were encouraging Romanian citizens to emigrate and asked the Embassy to investigate. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780416–0508) The Embassy response in telegram 7264 from Bucharest, October 13, stated that the allegations were “without foundation.” Aggrey wrote: “It is my strong impression that Andrei’s complaint was prompted by two different but related considerations: hypersensitivity of Romanian security establishment and GOR top level to US-Romanian consular relations in wake of Pacepa defection” and Embassy officials’ contact with Romanian citizens, especially Vlad Georgescu and Ecaterina Rauta. Aggrey continued: “These are sensitive cases for GOR, especially at this time. However, contacts involve legitimate US interest in persons who decided on their own, prior to contact, that they wish to travel to US.” Aggrey recommended that the Department inform the Romanian Government that the complaint was carefully investigated and found to be without merit. The Ambassador also recommended that the Romanians be informed that “it would not be supportive of progress in bilateral relations both sides seek for current sensitivities to result in restrictions on or obstacles to normal conduct of consular operations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780419–0034)
7. In telegram 3597 from Munich, November 22, 1977, the Consulate reported the attack in Paris on RFE Romanian broadcast freelancer Monica Lovinescu. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770433–0070) See also footnote 1, Document 207.
8. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 149.