207. Report Prepared in the Department of State1
The Romanian Defector Case
The Counsellor of the Department of State, Matt Nimetz, visited Romania on September 8 as a Special Emissary to discuss the case of Ion Mihai Pacepa, the Deputy Director of Romanian Intelligence, who defected to the West in August. The Romanians have been particularly upset by this defection because of the close personal relationship Pacepa had with President Ceausescu.2 They say that in light of the current very positive state of US-Romanian relations and the April 1978 visit to the United States by Ceausescu, it is impossible for them to understand our accepting this defector and initially demanded that we return Pacepa to Romania through extradition or otherwise.
Despite the Romanian concern, we do not believe that the defection will affect our basic relationship with them in the long term. Romania has a strong need for special ties to us as they pursue a foreign policy independent of the Soviets, and the Nimetz trip proved highly useful in demonstrating our continuing interest in maintaining just such a relationship.
In Bucharest, Nimetz made the following points to Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei:3
[Page 644]—The U.S. Government believes that this matter should not interfere with the steadily improving tone of US-Romanian relations.
—We will refrain from publicly exploiting Pacepa’s presence in the United States.
—Pacepa came to the United States of his own volition. No clandestine relationship existed between Pacepa and the U.S. Government before he presented himself to us in Bonn.
—Extradition would not be possible in this case, and if Romania pursued extradition it would only lead to unfortunate publicity.
—The only proper course, and the one best suited to maintaining our excellent relationship, is to close the book on this entire matter.
—There are no indications that Pacepa’s family knew anything about his plans. We hope that treatment of his wife and daughter will not compel Pacepa to raise the matter of their treatment publicly, which inevitably would have an adverse impact on our bilateral relations.
In order to signal to the Romanians that we were following a course of “business as usual,” Nimetz briefed them on a wide range of issues including the Middle East, China, US-Soviet relations, Southern Africa and disarmament. Nimetz also discussed bilateral issues and listed the positive economic decisions we have made since the Ceausescu visit (approval of a large number of export control cases, an ExIm loan approval, the Romanian fishing allotment, and CCC credits).4
Andrei, after consulting with Ceausescu, responded as follows, emphasizing that this was a personal and confidential message from Ceausescu to you:
—President Ceausescu shares President Carter’s desire to maintain the dialogue between the two countries and the momentum of the developing relationship.
—To eliminate this impediment to progress, it is necessary that Pacepa not be allowed to remain in the United States. Although extradition would be awkward, the United States is not required to permit Pacepa to remain in this country.
—Pacepa has already created problems with his provocative and misleading information. This has been designed to injure Romania’s relations with the United States, Germany, and the West in general. Certainly there are other forces (he meant, but did not name, the Soviet Union) who are interested in the deterioration of relations among the US, FRG, and Romania.
[Page 645]Andrei concluded by stating that Ceausescu told him to reiterate the full strength of the Romanian President’s desire for a political decision to continue to strengthen the cooperation between our two countries, and to find means to deal with the Pacepa matter in a way that does not do harm to our foreign relations or those of Romania.
Andrei then made the following personal comments:
—Without specifically mentioning the Soviet Union, Andrei left no doubt that the Romanians believe Pacepa is serving Soviet interests and was probably directed to defect by the Soviets. ([2 lines not declassified] This is a typical Eastern European reaction to discredit officials who defect.)
—He repeated several times that Pacepa had been in charge of security for Ceausescu on many official visits. Pacepa could, and would, seek to embarrass Ceausescu and harm Romanian interests with many countries.
—Andrei emphasized his and Ceausescu’s shock that the United States would give sanctuary to this traitor, given the excellent relations developed by the two Presidents and the improved relationship between the two governments. A way should be found to get him out of the United States.
[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]
Secretary Vance will tell Andrei in New York next week that Ceausescu’s message has been passed to the White House and will reiterate our belief that the Pacepa case should be put behind us so that our relations with Romania may continue to expand and improve.5
In addition, with Pacepa’s consent, we will explore with the Romanians an arrangement whereby Pacepa would voluntarily leave the United States. [1 line not declassified] In return, the Romanians would [Page 646] permit Pacepa’s wife and daughter to join him6 and would give assurances with respect to Pacepa’s safety.7
[1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified]
- Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–026, Romania—JEC. Secret; Sensitive. Sent under an undated covering memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. Gates forwarded the memorandum to Brzezinski and wrote: “Zbig—Regarding page 4: Given what the Romanians did to those RFE broadcasters (the CIA report last week), I would not trust them at all—especially in light of Ceausescu’s personal sense of betrayal concerning Pacepa and his apparent weakness for revenge.” Brzezinski forwarded the memorandum and the note to David Aaron adding “DA Stress to Carlucci the need to protect Pacepa’s safety.” Aaron wrote “Done” on the note.↩
- In telegram 5568 from Bucharest, August 9, Aggrey reported that Andrei had called him to a meeting in the Black Sea resort of Neptun to “convey President Ceausescu’s urgent request that U.S. return to Romania, General Mihai Pacepa” and that, in Ceausescu’s opinion, “should the CIA keep Pacepa this could not be considered a friendly gesture and would not be of a nature to permit improvement of our bilateral relations. Romania will draw the lessons it should from our response.” After conveying Andrei’s message, Aggrey commented: “Decision not to honor Ceausescu’s request is likely to seriously impair progress in our bilateral relations, especially in important humanitarian and consular areas. It may well produce serious general degradation for considerable period.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 11, Bucharest)↩
- In telegram 6321 from Bucharest, September 8, Aggrey reported Nimetz’s conversation with Andrei on Pacepa and other intelligence issues. (Ibid.) Andrei responded to Nimetz presentation the evening of September 8, when he joined Nimetz and Aggrey at dinner. Aggrey reported in telegram 6322 from Bucharest, September 9, that the Romanian Government had dropped the extradition demand, but was requesting that Pacepa not be allowed to remain in the United States. (Ibid.)↩
- The Embassy in Bucharest reported on Nimetz’s bilateral discussions in telegram 6402, September 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780370–1015)↩
- See footnote 5, Document 208. The meeting between Vance and Andrei scheduled for September 29 was canceled and apparently rescheduled for October 2; see Document 209. On September 29, Nimetz and Andrei met to discuss the Pacepa case over breakfast at the Romanian Mission to the United Nations. The Department reported the conversation to Ambassador Aggrey in telegram 252848 to Bucharest, October 4. Nimetz told Andrei that “in his personal view, it was very significant that the U.S. Government had responded in this sensitive matter by agreeing to facilitate, at the request of another government, the departure of a person who we had taken in. He knew of no similar case. The Romanian side therefore should consider this as very significant.” Andrei responded that a decision on the issue could only be taken by Ceausescu. (INR/IL, 980643000018, Box 11, Bucharest) No response to the offer was found.↩
- On September 22, Nimetz forwarded to Christopher a draft memorandum for the President reporting on his trip to Bucharest. In the covering memorandum, Nimetz informed Christopher that his plan was to raise the issue of Pacepa’s resettlement in a private meeting with Andrei following the bilateral with Vance, provided “the Romanian Government permitted his family to join him and assured his safety.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department of State, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, January 1977 thru December 1980, Lot 81D85, Box 1, MN Chron—Official—July–December 1978)↩
- During his September 8 conversation with Andrei, Nimetz informed him that the United States had information of plans by the Romanian intelligence services “to physically eliminate several persons residing in the United States.” “It is imperative” Nimetz told Andrei, “that control be placed over these present and planned activities and that they be stopped forthwith. You can be assured that my Government will take all necessary measures to protect our citizens. If these plans are not abandoned, the most serious consequences for our relationship must be expected.” On September 1, prior to his departure, Nimetz forwarded the talking points in this report to Christopher for approval. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department of State, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, January 1977 thru December 1980, Lot 81D85, Box 1, MN Chron—Official—July–December 1978.) The talking points were sent to Bucharest in telegram 226364, September 7. (INR/IL, 980643000018, Box 11, Bucharest)↩