171. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Briefing Paper for Mr. Aaron’s Meeting with Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister Janos Nagy, Wednesday, May 28, 1980, at 4:30 p.m.

I. PARTICIPANTS

  • Americans

    • Mr. Aaron
  • Hungarians

    • Janos NAGY, Deputy Foreign Minister (Phonetic: NODGE)
    • Ambassador Janos PETRAN, Chief MFA Department V
    • Ferenc ESZTERGALYOS, Hungarian Ambassador to the U.S. (Phonetic: Ess-ter-GUY-oash)

II. INTRODUCTION

Nagy is responsible for Hungary’s relations with the West. He will be named very shortly to be State Secretary, the number two position in the Foreign Ministry. Petran is Hungary’s chief CSCE and disarmament negotiator, and has just been named to head MFA Territorial Department V, which conducts Hungary’s relations with the U.S., Canada, the [Page 508] U.K., the FRG and Benelux. Nagy and Petran are heading a Hungarian delegation to the U.S. for annual consultations on CSCE.2

Hungary continues to stand out among Warsaw Pact countries in terms of its relatively relaxed domestic situation, commitment to economic reforms, and forthcoming attitude toward CSCE implementation. In the post-Afghanistan period Hungary has continued to stress detente and CSCE. The Hungarians welcome our policy of continuing to seek further improvements in U.S.-Hungarian relations.

III. ISSUES

A. Afghanistan and East-West Relations

U.S. opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan arises from a sincere desire to further the cause of international peace and stability. The Soviets’ use of force against a small country threatens the security of all nations and raises serious questions about their future intentions.

—The actions we have taken against the Soviets, therefore, are not intended to affect Eastern Europe. We continue to sell grain and controlled technology to Hungary. While our export licensing controls have been extended, we will continue to grant exceptions to specific restrictions for exports to Hungary and other Eastern European countries.

—However, as we have pointed out to Hungarian officials on a number of occasions, continued access to U.S. grain and sensitive technology will depend on Hungary’s willingness to respect our concerns regarding their end use.

B. Iran

—Although we appreciate Hungary’s private statements strongly disapproving of Iran’s holding of diplomatic hostages, we are disappointed by Hungary’s public statements which tend to emphasize Iran’s alleged grievances against the United States and imply that the hostages are strictly a bilateral issue.

—We are actively pursuing all opportunities for discussion with Iran that could lead to an honorable resolution of the crisis. We are convinced that economic sanctions supported by nations committed [Page 509] to the peaceful resolution of disputes will have a constructive impact, contributing to the resolution of the crisis.

—We believe that Hungary shares an interest in the release of the hostages, which would contribute to the easing of tensions and would create a safer environment for diplomats of all nations. Active steps by Hungary to secure the hostages’ release would be deeply appreciated by our government and people.

C. Bilateral Relations

—We are pleased with the great progress we have made in our bilateral relations over the past three years. It is no exaggeration to say that the President’s decision to return the Crown of St. Stephen to the Hungarian people and the signing of the Trade Agreement in July 1978 marked the beginning of a new era in U.S.-Hungarian relations.

—We remain committed to improving relations with Hungary on the basis of mutual respect and advantage.3

  • •It reflects our mutual desire to expand economic and commercial relations.
  • •It reflects our mutual desire to implement the provisions of all three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act.
Peter Tarnoff
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 27, Hungary: 1/78–1/81. Confidential. No memorandum of conversation was found. Stephen Larrabee, of the NSC, forwarded the briefing paper to David Aaron under a May 28 covering memorandum outlining the main points. (Ibid.) Attached biographic material is not printed.
  2. Nagy also met with Counselor Ridgway and Under Secretary Nimetz. In telegram 142884 to Budapest, May 31, the Department informed the Embassy of Ridgway’s discussions with Nagy, which focused on East-West relations, high-level visits, trade, economic, and cultural relations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800266–0800) The Department transmitted the memorandum of conversation between Nimetz and Nagy on June 3, to Budapest in telegram 145697. The conversation focused on East-West relations, bilateral relations, Yugoslavia, and CSCE. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800272–0403)
  3. For an attached political overview of Hungary, see Document 172.