170. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Hungarian Wheat Sales to the USSR
The Department of State has implemented the approved recommendation of the SCC meeting of March 20, 1980, by calling in Hungarian Ambassador Esztergalyos on March 28 and informing him as follows:2
—We attach importance to the limitations we have placed on sales of both grain and high technology to the USSR. We have explained to your government and to many others that diversion of such items to the USSR would be viewed most unfavorably by us.
—On high technology exports, we have purposely continued sales to Eastern European countries because we have wanted to recognize their special needs and their noninvolvement in the invasion of Afghanistan.
—On grain, we understand that the Soviet Union has asked to buy an abnormally large amount of grain from Hungary this year, up to several hundred thousand tons above the shipments in the most recent years. We believe shipments of this magnitude would be somewhat excessive. They would be viewed unfavorably by the US and taken into account in our own future sales of grain to Hungary because such Hungarian shipments would undercut our policy of reducing the total of our grain shipments to the Soviet Union.
In addition, we have instructed our embassies in Canberra and Ottawa and our mission in Brussels to inform host governments and the Commission of our approach to the Hungarians on grain exports [Page 507] as soon as we have advised them that the demarche has been made in Washington.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 111, SCC 293, 3/25/80 Iran/Afghanistan. Confidential. Deal forwarded the memorandum to Aaron on April 2, informing Brzezinski that the Department had not included hard numbers in the discussion with the Hungarians to protect the Hungarian source who had provided the information to the USDA. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 83534 to Budapest, March 29, the Department informed the Embassy of the discussion between Barry and the Hungarian Ambassador the day before. The points outlined in the March 29 memorandum to Brzezinski were delivered to Ambassador Esztergalyos as a non-paper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800158–0779) In telegram 1732 from Budapest, the Embassy suggested that the Hungarians “definitely have the message and understand our position” but that “from our viewpoint, we believe that we should not continue to hit the Hungarians on wheat diversion until we have more evidence that we should be concerned.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800168–0763)↩