Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

449. Minutes of a Special Coordinating Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 7, 1980, 10–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Minutes: SCC Meeting on Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS

• STATE

  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Ronald Spiers, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
  • Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern-South Asian Affairs

• DEFENSE

  • Robert W. Komer, Under Secretary for Policy Affairs
  • Daniel Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Matters

• JUSTICE

  • Judge Charles Renfrew, Deputy Attorney General

• JCS

  • Lt. Gen. John Pustay, Ass’t. to the Chairman

• DCI

  • Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director
  • Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
  • Charles Cogan, Chief, Near Eastern Division

• OMB

  • John White, Deputy Director

• WHITE HOUSE

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Thomas Thornton

Brzezinski: Pointed out that there were three items on the agenda. The first is an increase from $30 million to $50 million in support for the Afghan insurgents. The second is a Finding to permit covert supply of military equipment to Pakistan. The third is a request for $2 million for refugee support. He asked Adm. Turner to introduce the first item.

Turner: Up until now the opportunities of sending materials to the Afghan insurgents has been limited by pipeline restrictions in Pakistan. Now, however, the Pakistanis say that these restrictions are overcome and they want to increase the flow. The Saudis also want to maximize our efforts. I am concerned that the Soviets may be building up for a major offensive following the Olympics and the insurgents will need an increase in support in late August and early September. Therefore we should act now.

Newsom: State Department agrees.

Brzezinski: Is there no objection (there was none). Therefore we shall recommend unanimously to the President that we favor this first item. Will you please now go on to the second?

Turner: This represents an approach by General Akhtar, but he assures me that Zia is definitely behind it. The idea is to strengthen the Pakistani sense of assurance and to ensure that they continue the kinds of programs we have just been discussing. We and the Pakistanis have reached agreement on the numbers involved.

The Pakistanis do not want this openly; they prefer on a covert basis. I cannot guarantee that they will not be coming back to us for more. Our lawyers believe that it is legal for us to do this.

Komer: Are the SA–7s available?

Turner: No, [less than 1 line not declassified].

Brzezinski: Why can they simply not buy them? They are getting money from the Saudis.

Turner: It is very hard to find SA–7s.

Carlucci: The Pakistanis see this as an integral part of our cooperative program with them in supporting the insurgency.

Brzezinski: I find that we are crossing a very dubious boundary line here on the political side. Not much money is involved. They have turned down our military aid; are they trying by this means to accomplish something that is substantively significant? Are they perhaps seeking an increase in our political commitment? I have recommended to State that we have a PRC on Pakistan in light of the cable from Ambassador Hummel.² Could we not defer this question until then? (Not, of course, the covert aspect which has to be handled in an SCC, but the issue of the overall military relationship.) This is after all a qualitatively different type of political decision that we would be making.

Komer: This all will not help the Pakistanis very much militarily. In addition their troops are not used to this kind of equipment. If we go ahead for this, does it not give them a signal for further expansion?

Brzezinski: It certainly gives them some kind of a signal. We should weigh the political component very carefully. Therefore I am very uneasy about this. The Pakistanis have the money to buy this equipment and if necessary we could help them locate it.

Turner: This is part of the decision we made to help the Afghan insurgents. This will keep the Pakistanis on board; it is what they say they need.

Brzezinski: But we can sell equipment to them or help them find it. This operation would in all likelihood leak and could prejudice their program. I would emphasize that this is a political decision.

Aaron: What is the difference between supplying this covertly and openly? Why do they want it covertly?

Newsom: We have no objection to sending in Soviet equipment but we do not believe there is a fine line between what is used in the camps and by the insurgents in Afghanistan. We would have no way of knowing what crossed the frontier. Therefore we do not want to provide US equipment in a covert operation.

Carlucci: The Pakistanis see this as one overall operation and are skimming some off of the top. We are proposing, in effect, a two-to-one ratio.

Turner: Should we say in the Finding³ that we will provide Soviet or other equipment?

Newsom: The State Department position is that there should be no weapons involved that are of US-origin.

Turner: Then we can delete the “or US” in the Finding.

Komer: Where are the SA–7s? [4 lines not declassified]

Brzezinski: Let’s get a proposal on the table.

Aaron: How about having the Chinese do it? They need SA–7s themselves and do not make them.

Brzezinski: Let’s look into that also.

Turner: [2 paragraphs (5 lines) not declassified]

Murphy: [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

Aaron: Before we leave this issue are we all comfortable on the legal side?

Turner: Our lawyers have looked into it and said it is legal.

Newsom: We agree, and our Congressional liaison people say that it would also be feasible.

Turner: Taking up the third item, help for the refugee families, we recognize that this is peanuts but the Saudis are very anxious that we follow this. They see Muslims being killed in Afghanistan and feel that we should be doing more about it. By cooperating in this program we can keep our actions synchronized with the Saudis.

Brzezinski: This is certainly a minimal thing, apparently a form of Baksheesh. Let’s go ahead and do it.

Newsom: I am concerned that this is introducing a new dimension into the relationship. What will the long term total be?

Carlucci: I don’t see that this is really much different from regular refugee relief.

Newsom: We think that the $1 million figure for this is simply unrealistic.

Brzezinski: Let us register then that this is only a one-time operation and is meant as a goodwill gesture. It should not be the opening of a new program.

Spiers: Once you start a program like this, it is hard to stop.

Aaron: I think it would be easier to stop it right now before it starts.

Brzezinski: Well then, let’s turn this request down.

Cogan: This is really a matter of principle for the Saudis and we should go ahead.

Carlucci: The Saudis feel that we just are not paying attention to the Muslims.

Constable: We are putting some $50 million into refugee relief.

Turner: But this would be tailored specifically to help the fighters. I have no doubt that it will grow; we will just have to keep it in bounds.

Carlucci: [1 line not declassified]

Turner: (After some general discussion showing unease.) Let me simply withdraw this item. I will use my own good judgment in how I expend some funds that are already authorized.

Renfrew: As I look at the Finding, must we use the word “lethal” twice in it?

Brzezinski: Why don’t we just drop the word “lethal” in its second usage?

White: No. It is necessary for it conveys a very special meaning.

Brzezinski: Very well then. Let us close. We will expect the proposal with regard to the SA–7s in one week.

Thereupon the meeting closed at 10:25 a.m.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 103, SCC: (I) Pakistan 7/7/80: 7/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. For the Summary of Conclusions of this meeting, identified as a Special Coordinating Committee (Intelligence) meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 298.
2. See Document 447.
3. A draft of the Finding was attached to the undated memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for members of the Special Coordination Committee; see the attachment to Document 448. For the final text, see Document 450.