447. Message From the Embassy in Pakistan to the National Security Council and the Department of State1
For: Brzezinski and UnderSecy of State Newsom.
From: Amb Hummel.
1. Summary: This message is designed (a) to stimulate longer-range thinking about a contingency I think likely—that the Sovs will later this summer begin armed attacks into Pakistan; (b) to solicit USG instructions to me on the subject of preparing Pakistan to repel such attacks and (c) to lead to a dialogue with Pres Zia on this subject. End summary.
2. I assign a somewhat higher probability than do others to the likelihood of Soviet attacks across the border into Pakistan, after the Olympics are over.2 I see the Soviets as being completely incapable as of now of making any progress toward their goals in Afghanistan, and because they will not give up in defeat, they are very likely to escalate their pressures.
3. For me, the basic Soviet goal is not so much propping up Babrak, or dampening the insurgency, but is far more basic and ambitious—the remaking, over a number of years, of all the institutions in Afghanistan so that Afghanistan is more than just a Finland but rather is indistinguishable from other SSR’s. I think they came in December thinking they could provide basic security so that the party, the Afghan army, the civil service, the economy, and the religious infrastructure [Page 1017] could over time all be re-built in a socialist mode. They assumed difficulties but nothing of the present magnitude of internal resistance and external pressures.
4. Thus the Sovs must be deeply discouraged, because they must realize that it is now impossible to achieve even minimal progress toward rebuilding a new and viable Afghan polity, given the hatreds and tensions endemic in that society, added to which is the new anti-Soviet fervor displayed in cities and countryside alike. I do not believe any Soviet planner can realistically see any way to begin reviving the Khalq-Parcham Party, the army, or any other Afghan institution.
5. Therefore, I rate as fairly high the possibility that the Sovs will seek to break this downward trend by lashing out at visible sources of external support—i.e., Iran, or more likely Pakistan. Soviet motives will likely be a combination of (a) desire to curtail the insurgents’ cross-border activities; (b) an expectation of destabilizing Pakistan, perhaps to the point where the Pakistan Peoples Party (the President of which has already announced [her] desire to accommodate to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan) can succeed a Zia government that has demonstrated its inability to defend the country; and/or (c) Soviet hopes for the additional bonus of presenting the USG with a very serious dilemma—whether to offer to deploy US forces to Pakistan with the attendant risk of direct US-Soviet combat, or to be seen by our allies as being unable to give meaningful substance to our assurances that we will resist the Sovs and defend countries that come under attack by them.
6. But the exact degree of probability of this scenario is not my central point. Even if higher-level USG estimates should differ from mine, all should agree there is a measurable possibility, that is far from zero, that we may see Soviet intrusions into Pakistan, and we should be making plans for that contingency, even if some may think it less than likely.
7. Pres Zia has passed word [less than 1 line not declassified]3 that he needs some immediate help for his own forces because of his concerns which seem similar to mine, about a more aggressive Soviet posture later this year. He has pointed out that time may be short, if as we fear the Sovs begin to move in August after the Olympics are over. He has asked specifically for SA–7’s and RPG–7’s for his own army to upgrade his ability to defend against, and to repel, “hot pursuit” raids, or perhaps temporary lodgment of Sov forces in some border areas of Pakistan.
[Page 1018]8. It is not going to be useful to engage at this juncture in piecemeal or incremental decision-making. No “one-time exception” to our present policies of arming Afghan rebels only (and not GOP forces) is going to serve. We should look at longer-term needs and act accordingly. For one thing, there is no inherent need to confine ourselves to Soviet-origin equipment if Pak forces are to be the recipient. And SA–7’s seem extremely difficult (and perhaps impossible) to acquire in the numbers that would be needed for a meaningful upgrading of the GOP’s defense forces on the border. Logically, US or European origin weapons would be even better, as Zia has said, and preferably in magnitudes that will produce a meaningful, and not just a cosmetic, upgrading of GOP capabilities. Any Pak Govt, Zia’s or a successor’s, would be severely undermined by a demonstration that it cannot take strong and effective action against such Soviet aggression; likewise, Pakistan and Saudi, and PRC, and NATO, and Thai confidence in the USG would plummet if our responses to this danger are seen as feeble, or late. A modest number of SA–7’s, RPG’s and other new weapons for the Pak Army, even if we could find them, will not materially affect Pakistan’s abilities to defend itself at this low end of the escalatory spectrum. We should think in broader, more realistic terms if we want insurance against an unstable situation that the Soviets would take further advantage of.
9. Ideally, we should wait until the Saudis, Kuwaitis, etc, produce funds with which the Paks could purchase US weapons, and then we would make cash sales with the usual congressional consultations. It does not appear that we have the time for this. [less than 1 line not declassified] fund the weapons on a grant basis would, I presume, not violate the Symington Amendment’s prohibition against using Foreign Assistance Act funds in Pakistan, but I have no way of knowing whether [less than 1 line not declassified] the necessary congressional consultations prior to their use would present an obstacle in terms of the spirit of Symington. In any event, there is a strong case for moving as quickly as we can, by whatever means are necessary.
10. Whatever we furnish to the GOP would, I believe, be used prudently on the Afghan [garble—borders?]; there is no streak of adventurism in the Pak military that might trigger an unnecessary conflict with the USSR. However, I doubt that we could obtain cast-iron assurances from the Paks that under no circumstances would our weapons ever appear on the Indian front; we could perhaps get agreement that they would be used for defense against India only in the event of a coordinated Indian-Soviet attack from both fronts (the Paks think this likely but we do not) but defining that contingency would likely leave loopholes.
11. As can be seen, this message is designed to open a discussion with Washington decision-makers—a discussion that should not be [Page 1019] too lengthy in view of the short time for action. I would hope that a further step in the not distant future would be for me to get instructions with which I could start a direct dialogue with Pres Zia on these matters. Dept will know that I have made sure, directly with Zia as well as indirectly [less than 1 line not declassified] that Zia knows that I am fully informed of all aspects [less than 1 line not declassified] with the GOP. Zia has let me know that he does not want me to discuss these matters with any MFA officials, nor do I want to. If I get appropriate Wash instructions, I could arrange a special meeting with Zia, without MFA presence, for discussion of his latest request for SA–7’s and RPG’s as well as broader discussions of the parameters of possible USG inputs, and whatever stipulations we would have to make about use and deployment of the weapons.