Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

448. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 30, 1980

SUBJECT

• Afghan Covert Action Program

I would like to report to the SCC on my recent discussions on the Afghan covert action program with [less than 1 line not declassified] and [less than 1 line not declassified] in Saudi Arabia.² [less than 1 line not declassified] gave an unequivocal endorsement to continued Saudi participation in this program, including any expansion of it that appeared feasible. He clearly is anxious to provide everything that we possibly can to the cause of the Afghan insurgents. There are three aspects of the program which require SCC attention:

a. The Pakistanis have indicated to us a capability and willingness to increase the flow of arms to the Afghan insurgents. I propose that we plan on a total program of $50 million rather than $30 million as has previously been planned. This amount would be divided equally [less than 1 line not declassified]. Funds for our portion would be made available from [less than 1 line not declassified] but this may require another 1981 supplemental [less than 1 line not declassified].

b. The Pakistanis have approached us to provide a limited number of SA–7s and RPG–7s for their own defensive use in the border areas. This is a reasonable and logical item of support for our program to the Afghan insurgents [3 lines not declassified]. This program could cost up to $6 million over some period of time. Availability of the SA–7s is such, however, that it will take some time to provide that much support. I propose asking the Saudis to fund this program jointly. (Attached is a formal SCC proposal for this aspect of the program.)

c. The Pakistanis have approached the Saudis to provide $2 million to support the families of Mujaheddin now resident in Pakistan. The point here is that some of the fighters cannot go off to Afghanistan because they must work to support their families. The Saudis feel very strongly that this portion of the program is at least as important as the provision of the arms themselves. They propose to fund it separately. I recommend we offer to fund it jointly and merge it with the other two programs above. This would help to continue the fine team effort we have had with the Saudis thus far. It would also ensure against the Pakistanis in any way playing one of us and one of our programs against the other. (S)

Stansfield Turner³

Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for Members of the Special Coordination Committee⁴

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Covert Action Options for Pakistan

1. INITIATIVE: The initiative for this proposal originates within CIA in response to a Pakistani request. It arises from Pakistani concern about future Soviet incursions into Pakistan in retaliation for Pakistani support to the Afghan insurgents.

2. ISSUE FOR DECISION: The issue for decision is whether CIA should supply Pakistan with weapons to counter possible [less than 1 line not declassified] incursions into Pakistan. Since the Presidential Finding of 28 December 1979,⁵ [1 line not declassified] approximately $10 million worth of weapons and materiel to the Afghan insurgents. An additional $20 million worth of equipment will have been distributed by September 1980. There is good evidence that this materiel is being effectively used by the insurgents.

The Pakistanis are concerned about [less than 1 line not declassified] incursions into Pakistan in retaliation for this aid program. [4 lines not declassified] The Pakistanis are not intimidated by the [less than 1 line not declassified] threat but wish to be prepared to meet it. To this end they have asked for assistance in acquiring for their own purposes some of the types of anti-armor and anti-air weaponry which have been passed to the Afghan insurgents. The Pakistanis intend to place these weapons along the Afghanistan border at spots most vulnerable [less than 1 line not declassified].

3. ACTION OPTIONS: Our first preference is to supply the Pakistanis with Soviet-made weapons. If these are not available from [less than 1 line not declassified] the world arms market, we would then supply them with weapons of some other country. Lastly, we would provide U.S. weapons if necessary. We are requesting authority to acquire and deliver the weapons, either unilaterally, or through other countries, [less than 1 line not declassified] and to offer procurement advice if the Pakistanis wish to act on their own or through other countries. This is in order to retain as much flexibility as possible in terms of channels, funding, and advice in supplying the weapons. These weapons would be deployed in Pakistan for defensive purposes only.

We are making one proposal containing three aspects:

A. Provide Pakistan with about 100 Soviet SA–7 Missiles and 20 Launchers and 100 Soviet RPG–7 Anti-armor launchers and appropriate ammunition.

B. To the extent that Soviet weapons are not available, provide Pakistan with foreign manufactured weapons of similar capability.

C. To the extent that neither Soviet nor equivalent foreign weapons are obtainable, provide Pakistan with U.S.-manufactured weapons with similar capabilities to the SA–7 and RPG–7, such as Redeye missiles and Dragon Anti-armor weapons.

RISK: Moderate COST: $6 million

4. COMMENTS: The Pakistanis believe that the target of Soviet incursions would be Afghan refugee camps, Pakistani frontier forces outposts and Pakistan SIGINT installations. This is where they would deploy these weapons for defensive purposes.

Consideration has been given to supplying Pakistan through the Defense Department’s Foreign Military Sales Program, but the Pakistanis do not want to overtly purchase this material because of [1 line not declassified] and probable adverse domestic Pakistan reaction. (This paper does not consider possible overt options which would in any event be complicated by the Symington Amendment to the International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act.) Having turned down a $400 million U.S. offer for the putative reason that it was inadequate in the face of the Soviet threat, President Zia will find it difficult or impossible to publicly justify a small purchase which could generate the same threat. Zia is aware of and endorses this request with the understanding that the matter be handled via intelligence channels as part of the Afghan support program and not as open U.S. aid which would be publicly announced. Ambassador Hummel supports this proposal as a one-time effort to assist the Pakistanis in defending the border. He also noted the importance of keeping the matter secret.

5. FINDING: The option outlined above requires a Presidential Finding, and will require reporting to Congressional Oversight Committees—in accordance with Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. A draft Presidential Finding is attached. Also attached is a Scope Paper to indicate what CIA will do if the activity is approved.⁶

6. SOURCE OF FUNDS: Saudi Arabia will contribute half the cost of these weapons ($3 million) as part of their matching funds program for Afghan support. No money is in the Agency budget for this purpose. If this program is approved [1 line not declassified].

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000013, Box 4, SCC Reports 1979–1980, SCC Meeting Book 27, July 7, 1980. Secret.
2. Turner visited Jidda on June 22. He reported on his trip to Saudi Arabia, among other countries, in a July 7 memorandum to Carter. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, 80 Saudi Arabia) For the portion of the memorandum on his talks in Saudi Arabia, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 297.
3. Turner signed “Stan Turner” above this typed signature.
4. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A stamped date reads: “30 Jun 1980.”
5. See footnote 2, Document 428.
6. Both are attached but not printed.