Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

298. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordinating Committee (Intelligence) Meeting¹

Washington, July 7, 1980, 10–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Conclusions: SCC (I) Meeting on Pakistan (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• STATE

  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
  • Ronald Spiers, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
  • Peter Constable, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern-South Asian Affairs

• DEFENSE

  • Robert W. Komer, Under Secretary for Policy Affairs
  • Daniel Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Matters

• JUSTICE

  • Judge Charles Renfrew, Deputy Attorney General

• JCS

  • Lt. Gen. John Pustay, Ass’t. to the Chairman

• DCI

  • Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director
  • Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
  • Charles Cogan, Chief, Near Eastern Division

• OMB

  • John White, Deputy Director

• WHITE HOUSE

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

• NSC

  • Thomas Thornton

The SCC (I) met to discuss three CIA proposals regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan. (S)

The first proposal was unanimously recommended. It provides for an increase from [less than 1 line not declassified] to [less than 1 line not declassified] in covert support for the Afghan insurgency.² We and the Saudis would split the costs. The earlier bottlenecks in Pakistan have been overcome and both the Pakistanis and Saudis are anxious to increase the level of support. Admiral Turner noted that this may be needed quickly if the Soviets undertake an expansion of their military activities in Afghanistan after the Olympics are over. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the increase in support for the Afghan insurgents from [less than 1 line not declassified] to [less than 1 line not declassified], the cost to be shared equally with Saudi Arabia.³ (S)

A second proposal was also unanimously supported, albeit with qualifications. It involves a finding (attached at Tab A for your signature) that would have us share with the Saudis the cost of up to [amount not declassified] for Soviet or other hand-held anti-tank and anti-aircraft launchers (100 each). CIA would provide necessary training. The Pakistanis want this covertly because of their earlier problems with our assistance offer. According to CIA, they see this as an integral and necessary part of their ongoing support for the Afghan insurgents. State and NSC expressed concern that the Pakistanis are using this method as a means of increasing our political commitment to them, and noted that there should be no major problem for the Pakistanis simply to buy the equipment. Nonetheless, in view of the urgent Pakistani desire (and the fact that they control distribution of our material and can skim off whatever they want anyway) it was agreed to recommend that you approve the finding. The finding was changed, however, to exclude the provision of US-origin equipment. The Pakistanis do not want it for political reasons and there is a real danger that it might find its way across the border. SA–7s are preferred, but these are in short supply; European equivalents may be available. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached finding.⁴

A third proposal, to provide jointly with the Saudis some [amount not declassified] in assistance to the refugee families whose breadwinners are fighting in Afghanistan, was found to have a number of problems and was withdrawn. The same effect can be achieved through other means. (S)

The SCC (I) also further directed that by next week DOD and CIA should come up with specific proposals for the manufacture of SA–7s. It is clear that we need an additional source since the supplies available in Europe are pretty well dried up. There are three apparent options for manufacture—in the US [less than 1 line not declassified] in Egypt [less than 1 line not declassified].⁵ (S)

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–020, SCC Minutes and S/C, 1980. Secret; Sensitive. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: “Zbig, J.” The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The full text of the Summary of Conclusions is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIX, South Asia.
2. The proposal originated in a memorandum from Turner to Brzezinski, June 30, reporting on Prince Fahd’s “unequivocal endorsement” of ongoing Saudi participation in the Afghan program. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 10–12/80) See Document 297.
3. Carter approved the recommendation and initialed “J” in the right margin.
4. Not attached. Carter signed the Finding on July 8. Its scope was Pakistan, with the description: “Provide directly to the Government of Pakistan, or via third countries, lethal military equipment of Soviet or other foreign manufacture for defensive purposes along the Afghan border. As necessary, provide cash, procurement advice and weapons training. Encourage other countries to discreetly supply funds or lethal military equipment directly to Pakistan.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980)
5. In a memorandum for the record, June 17, Carlucci stated that in his view there were only two possible routes to procure SA–7s for Pakistan: Foreign Military Sales or a Presidential Finding. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos, Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron Meetings, January–December 1980) In a memorandum to Brown, July 7, Komer noted that during the SCC(I) meeting he had “insisted” that the SA–7 issue be decided “promptly” and that the CIA and Department of Defense provide proposals in a week in which it would be decided if the SA–7s would be of Egyptian or U.S. origin. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0217, Box 2, Afghanistan, Jan–Feb 1980) No proposals were found. An undated memorandum from Turner to Brzezinski reviewed a proposal for a program sponsored by the Department of Defense in which SA–7 clones would be manufactured in Egypt and in exchange Egypt would receive Redeye missiles from the United States. Turner noted that Egypt appeared uninterested in this deal, which remained inconclusive at the end of the Carter administration. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–031, Sep–Dec 1980)