Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

438. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 21, 1980, 10:30–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Minutes—PRC Meeting on Pakistan (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher, Dep. Secr.
  • Harold Saunders, Ass’t. Secr., Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
  • Matthew Nimetz, Under Secr. for Security Assistance, Science & Technology
  • Arthur Hummel, Ambassador to Pakistan

• Treasury

  • Fred Bergsten, Ass’t. Secr.
  • Donald Templeman, Director, Office for Developing Nations and Finance

• Defense

  • Ambassador Robert Komer, Under Secr. for Policy
  • David McGiffert, Ass’t. Secr., Internat. Security Affairs

• OMB

  • Dr. John White, Dep. Director
  • Randy Jayne, Assoc. Dir. for Nat’l. Sec. & Internat. Affairs

• ACDA

  • Spurgeon Keeny, Dep. Director
  • Dr. Robert Roch, Dep. Ass’t. Dir. for Non-Proliferation

• JCS

  • Lt. Gen. John Pustay

• DCI

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
  • Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia

• IDCA

  • Guy Erb, Deputy Director

• White House

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Ambassador Henry Owen

• NSC

  • Thomas P. Thornton

The meeting opened with a briefing by Admiral Turner on the situation in Pakistan. He noted a substantial change in mood in the country—an abatement of fear of Soviet attack in the short-run and a growing desire to cooperate with India. He noted however that the Pakistanis feel isolated from their traditional friends because of the inadequate aid they have received. On balance they have time to weigh their options.

Admiral Turner continued on domestic matters, noting that President Zia looks to be in office for the foreseeable future but that he faces difficult problems in the long-term on both the political and economic fronts.

Overall the sense in Pakistan is one of political apathy and a sufficient fear of the outside threat that there is a reluctance to change leadership. Also there is no real competitor in sight.

Admiral Turner noted a new reality in Pakistani foreign politics—an unwillingness to antagonize either India or the Soviet Union, a desire to improve relations with India, and a seeking for support wherever available, especially among the non-aligned. Most Pakistanis oppose a rapprochement with the Soviets but the outcome of that debate is still undecided. It is difficult for the Pakistanis to meet the various demands that the Soviets are likely to put on them. Pakistan will, however, seek to improve relations with the Soviets.

With regard to the insurgents, Admiral Turner said the critical question would be the extent of Soviet success in the coming months in sealing the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the Soviets are successful in doing this, then further Pakistani support to the insurgents would be seen as a direct affront to the Soviets and be extremely dangerous.²

Ambassador Hummel expanded on this analysis by noting that some elements, already in sight, could change it. First, the Pakistanis are still unaware that we are not going to have any resources available for them until Fiscal Year 82. This will lead to a serious deterioration in our bilateral relations. They are also deeply concerned about the lack of Saudi and other Arab response.

If there is little assistance forthcoming to Pakistan, this will have negative implications for Zia’s domestic position and also enhance the prospects of Soviet action against an apparently unsupported Pakistan. Also, of course, the Saudi and Chinese perceptions of US reliability will alter. Ambassador Hummel closed his remarks by flagging the importance of debt rescheduling to the Pakistanis.

Deputy Secretary Christopher pointed out that Pakistan is important to the United States because of the support that it provides to the Afghan insurgents, its opposition to Soviet policies in Afghanistan, the desirability of access to Pakistani ports, and some nuclear hopes that we still have with regard to Pakistan. He added that an abandonment of relations with Pakistan would harm the United States. Therefore we should avoid an all-or-nothing approach and see how much of the relationship we can retain. He also noted that debt relief is their key concern and this should be our first matter of discussion.

With regard to debt relief, he said it is his personal opinion that the Executive Branch should concert with the Congress and only then approach the Pakistanis with the possibility that we may be able to do something. First we have to get the issues sorted out among ourselves.

John White asked whether debt relief or ESF would be better.

Ambassador Hummel said the Pakistani priorities were first, debt relief, second ESF, and third other foreign bilateral aid. The possibility of $100 million for Fiscal Year 1981 is only marginally useful in our relations with them.

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that he wanted to make some general comments since he had to leave the meeting early. He agreed that we should retain what leverage we can over Pakistan. We should move as best we can on the economic side. His mind is open as to whether we should consult Congress first or later; a delay of two weeks or so shouldn’t make too much importance. He also thought we should proceed with the arms sales list which had, after all, been agreed upon at the previous SCC.³

Dr. Brzezinski said that Pakistan must realize that we have not cut off our relationship in the security area. Thus he would be opposed to creating any difficulty about selling M–60 tanks to Pakistan. The list which DOD has prepared shows what we are willing to do.

Turning to the draft letter to General Zia,⁴ Brzezinski suggested it be changed along the following lines. First, it should be frank, not the formal kind of communication in the current draft. It should specifically raise the problem of public polemics (for instance Zia’s comments about US assistance to the Afghans which he made in Salisbury).⁵ We should not enclose a litany but a brief paragraph pointing out the problems this sort of rhetoric causes us with Congress and public opinion. Secondly, we should take credit for the fact that we have been helpful in getting other countries to assist Pakistan economically. Third, the letter should include a statement that we attach great importance to what happens to the Afghan resistance and note that the resistance forces require sustenance.

He then raised the possibility of Thornton and Peter Constable going to Pakistan to continue talks at a substantive but not high level. He said that this should be left to the decision of the PRC.

Overall he emphasized that we should show the Pakistanis that we are serious.

Ambassador Hummel pointed out that he had had no input to the list of military equipment that had been prepared, that he believed there should be more than a simple list. We should talk about the kinds of units and organization that the Pakistanis need for defense of the Northwest border; the paper that we give them should be much broader than a simple list. They expect help from us in their planning effort and the Defense Department should be able to construct a response at the military-to-military level.

Under Secretary Komer said that this would simply be an invitation for the Pakistanis to ask more than we can provide.

Ambassador Hummel replied that was of course the case but we had crossed that bridge some time ago when we agreed to send a military mission.

Dr. Brzezinski said we should transmit the list now and send the President’s letter. We should also offer planning advice and assistance on how the Pakistanis could best organize themselves.

Ambassador Hummel said we should first ask the Pakistanis when and how they want to continue the military dialogue. They will probably want to wait until after the Islamic Conference in Islamabad in May.

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that this sounded sensible but we should have the list ready if they want it right away.

Assistant Secretary McGiffert replied that we have already asked the Pakistanis about further consultations and they said no. We did not, however, get into the question of a list with them. There is no need for us to create a large appetite in Pakistan; what we offer can be related to a relatively limited threat. It can be done quickly and the list itself implies our view of their organizational requirement.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that we should go to the Pakistanis and offer the list to them at any time and also be prepared to go beyond and analyze their organizational requirements.

Under Secretary Komer said just simply send the list; it carries its own organizational implication.

General Pustay noted that there is a great lack of infrastructure in Pakistan and if we suggest further military consultations this will imply that we are ready to provide assistance in developing the infrastructure.

Ambassador Hummel noted that the Pakistanis already have a considerable appetite but they have no illusions about what they are going to be able to get from us in the way of assistance. He reiterated the need for an established military-to-military relationship that could survive political vicissitudes.

Under Secretary Komer said he thought that the Pakistanis still do have other illusions. The list is impressive and as far as organization for defense of the Northwest goes, the Pakistanis probably know more about that than we do.

Ambassador Hummel countered by noting that their planning is rudimentary and asked whether Komer suggested that we do nothing.

McGiffert said we could use the offer of a sales list to create an opportunity for further military-to-military contacts.

Deputy Secretary Christopher summed up by saying we should agree to send a list on the Pakistani timetable and then ask if they want further analysis. But we have already done enough to discourage them.

Dr. Brzezinski said we had excessively discouraged them.

Under Secretary Komer said looking at the history of the relationship that the Pakistanis are always raising new expectations. Let’s leave the initiative with them.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said we could make our approach in a low key and that would probably reduce the danger.

Henry Owen briefed the meeting on the status of the debt relief question, suggesting that we should defer any action until we have the first budget resolution in hand. We should not go to the President now.

Guy Erb pointed out that debt relief means an immediate outlay of dollars and that this is much more difficult than other forms of aid.

John White said that the situation in Congress is extremely confused and dangerous now and said that a decision on the first budget resolution was certainly more than a week away—perhaps as much as one or even two months. Even after the first budget resolution we might not know much more than we do now.

Deputy Secretary Christopher asked whether we should just restrict ourselves to thinking about FY 1982.

Henry Owen said it would be cleaner to do so since getting anything for Fiscal 81 would be unlikely.

John White added that what he can see of 1982 will not be much better.

Ambassador Hummel said that 1982 assistance offers create a tactical problem. Zia will see this as an indication that we are committed to his overthrow and want to wait to deal with a successor government which might be more cooperative on nuclear matters.

Deputy Secretary Christopher asked whether any money would be needed before 1982 for debt relief.

Henry Owen said that probably there would be no need for actual outlay of funds in FY 1981.

Assistant Secretary Bergsten said that he could see no need now for debt relief and could certainly not tell what the situation might be by Fiscal Year 1982. This would just look like a way of getting around restrictions on foreign aid. It would be impossible to reach an agreement on debt relief and then implement it some time after. The usual practice is to provide debt relief immediately once a settlement has been negotiated.

Guy Erb asked if there was a possibility of ESF in 1982.

Deputy Secretary Christopher pointed out that the Pakistanis are less interested in ESF and in any event this would raise problems of getting around the Symington Amendment.

John White asked whether the Symington Amendment was also not a defacto barrier to rescheduling. (The question was not answered.)

Randy Jayne said he was afraid that if we went to Congress and talked about rescheduling in 1981 Congress would make its own judgment and allot the money to Pakistan leaving it up to us to find out how to find the money. We then might not be able to come to an agreement in that year and would then lose the money. This would be the worst of all possible worlds and there is no way of avoiding this danger through informal consultations.

Under Secretary Nimetz asked when the Pakistan Consortium would meet.

Henry Owen replied that the date was June 13. He summed up the discussion by pointing out that OMB, Treasury and others believe that debt relief in FY 1981 is not feasible and that we are not in a position to discuss the possibility for FY 1982.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said it was not clear that debt relief was unfeasible in 1981. We should not act now but we also should not raise the issue with the President until the budget situation is clarified.

Guy Erb asked Ambassador Hummel whether it was correct, as Hummel had said earlier, that the Pakistanis did not realize that there would be no funds available in FY 1981. (That question was not answered; later in a private conversation Hummel said that indeed the Pakistanis were not clear about this since their Embassy had not informed them adequately.)

Under Secretary Nimetz expressed his concern that what we were doing would look bad not just with the Pakistanis but also with the Saudis and others.

Deputy Secretary Christopher, turning to the question of a letter to Zia, said that the redraft should take Brzezinski’s comments into account and asked whether there were other items that should be added.

Spurgeon Keeny asked whether we should not add something on the nuclear issue, especially as regards the possibility of transfer of technology to countries such as Libya.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said that our position had been made perfectly clear to the Pakistanis on this and we did not need to refer to it further.

Assistant Secretary McGiffert suggested we should say something to the Pakistanis about our concern at their rapprochement with the Soviets.

Under Secretary Nimetz said that the point that Brzezinski had made about support to the Afghans covered this matter adequately in a positive manner.

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that a redraft could be circulated so that it can go to the President before the end of the week.

Under Secretary Nimetz, discussing IMET, said there was no possibility of finding funds in Fiscal 1980 or 1981. If we raise this hypothetical question with the Congress this would risk a confrontation which would be harmful for Pakistan. In any event the amount involved was very small.

Assistant Secretary McGiffert doubted that Congress was concerned so much about FMS credits as it is about IMET.

Under Secretary Nimetz said that was true but there was always the danger that somebody on one of the committees might make it a major issue.

Ambassador Hummel said that a modest IMET program is simply not worth the danger of a serious confrontation with Congress. The Pakistanis even now are buying whatever IMET they need.

Assistant Secretary McGiffert said that if that was the case he would yield to Ambassador Hummel’s judgment.

Ambassador Hummel spoke in favor of selling M–60 tanks to the Pakistanis despite the problems this would cause with India.

Under Secretary Komer agreed with him and thought it wouldn’t be too hard on the Indians. We could get the tanks to the Pakistanis in 1982 and perhaps earlier.

Deputy Secretary Christopher asked whether we should seek FY 1982 funds (ESF?) but added that it was probably premature to do so now.

Assistant Secretary Saunders suggested that we plug this into preliminary planning for FY 1982; there is no need to make a decision now.

Under Secretary Nimetz asked whether it would be advantageous to tell the Pakistanis of our plans.

Ambassador Hummel said that we should probably do so rather than appear to be giving a totally negative response on assistance to the Pakistanis. (S)

Thereupon the meeting closed at 11:30 a.m.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 25, (Meetings—PRC 138: 4/21/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. For a Special Analysis prepared in the CIA, April 22, entitled “Pakistan: The Afghanistan Debate,” see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 256.
3. The list was not found. See Document 436.
4. The draft letter was not found. For the final version, see Document 440.
5. According to the New York Times, on April 17, Zia, while in Salisbury celebrating the establishment of Zimbabwe, said that the United States “should have played a much more significant role over the Soviet intervention, which I’m sorry to say it did not,” and concluded: “On such occasions, practical steps are more significant than mere statements.” (“Zia Assails U.S. on Afghan Stance,” New York Times, April 18, 1980, p. A6)