Office of the Historian

437. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia (Ames) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)1

NFAC 2881–80
Washington, April 18, 1980

SUBJECT

  • PRC Meeting of 21 April 1980—Pakistan

1. Action Requested: None; the following is for your background in preparing for PRC meeting on Pakistan.2 [portion marking not declassified]

2. Background: It is our impression that there are differences between the NSC and State (and within State) over how to handle the Pakistanis. Part of the problem is that there are no good options at this point: the Zia government is alienated as a result of the last aid offer go-around; there is a perception that Congress will not go along with the level of aid offers that would entice the Paks; and there is no consensus on prioritizing our interests in the Pakistan problem as they relate to proliferation, India, China, the Arab States, etc. [portion marking not declassified]

3. Within the State Department, those who favor trying to strengthen our ties with India as a counter to Soviet moves in Afghanistan are making life difficult for those advocating more forceful initiatives toward Pakistan. The mood in the NSC seems to have swung full circle from extreme annoyance with the Pak rejection of our first aid offer, to consideration of an Indian option, then back to how can we [Page 995] re-embrace Pakistan. It is our impression that Brzezinski would now like to use a “successful” initiative with Pakistan to demonstrate US resolve. Even those in State favoring a resumption of a Pak-US dialogue want the effort to be cautious and low profile. [portion marking not declassified]

4. We suspect that you have been asked to open the meeting with an unusually broad intelligence assessment because the Agency has not been pulled into the “to-ing and fro-ing.” State probably believes that the facts will highlight Pakistan’s instability and thus the dangers of over-dramatizing our efforts. Indeed, the facts do seem to suggest that “splashy” achievements in strengthening bilateral ties are probably impossible. [portion marking not declassified]

Robert C. Ames3
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 18, Folder 16: PRC Meetings—Pakistan. Secret. Sent through the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment.↩
  2. See Document 438.↩
  3. [name not declassified] signed for Ames.↩