Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

256. Special Analysis Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, April 22, 1980

PAKISTAN: The Afghanistan Debate

Pakistan continues to insist that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is a precondition for any improvement in its relations with either country. Islamabad’s position is under constant review, however, and President Zia is subject to conflicting pressures from within his government. Some officials favor opposing the Soviets more strongly; others want to appease Moscow. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

Zia and his advisers are worried about Moscow’s long-term objectives in the subcontinent and about the serious problems Pakistan faces in the short term as the Soviets try to pacify Afghanistan. Some advisers believe that a continued influx of refugees could soon lead to a serious breakdown of law and order along the frontier. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

If the Soviets make punitive raids against refugee camps or even occupy territory on the Pakistani side of the border, the Pakistanis fear they might be forced to choose between a dangerous confrontation with the USSR and acquiescence in a violation of their country’s sovereignty. The Pakistanis believe that the Soviets are already encouraging leftists as well as separatists, especially in Baluchistan, to oppose Zia more actively. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])

Diplomatic Tightrope

Islamabad has taken a strong diplomatic stand against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but it is trying to avoid giving unnecessary offense to Moscow. Zia rejected US aid primarily because he believed that accepting it would increase tension with Moscow but would not strengthen Pakistan’s security to a corresponding degree. ([2 lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])

Islamabad’s desire to avoid confrontation with Moscow is further reflected in its reluctance to back publicly exile groups in Pakistan and its unwillingness to give extensive help to Afghan insurgents. Pakistan also has tended to avoid publicity on border incidents, including Soviet overflights. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Zia and his advisers nevertheless are not seeking an accommodation with Moscow. Pakistan’s closest allies—Saudi Arabia, Iran, and China—would have serious reservations about any significant move toward Moscow. At home, many Pakistanis—especially the conservatives supporting Zia—would oppose abandoning fellow Muslims in Afghanistan or any “sellout” to the USSR. ([classification marking not declassified])

Pakistani policymakers doubt, moreover, that any agreement with Moscow would bring more than temporary benefits. There also is considerable sentiment in the military—on which Zia ultimately depends—for a continued hardline on Afghanistan. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Pakistani leaders seem to agree on their sense of isolation while facing the Soviets. This has led them to an unprecedented interest in trying to improve relations with India despite longstanding deep distrust of India’s intentions and of its relationship with Moscow. The conflicting advice Zia is getting makes Pakistan’s policy unpredictable. Some aides—notably Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi—seem to favor some agreement with the Soviets but most probably would support an accommodation only if they see no other good alternative. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Domestic Politics

Although foreign developments and the extent of foreign support will strongly influence Pakistani policy, domestic politics could become an equally important factor. The near automatic support that Zia received after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—even from many of his political enemies—is beginning to dissipate. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Former Prime Minister Bhutto’s widow has publicly attacked Zia for failing to accept the Soviet-installed Babrak government and for allowing insurgents to use Pakistani territory. Many Islamabad officials, on the other hand, believe that any attempt to placate the Soviets could turn many in the Army against Zia. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 8, Central Intelligence Agency: 4/78–4/79. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified].