436. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia (Ames) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- SCC Meeting of 14 April 1980—“Security Framework”
1. Action Requested: None; the following is for your information. [portion marking not declassified]
2. Background: This was the eighth in a series of SCC meetings on the Security Framework for the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean.2 Dr. Brzezinski announced at the outset that the meeting would last until 1130, vice 1200, that the Defense paper on basing would not be discussed (it was not ready) and that base access in Somalia and Pakistan would be the items covered. He also noted that the last fifteen minutes would be devoted to a rump session on intelligence items. [portion marking not declassified]
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]
4. Pakistan: Dr. Brzezinski opened this segment by stating that he believed that Pakistan was important to our strategic needs in the area. Egypt and Saudia want us to support Pakistan. Pakistan is important vis-a-vis the Afghan insurgency. A stable Pakistan is healthy for the region. Henry Owen then outlined the Pak’s key concern—debt rescheduling—per his paper.3 He said this question boiled down to two issues: could we waive the “imminent default” clause and where would the money come from. We will have a better indication of the latter when the FY81 budget goes forward in three weeks, but it will be difficult to come up with something positive for the Pakistanis right now. It was mentioned that the Pakistanis are currently reviewing their policy options and it would be a good time to come up with something that might cause them to turn our way. Perhaps we can say the following—we will be prepared to discuss with you an effort to undertake debt rescheduling in early May, before the Pak Debt Consortium convenes in June. In this kind of statement we make no promises, buy three weeks (the budget will have gone forward) and the Paks could well be in imminent default. This option will be reviewed for the PRC on Pakistan. On arms, we will not give the Paks a list of recommendations, but rather a list of items we are prepared to sell. This will assume the Paks can come up with their own financing. The list will show our assessment of the levels of immediacy of types of weapons required to defend the northwest. [portion marking not declassified]
5. Other Pakistani items, including a response to Zia’s letter to the President,4 will be discussed at the PRC meeting on Pakistan to be held on 21 April, vice 18 April as originally scheduled. [portion marking not declassified]
6. NIO/NESA Comments: In spite of Dr. Brzezinski’s comments on the importance of Pakistan to our policy in the region, I did not get the impression that anyone was prepared to take strong positions to ensure that Pakistan does not seek an accommodation with the Soviets. The 200 million dollars required to sustain debt rescheduling will either have to be found in the budget or Congress must be presented with the vital nature of the problem and grant an increase. We are pussy-footing around the Pak issue while other friends in the region, who are also debating the extent of US resolve, are waiting to see how we handle Pakistan. Can we really be giving billions to Israel, while potentially losing South Asia for want of 200 million? It seems we not only have some priorities wrong, but are subsidizing regional [Page 994] instability. I realize that a “good” budget and an election year go hand in hand, but we cannot survive as a nation in this rapidly changing world if every four years we forget about long term policy for a year. Pakistan is a very important case in point. [portion marking not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–1981), Box 13, Folder 11: SCC Meeting ME Security. Secret. Sent through the Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment.↩
- The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 112, SCC 302, 4/14/80, Security Framework. An extract is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 73.↩
- Not found.↩
- See Document 426.↩