Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

428. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)¹

Washington, February 26, 1980

SUBJECT

• SCC Meeting on Afghanistan

We understand the SCC on Wednesday will be discussing the question of increased support for the Afghan insurgents.² We also understand that a decision in principle has been made to provide additional arms. The proposed level of US funding would be $15 million for CY 80 [1 line not declassified].

You are fully aware of the pros and cons previously adduced with respect to this covert program. However, I think the program should be looked at in the context of our overall relations with Pakistan at this time.

Since the Brzezinski/Christopher mission³ it has become increasingly clear that the Pakistanis are reluctant to enter into a high profile relationship with us. They have asked us not to go ahead at this time with our legislative proposal including reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement, FMS and economic aid, although they will probably accept US assistance as part of a multilateral package.⁴ The Pakistanis still doubt our constancy in the long haul. Moreover, they probably see a conspicuous bilateral relationship with us as running against the domestic political grain and as detrimental to the maintenance of other important ties, particularly to the Islamic and non-aligned world.

In contrast to their reluctance to enter into a high profile public relationship, the Pakistanis are apparently receptive to continued covert cooperation in support of the insurgents. (The Pakistanis, however, have been very upset by the Washington leaks on the program⁵ and may have second thoughts if there should be any further publicity.) We understand that about $7 million worth of weapons has been delivered since December. This has been distributed through the Pakistanis [less than 1 line not declassified]. Some is going into the [less than 1 line not declassified] in central Afghanistan and some to the eastern provinces [less than 1 line not declassified] have most of their connections. The Agency believes the equipment is indeed moving into Afghanistan and, at a minimum, is providing psychological support for the insurgency. A small number of SA–7’s are included.

[5 lines not declassified] However, we doubt that a program of these dimensions, particularly including anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, will go unnoticed by the Russians. More visible introduction of weapons from Pakistan may well tempt the Soviets to take punitive action against Pakistan in the form of a cross-border strike or raids on refugee concentrations. The Pakistan Government is already evincing growing concern over this possibility.

It would seem appropriate to consider what situations we might face if the Soviets decide on punitive action and where this might leave us in terms of our relations with Pakistan and others who are involved with us. Pakistani leaders have said that they prefer to have Pakistani armed forces take care of cross-border incursions if they can obtain sufficient outside equipment and financial aid. However, the political and psychological impact in the near term of a deliberate punitive raid by the Soviets is difficult to gauge. The GOP could choose to use the occasion to demand greatly enhanced US military and economic assistance. Failure to meet these demands would undercut US credibility as a reliable partner not only in Pakistan but elsewhere in Southwest Asia. Alternatively, given their reluctance to enter into a high profile relationship, the Pakistanis might conceivably cave to Soviet pressure and this could also leave us out on a limb with our colleagues in this endeavor. In either case we risk being seen as a “paper tiger”.

Since the State Department may have to testify before Congressional intelligence committees on the policy context of the covert program, I believe it would be useful to raise these issues at the SCC and get some sense of how we propose to handle questions directed at these contingencies.

In presenting this to the SCC, you might wish to raise a number of questions.

—Will the input of $30 million worth of weapons into Afghanistan move this program to a new level of visibility? Does it increase the chances of Soviet reaction?

—Do the Pakistanis have the capability now to respond to a punitive cross-border raid by the Soviets/Afghans? If the Pakistanis are unable to respond effectively, what is the likely political impact on the Pakistan Government?

—If the Pak response were to turn to us for a massive increase in military and economic assistance, what would be our reaction? Failure to meet their demands could undercut our reliability with the Paks and our other partners.

—It is also conceivable that the political climate following a raid might lead the Pakistanis to seek accommodation with the Soviets and refuse further covert cooperation. This could lead to recrimination if the Paks sought to shift the blame to us and/or leave us looking helpless in countering Soviet action.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000013, Box 4, SCC Reports 1979–1980, SCC Meeting Book 24, Feb. 27 1980. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Coon. An unknown hand initialed the memorandum on Saunders’s behalf.
2. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting, held on Wednesday, February 27, is printed in Foreign Relations, vol. XII, 1977–1980, Afghanistan, Document 220. The Afghanistan covert action program included a July 3, 1979, Presidential Finding authorizing aid to the insurgents; a November 7, 1979, Presidential Finding enabling the supply of non-military supplies, procurement advice, and communications equipment; and a December 28, 1979, Presidential Finding providing for lethal military aid. Documentation on the covert program and the Pakistani role is ibid.
3. See Document 423.
4. See Document 427.
5. See, for example, William Beecher, “What he Didn’t Say,” Boston Globe, January 5, 1980, p. 1; Michael Getler, “U.S. Reportedly Is Supplying Weapons to Afghan Insurgents,” Washington Post, February 15, 1980, p. A1; David Binder, “U.S. Supplying Afghan Insurgents With Arms in a Covert Operation,” New York Times, February 16, 1980, p. A1; Craig R. Whitney, “Soviet Press Plays Up U.S. Reports on Help For the Afghan Rebels,” New York Times, February 17, 1980, p. A10. In telegram 1487 from Islamabad, February 19, Hummel summarized a conversation with Shahi, during which Shahi conveyed Zia’s “very deep concern about these evident leaks,” which raised his concern about whether Pakistan “can confide in U.S. officials and leaders and take their word in return for face value.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 2–3/80) In a February 27 memorandum to Vance and Brzezinski, Turner reported similar comments made by Lieutenant General Akhtar, who was instructed by Zia to convey the following regarding the Afghan covert action program: “President Zia and I are greatly incensed at leaks by U.S. officials about support to Afghan tribesmen. Our future cooperation will be jeopardized if there are similar leaks in the future.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 2, 1979 ES Sensitive, February 1–29)