Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

427. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, February 19, 1980

1. Pakistan. The Pakistanis are firmly opposed to a congressional suggestion that the House Appropriations Committee proceed immediately with funding $200 million for Pakistan in FY–1980, in advance of an Administration request for an authorization.² The Paks want to assess their efforts to obtain additional multilateral and bilateral financial support in the Gulf and in Western Europe before supporting any US proposal. In particular, they seem to be waiting further word from the Saudis.

We have had several recent indications that the Pakistanis are ambivalent about accepting military aid from the US, at the proposed levels. Agha Shahi told Ambassador Hummel yesterday³ that Pakistan might want the US to focus only on economic assistance while it looks for military financing elsewhere.⁴

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 2/80. Secret. Carter wrote “Warren, J” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.
2. In a February 7 memorandum to Vance and Brzezinski, Turner reported Lieutenant General Akhtar’s statement that the $200 million offer was “completely unacceptable and personally demeaning” to Zia. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 4, 1980 ES Sensitive, Feb 1–29) The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 200.
3. In telegram 1470 from Islamabad, February 19, Hummel reported his February 18 meeting with Shahi, during which Shahi explained that “it might be better to have US focus only on economic assistance to Pakistan, while Pakistan looks elsewhere for the funding it requires for satisfaction of its urgent military needs, e.g. high performance aircraft, border roads, airfields, tanks, APCs, etc. If the Arabs—he specifically mentioned Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, in that order—provide the money, Pakistan would, of course, be interested in substantial cash purchases of arms from the U.S., but not as tied to ‛aid from the U.S.’ ‛If Arab money is not there,’ he added, ‛then Pakistan’s defense will rest solely on its diplomacy’—a hint again of the possible need to seek accommodation with a regionally paramount USSR.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0542, P870097–0551, N800003–0643)
4. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “If Paks prefer this, it’s ok with me” and drew an arrow pointing to the phrase “looks for military financing elsewhere” in the last sentence of the paragraph.