Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

423. Summary Record of Talks¹

Islamabad, February 2–3, 1980

PARTICIPANTS

• Pakistan

  • President Zia
  • Ghulam Ishaq, Finance Minister
  • Agha Shahi, Foreign Affairs Adviser
  • Shahnawaz, Foreign Secretary
  • General Jilani
  • General Arif
  • Ambassador Sultan Khan
  • Ambassador Yaqub Khan

• United States

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
  • David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary of Defense
  • Arthur Hummel, American Ambassador to Pakistan
  • Thomas Thornton, NSC Staff Member
  • Jane Coon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
  • General Graves, Department of Defense
  • Arnold Raphel, Department of State

The meetings began on the morning of February 2, with a briefing of the military situation by the Pakistanis. It followed the customary lines and concentrated heavily on both the Afghan/Soviet and the Indian threats. The main contingencies which the Pakistanis envisioned on their Western border are the following:

(1) Hot pursuit by Soviet or Afghan units pursuing Afghan rebels. The Pakistani objective would be to punish the intruding troops.²

(2) A Soviet/Afghan attempt to occupy and hold salients within Pakistan. The Pakistanis would seek to dislodge these salients.

(3) An attack by India as a Soviet proxy. The Pakistanis say they need additional equipment and a stronger commitment from the United States to deal with this.

(4) An attack from east and west with the objective of dismantling Pakistan. Pakistan would require additional equipment to strengthen itself so that it could deter or delay such an attack until the U.S. could come to its assistance. (S)

In the course of this military briefing, Dr. Brzezinski asked whether it would be helpful to the Pakistanis if the Chinese were to increase their forces along the Indian border, thereby forcing the Indians to pull troops away from the Pakistan border. The Pakistani briefer replied that this would probably not be very useful since the seasons for military operations on one border are quite different from those on the other. (S)

After the military briefing, the two sides gathered in a smaller group for discussions led on the Pakistani side by President Zia, and on the American side by Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher. Dr. Brzezinski opened by putting out that he had learned much from the briefing and emphasizing the historical significance of the current meetings for U.S. and Pakistan relations. He read Presidential instructions reiterating American support for Pakistani independence and security³ and said that the U.S. has made an important choice in this regard. He outlined our attempt over thirty years to build security and stability in Western Europe and the Far East. We have vital interests there which are inseparable from our own security and our actions have demonstrated our seriousness there. We have made clear the threat of nuclear war in Europe and showed ourselves ready to shed blood in the Far East. The President has, in addition now, indicated that American vital interests are engaged in Southwest Asia. (S)

In defending these vital interests we have a choice between a purely maritime strategy on the one hand, and on the other an involvement on the mainland. We have chosen not to adopt a purely maritime strategy because we have faith in Pakistan and in the future of the relationship. We are just at the beginning of a new stage with the relationship, not one that is going back to the 1950’s, but one in which we will stand by you since we believe you are prepared to stand up on your own. (S)

After some discussion of the global threat and Soviet moves in Afghanistan, Dr. Brzezinski returned to the points made in the briefing concerning the threats to Pakistan. He said there are four areas of response to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan (leaving aside for the time being bilateral U.S.-Pakistani issues):

(1) The first is a broad, strong and continuing international response.

(2) It is important to keep the Soviets occupied within Afghanistan so as to raise the cost to them and prevent a quick consolidation of an operating base.

(3) There is a need for a multilateral effort with United States participation to strengthen Pakistani capability to withstand especially the lower levels of Soviet aggression. Dr. Brzezinski added that Iran must be included in this at some time and wondered whether Pakistan could help. He noted that the American people were deeply resentful about Iran but were also mature enough to put this matter behind them once the issue is resolved. (S)

(4) We must convince the Soviets of an American response if they impose a challenge beyond Pakistan’s capabilities. (S)

These four considerations in turn define minimum and maximum objectives for Afghanistan itself. The maximum objective would be the establishment of a neutral Afghan government without any Soviet presence. The minimum objective is protracted Soviet involvement in the suppression of the Afghan people. The former of these is harder to obtain; thus it should be made politically and militarily costly for the Soviets to continue on with their actions. On the political front you and other Muslim nations might propose a neutralization by an international Muslim force. This would put the Soviets on the defensive and belie the idea of U.S.-Pakistani collusion. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to discuss the progress which we had made in the four objectives he had mentioned above. He noticed that the Islamabad conference had been remarkably successful in bringing international pressure to bear on the Soviets as had the vote in the United Nations.⁴ He praised Pakistan for its role in both of these. It is important to insure that there is a more intense and more sustained response in this case than there was at the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The United States leadership is determined to make this stick. (S)

On the second point we need to consult more closely. This is a delicate matter that needs to be handled with determination. We have also discussed it with other governments. (S)

On the third issue it is important to strengthen Pakistan’s ability to respond to political intimidation or subversion as well as limited military operations (e.g., the first two threats mentioned in the morning briefing). The Soviets must be forced either to withdraw or to escalate the conflict which would precipitate a U.S. engagement under the 1959 agreement. It is necessary to examine concrete ways for strengthening north-west frontier. Turning to other concerned regional nations, Dr. Brzezinski recounted briefly some of the results of the Brown visit to China.⁵ With regard to India he cautioned the Pakistanis not to prejudge that country in a way that would become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We, too, were disturbed by the Indian statement in the UN General Assembly,⁶ but we do not see India as a partner in the Soviet global design. Perhaps we and our allies can encourage them to realize that the strengthening of Pakistan’s security will help them too. We have to be sensitive to India about their concerns in the view of their own role. We do not dispute the dilemma that Pakistan faces, but the United States and Pakistan should not become anti-Indian. With regard to Iran, he reiterated our willingness to re-establish relations and look for a new relationship. (S)

Pakistan and the United States, he went on, are at the beginning of a new relationship which must be based on realistic harmony. It was impossible to satisfy Pakistan’s immediate expectations, but this must be seen as a long-term relationship. Pakistani independence is important to the United States, and we know that you will fight even if you are not supported by outside forces. We think of you as Poles rather than Czechs. (S)

A year ago, what we are proposing to do with Pakistan would have been inconceivable. (S)

If the result of our meeting is that our effort is seen as inadequate, this will impact adversely on our historic relationship. (S)

It is hard to mobilize others, but by all means do not characterize what we are doing as inadequate. We have to convince Congress five years after the Vietnam war to become reengaged. The threat is one of great magnitude and we do not want to have to fall back to a maritime strategy. We cannot expect 100% agreement with you, but we should not leave the impression of a dispute. (S)

President Zia responded by mentioning three additional points: This is the first time that the Soviet Union has expanded into Asia; a buffer state has disappeared from the maps; and Peter the Great’s will is being carried out. (Dr. Brzezinski intervened at this point to say that the so-called will of Peter the Great is a forgery.) Zia continued that the world community’s conscience had been aroused in a way that had not been the case previously. A Russian expansionist movement has engulfed Afghanistan and is threatening Pakistani security and U.S. vital interests. There is a qualitative geopolitical change in Southern Asia. (S)

Pakistan, Zia continued, has a superpower on its western borders and an unfriendly, if not hostile India on the East. Pakistan is looking for durable and permanent guarantees for its security; thus, they are seeking clarification (assumedly of the U.S. commitment). The Soviets resent the activities of which Pakistan is a focal point. The Indian Foreign Minister demanded a regional discussion of the problem, but Zia responded to him that the problem is global. The Islamic Conference was indeed a victory for the United States and Pakistan, but it leads to further Soviet hostility. Thus we need another superpower as an antidote to the hostility of that superpower. The 1959 agreement must be reconfirmed, especially in light of our experiences in 1965 and 1971. (Zia at this point went into a fairly lengthy discussion of assurances from Ambassador Oehlert,⁷ George Ball,⁸ and the quotes in the Kissinger autobiography about 1971.⁹) In order to remove these lacunae, Pakistan proposes that the 1959 agreement be turned into a treaty, or else give it a Congressional cover, approval or reaffirmation. To write a new treaty is, of course, lengthy and difficult. (S)

How does the U.S. see implementation of the 1959 agreement now? In case of aggression from the West, will it stand committed to Pakistani security? If the threat is agreed on, military assistance should be commensurate with the appreciation of that threat. We have to assure our own security and half-way measures will not be adequate. Certain items will be needed urgently for dealing with hot pursuit, and these will also help to boost army morale. We have to start development activity in the West, and that means economic assistance. How are we going to be able to overcome our problem in the East? Can the Indian threat be neutralized? Can the U.S. approach China to give guarantees to Pakistan? What if the USSR and India attack jointly? We are seeking to improve our relations with India, but what if we fail? If there is collusion and an attack from both sides will you stand by our side? (S)

Henry Kissinger, in the January 21st Wall Street Journal interview said it is unlikely that the Soviets would attack Pakistan over an Indian objection.¹⁰ The danger for us is being dismembered by India. We are trying hard in our relations with India. But don’t forget that during the 1970 visit (to Washington) Mrs. Gandhi talked about the congenital defects of Pakistan, its regional weaknesses, etc. This is all in the Kissinger book.¹¹ (S)

Therefore, a reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement should address first, proxy aggression from India, second, subversion, and third, it should be free from references to all older documents such as the Eisenhower doctrine, since this poses problems with Pakistan’s non-alignment. It should become a purely bilateral agreement against the threat from the West as well as the East. (S)

Our position is similar to that of Poland in 1939, when the Germans and Russians wanted territory and the UK had no power to uphold the guarantees it had given. Agreements and treaties are valid only as long as they can be implemented. (S)

President Carter has said that the United States wants to give Pakistan the ability to repel and deter invasion. Our commitments are permanent, not transitory. We conclude that the United States is serious and will provide the necessary support. If so, you need not be reminded that limitation to any particular armament is not practical. We must assess the needs and find ways to meet them. Dr. Brzezinski has said the U.S. would “become engaged” in case of a hot pursuit. What does that mean in light of the 1959 agreement? Our experiences are bitter. In 1970 and 1971, refugees went to India from East Pakistan and the Soviets accused us of mismanagement. In 1979, the Soviet Ambassador claims that Pakistan is interfering in Afghanistan by accepting refugees. Also in 1970–71, we told Indira Gandhi that if she supports the insurgents it would cause similar problems for India. She agreed, but then did exactly the opposite. The Soviets have a tremendous reinforcement capability. If they can move 50,000 troops into Afghanistan in four weeks, we can imagine what greater things they could do. (S)

Turning to the scope of the Afghan insurgency, when in April 1978, following the coup, we consulted China, we were told that we would get our fingers burned if we became involved. We felt that the United States was not interested in the situation. Even with our meager resources we have alone been helping the freedom fighters. In November 1979, we told Prince Fahd that the Muslims could regain their position if they had help. He, however, said no. But we have been helpful (and with U.S. aid in the last few months). Now the Chinese and Saudis have also agreed in principle. Throughout centuries, the Afghans have never been subjugated. The insurgency will continue, but whether at a high or low level depends on the level of Soviet operations. The Soviets are ruthless. (S)

Since December 27th, up until January 20th, 22,000 refugees have fled to Pakistan, showing Soviet ruthlessness. Therefore, the insurgency has prospects but the freedom fighters need outside support. They will need outside bases, and that means Pakistan and to some extent Iran, and these bases must be secure. An insecure Pakistan would jeopardize the future of the freedom fighters and the situation in Iran is still less favorable. (S)

What is the likely timeframe for the Soviet push further southward? We cannot fix that. It depends on the deterrents at the international level—the United Nations, the Islamic Conference, U.S. resolve and support—and also the strength of Pakistan itself. (S)

U.S. and Pakistan each have interests to watch over. President Carter has talked about vital interests in the Persian Gulf. That is a strong commitment. Is Pakistan included? I gather from Dr. Brzezinski that we are. (S)

There was then some discussion on the exact wording of the President’s State of the Union message, and what the Pakistanis perceived as a difference in strength of commitment between the longer and shorter versions.¹² (S)

This new undertaking has a dynamic which we appreciate. Not only the quick U.S. response including steps already taken, but international efforts as well which we appreciate highly. (S)

We had serious differences over a few months ago, and I was deeply ashamed about these. (President Zia was referring here to the burning of the American Embassy.) We have never been ungrateful, we have tried to stand by our friends. We are facing serious decisions and are at a crossroads. No country ever closes its options, and frankly this is the best time for U.S.-Pakistani cooperation. You will find a neglected ally and you will build a dam against the Soviets. Our national interests coincide. We deeply appreciate your visit and hope we will be able to find appropriate answers to all these questions. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher then spoke concerning the American security commitment to Pakistan. He noted that the President has recently reaffirmed this commitment publicly, and in a letter to President Zia.¹³ We are ready to do more. We are ready to make this letter public, and to ask Congress to reaffirm the 1959 agreement. Asking Congress to do this is highly significant. It would define the Soviet threat (at this point Secretary Christopher quoted a sentence beginning “these extraordinary.”¹⁴ Such a reaffirmation would be enacted in both Houses and thus be more binding than an Executive agreement. Secretary Vance and I have discussed this with Congress and they are prepared to move ahead. The contemporary vitality of this agreement will reassure you and educate our people. This is an unprecedented way for us to go about making such a commitment. (S)

It is also unprecedented that the legislation will provide for assistance “notwithstanding any other provision of law”, thus setting aside the Glenn and Symington amendments and any other obstructions. (S)

We need to see this as a beginning of a process. We have to get it enacted. Congress is chary of such things, but at this time is willing to do it. Proceeding this way is much quicker, cleaner and more decisive than a treaty. You recognize the delay that would be involved in a treaty, and an in-treaty would likely incur debate over various conditions such as non-proliferation. (S)

Addressing the contingencies you raised, a Soviet or Soviet/Afghan attack that threatened your independence or integrity would fall under the terms of the 1959 agreement. The President would immediately consult with you under Article I of the agreement, and also consult with Congress. Our response could involve the use of armed force. (S)

In case of a concerted Indian-Soviet attack, the first article of the 1959 agreement would also come into play. (S)

If the Soviets have India attack as a proxy—we see this most unlikely. India is even less willing to do this after the invasion of Afghanistan. The key, though, would be whether the attack was Communist controlled and/or inspired. More important, though, is that the United States and India have good relations. We are pleased that you are consulting with the Indians. To sum up, though, if India attacked as an agent of the Soviet Union, Article I would indeed come into effect. (S)

Concerning assistance: this is not a single shot effort but the beginning of a long-term effort. We have to get our own legislative system started up. (S)

On the economic side our contribution would be part of a consortium. Others, such as the FRG and Japan will also increase their aid and we will press them on this. Our first step will be $200 million in ESF over the next 18 months. This is very difficult for us politically since it means reopening the FY 80 budget and amending the FY 81 budget. We have to begin on this immediately and present the legislation next Monday.¹⁵ Otherwise there will be no money in FY 1980. (S)

We will also increase our PL–480 to $60 million and perhaps more in FY 80 and FY 81. (S)

We will fund up to one-third of the effort on refugees. (S)

We are prepared to look at your debt structure together with other creditors and reschedule in connection with an IMF upper tranche agreement if default is imminent. We cannot, however, use rescheduling as a substitute for aid. (S)

Thus, the total economic aid we have in mind is almost $300 million. But this aid should not be measured in monetary terms; it has a value beyond the dollars involved. Therefore, let’s agree to get this legislation going next week. (S)

On the military side, our offer of an FMS program is a reversal of a 15-year policy against military sales credits. The $200 million is also just one step, and part of a combined effort. We want to hear about your efforts in getting money from others. The President has also authorized special FMS terms for Pakistan involving no-principle payments for ten years, and a 20-year repayment period thereafter.¹⁶ If we do not move promptly on this, we could lose nearly a year. (S)

On the nature of military supply, we want to agree on a priority package to be delivered quickly. As regards the wording of the 1959 agreement (not commitment) the President views the agreement as a solid base for cooperation. He intentionally left the definition of the Persian Gulf region vague, but there is a specific U.S.-Pakistani agreement. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski added that President Carter has said the threat to Pakistan is a threat to the Persian Gulf region. This provides a wider context to the 1959 agreement. As we think of security, we should consider how our actions contribute to deterrents. For instance, shouldn’t our forces in the Indian Ocean be deployed near Pakistan? Should we have joint exercises? We are not proposing these things, but would be prepared to respond if you wish. (S)

We are beginning a difficult process and we must start off on the right foot for a long-haul relationship. (S)

Ghulam Ishaq then set forth Pakistani views on the economic matters. He noted that the U.S. has been the largest donor over the years, but that all aid except for PL–480 has recently been stopped. As late as 1974–75, U.S. aid was more than $200 million. (S)

The current Pakistani government inherited an economy in shambles, but has done quite well in improving it. (Ghulam Ishaq gave considerable statistic detail which is not recounted here. He did particularly note that aid flows have dropped considerably, and that in some cases there is a reverse flow.) He went on to point out that defense must now have still a greater priority, and this comes at a time when there is a greatly increased energy impact. He also pointed out that he would have to find counterpart rupees because of increased U.S. assistance as well as building up a new infrastructure in certain parts of the country. (S)

He said that $200 million is not even a beginning for a meaningful program. He projected resource gaps for 1981, 1982 and 1983 of $988, $1,496, and $1,812 million respectively. (S)

He specifically recommended debt relief. If the ODA maturities were to be written off this would yield $232, $215, and $213 million in the respective years. He suggested food aid for those years in the sum of $150, $100, and $100 million, as well as $400 million non-food aid. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher pointed out that if we pass our legislation it will open up the possibility of development assistance aid in addition to the ESF and PL–480 we are offering. The Pakistanis should note that ESF is fast disbursing. (S)

We are not making any non-proliferation conditions to our proceeding with these undertakings. We have adjusted our policy. You should recognize, however, that we will be questioned closely and we will want to underscore our continuing concern in these regards. (S)

A nuclear explosion would greatly increase the danger to Pakistan. Other countries have also raised this problem with me and there would be a strong impact on Congressional and public opinion. (S)

We need to count on you to act responsibly. In recent discussions Agha Shahi gave us two guarantees. We also need an assurance that you will not explode a nuclear device “in the course of your administration. (S)

Ghulam Ishaq responded that Pakistan needs flexible aid to help sustain its defense effort. Debt rescheduling will be best, in the amount of $200 million. There should be no conditions attached to fertilizer aid. The Soviets will be trying hard to make an impression in Afghanistan, therefore we must do more for the northwest frontier and for Baluchistan. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher responded that we are prepared to be more flexible on debt and talk about emerging default rather than imminent default. We are also asking other countries to use grants and other real aid instead of debt rescheduling. We support your concerns about Baluchistan, and we are often asked about the minorities in Pakistan. We will be greatly helped if we can hear from you what the plans are for your minorities. (S)

At this point the morning session ended. In the afternoon of February 2nd the discussions resumed. Dr. Brzezinski began with some discussions of handling the press, with which President Zia agreed. (S)

Zia began his presentation by saying that he is an optimist. He had lived through hard times and risen from modest circumstances. He saw Pakistan come into being. Like you, Dr. Brzezinski, I had to leave my home. My mother had to walk 80 miles in 1947 to reach the safety of Pakistan at the time of the massacre. I remained behind with the Indian army longer than anyone else and brought the very last stores, etc., with me to Pakistan in December 1947. Therefore, I will be forthright and frank. (S)

We are looking for three things in order of priority. One, security guarantees; two, economic capabilities; and three, military capabilities. (S)

An antidote of the superpower is another superpower. The USSR is too much for us with or without Indian support. We could not cope with that attack, even if we had a massive military program of the kind you have provided to Egypt. Such a close “love-lock” may be impossible right now after the past differences we have had. In Islam, marriage contracts contain various stipulations, even including the amount of alimony to be paid in case of divorce. There is much talk of temporary marriage these days. The U.S. and Pakistani relationship, however, is not such a temporary marriage, but an Islamic marriage. (S)

(At this point, President Zia left for evening prayers; the discussions resumed when he returned.) President Zia asked about implications in all three of the areas he discussed, since there are gray areas involved. (S)

We recognize there are difficulties with your legislation, and thus we have decided to split the issues. The most important is the security guarantee. We are at a crossroads now; should we foreclose our options? (S)

We consider that the 1959 agreement is against a Communist threat. You should perhaps replace the word “Communist” with some other word which would restrict it to Soviet or Soviet-aided enemies. (S)

Then we need some guarantees against India. After the meeting that we will be having with the Indians, and then with the Chinese, we will see what more we need. We will ask the Chinese for moral support. (S)

We look forward to the practical implementation of this agreement, even including the U.S. use of troops. (S)

Then we have to see about the infrastructure. Detailed planning must continue. The U.S. military team now in Pakistan will be looking into this and at the end of that we can talk about military needs. (S)

On the economic side, it is not a question of a token grant. We do not want to embarrass you. Therefore, don’t undertake such an exercise because of nuclear opinion here. I can give you certain understandings later, after the military program is in place, but not now. Therefore, let us leave aside the economic and military matters and focus on security guarantees. (S)

Ambassador Yaqub Khan was then asked to speak. He said that the program proposed by the United States offers a provocation to both the USSR and India. It is not even in the interests of the United States to engage its prestige in something that does not do more than provide a token. This would simply become another case of the U.S. ally coming out second best, and this would damage U.S. prestige. (S)

(Deputy Secretary Christopher interrupted to ask whether the Pakistani side was clear that our proposal does not require nuclear assurances to Congress. President Zia said no, that he understood this but the American government would be asked by Congress.) (S)

Yaqub went on to say that the government of Pakistan is also very sensitive to public opinion, more so than in many countries that claim to have democratic governments. It would be impossible to explain the U.S. legislative proposals to the Pakistani public. I have pointed out to President Zia that between the sincere will of President Carter and its implementation, there are many Congressional obstacles. I do not mean this as a criticism, but we have to take reality into account. (S)

Ghulam Ishaq made two more points: the first regarded the type of security guarantees, and the second the need to strengthen defense and economic capabilities. (S)

He said that public opinion is very important. The guarantees must be permanent and all-embracing. There must be no equivocation and they must come automatically into play under agreed circumstances. There must be a guarantee to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. (S)

The 1959 agreement, reaffirmed by Congress, would be adequate if its weaknesses are removed, such as the reference to “Communist” aggression. This was conceived on the basis of another historical setting and it will have to be amended. The economic and military factors can be de-linked. (S)

Defense aid can be assured only after the military team has made its survey. Only experts can determine what is needed immediately and what in the long run. On the basis of that, a price tag can be developed. (S)

On the economic side, I gave you the figures this morning. We need 1 to 1.5 billion dollars annually for five years. This does not take defense needs into account. If aid can be revived on the basis described, we can proceed. (S)

If you prefer, you can provide extensive aid under PL–480, including edible oil and wheat. This would not require a change in your law. (S)

When we do resume aid, the type most needed will be flexible aid—commodity program lending and debt rescheduling. (S)

You have talked about “keeping the insurgency alive” in Afghanistan. The issue is one of motivation. To accept an injection of arms to the refugees would be dangerous for us unless we are able to defend against the first two strategic contingencies we discussed earlier. (S)

Agha Shahi, at this point, suggested some amendments to the 1959 agreement which he described as “merely updating.” In fact, the proposed changes deleted all elements of the agreements linking the U.S. commitment to “Communist-inspired” aggression. The result would have been to expand the scope of the agreement to include aggression from India. (S)

With regard to Article I, Agha Shahi hoped that Congressional support would mean that Congress will readily concur in actions the President may propose. He suggested reducing the scope of uncertainty by consulting in advance on contingencies in the actions that would be appropriate in response to those contingencies. (S)

With regard to India, President Zia has said that we are seeking good relations. This will depend on India and Mrs. Gandhi. If we are to help the insurgents with arms, however, the Indians may intervene. He then quoted from an interview which Mrs. Gandhi had given to the French magazine Paris Match. (S)

Please explore with the Chinese what guarantees you might jointly give in case of an attack. (S)

It would be very difficult to prove Indo-Soviet collusion in an attack. Therefore there should be no reference to that sort of thing. (S)

President Zia took up the discussion and said that they were not putting any price tag on the relationship when Ghulam Ishaq cited figures. He is an economic expert and sets things forth in those terms. (S)

He noted that very few countries do not attach strings to their aid. China is an exception and it would be good if the U.S. kept this in mind. Third, once a country is under obligation, the relationship must be equal. There must be no demands in the internal situation. The policies you followed towards the Shah in Iran, for instance, turned out to be unproductive. Let us leave the whole question of military and economic assistance. If favors can be granted as Ghulam Ishaq says, we would accept this. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski, at this point, asked for an adjournment so that the American side could discuss the situation. (U)

Upon his return, Dr. Brzezinski said that the U.S. side understands that the points you have made are based on serious concern for the structure of U.S.-Pakistani relations. We share that point of departure. (C)

We agree on some things:

—Consultations about contingencies, although we must recognize that no formalistic conclusions can be made.

—As our relations unfold, there will be consultations with others, such as China. (Secretary Brown has done some of this already.) China might help defeat a Soviet-Indian alignment, but if we are not careful Chinese involvement could precipitate just such an alignment.

—We agree that relations must be equal. Only a self-reliant country is a good ally. (S)

Turning to some basic points:

—In your discussion of the changes you want in the 1959 agreement, you asked for full-scale, comprehensive guarantees in all directions. This is not consistent with some of the points that we have made, namely that the agreement is directed against the threat from the north. If that threat is not joined with others, then we have no problem. But we are not ready to make this agreement applicable against other regional powers.

—We have no problem with making this agreement more up to date. But if it is intended to transform its essence, that would result in problems for us.

—We are prepared to stand with you against the strategic threat from the Soviet Union. We assume that you would not want to transform the agreement, given what you said this morning.

—You suggest first that the defense team is to stay behind to determine what is needed; second, that your economic needs are very considerable; and third, that we initiate no steps in the Congress.

—You are saying that you do not want to undertake a long process, but want an instant, pre-arranged marriage. If we do not submit legislation, we will lose momentum. I have had conversations with Senator Glenn and think that his problems can be taken care of if we move rapidly. If we do not undertake this legislative effort, then our international efforts will collapse. (S)

Thus, what we propose is more effective and practical:

—First, reaffirm our commitment through legislation—a unique historic commitment.

—Second, provide in the legislation for an initial input to your economic and military well-being. This expresses our engagement in Pakistan and you should appreciate its symbolic significance. What you propose means a complete dissipation of what we are trying to do.

—Three, propose military cooperation to demonstrate to the Soviets that we are engaged.

—Four, we are prepared to mount efforts for military and economic consortiums. (S)

In brief, we are proposing a sustained American engagement with Pakistan as our partner. I understand that you are rejecting this. This will have strategic results. We must be clear. We came here to engage with you in a program that would generate political support. (S)

President Zia replied that this was not a rejection. He pointed out that he has political difficulties just as the American government does. He said he saw this as a beginning that would generate support internationally, but stressed that he has to also be able to sell this arrangement to his people. (S)

He noted that $200 million would only buy, for instance, 12 Mirages. The United States seems to want to have Pakistan stand up with crutches. Zia wants it to stand on its own strength. (S)

Let us then, he said, proceed by steps. Give us a security guarantee against the Soviet threat—we can review the amendments that we have proposed. The aid you proposed is just not commensurate with what I see. You are looking at things on a material plain, [plane] we are looking at them more on a moral plain [plane]. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said this was true, but that we also have to show the Soviets that we are engaged. Congressional involvement will become part of the U.S. commitment. We are filling in a gap in our commitments. We also want to give you what you need to stand on your own. If we do not start, then we will not even be able to develop the security guarantee. You want a comprehensive guarantee, including India, but still do not want to take steps to implement this guarantee. We are attempting to start a process; you needn’t say that what we have offered is enough. Just simply say to your people it is the first step on a long road, which will also include sacrifices and challenges. (S)

President Zia asked what if India were left out. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski went on to say that we want to start a process of help so that Pakistan can rebuff the Soviets. A guarantee is only a hollow promise without that kind of back-up, and we would lose an excellent opportunity in the United States. (S)

Zia responded that we should then work out a total amount. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski said we can do both. The military team is not here to discover the obvious fact that $100 million a year is not enough for Pakistani requirements. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher recommended that the two sides consider matters further overnight and meet tomorrow. (U)

Ghulam Ishaq pointed out that the problem arises in de-linking the military and economic aspects from questions relating to the 1959 agreement. He asked whether it is necessary to specify amounts. Could this not be left to the consortium? (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that momentum would be lost. (U)

Ghulam Ishaq reiterated that the only question arises if we have to quantify the amount. (U)

Deputy Secretary Christopher responded that we cannot go to the consortium without legislation. (S)

Ghulam Ishaq suggested that the U.S. could make an announcement subject to legislative action. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the Pakistanis are underestimating the time question. All that they have to do is act in ways that would not embarrass the United States. They do not have to accept the amounts that we propose. We can find ways of dealing with that. (S)

Ghulam Ishaq said that there would be a terribly adverse reaction in Pakistan and with its neighbors. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that Congress would not lift the legislative restrictions without a sum of money being specified. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski added that we will be losing a great opportunity and in particular we will lose bipartisan momentum in Washington by summer. (S)

President Zia suggested that we must first of all be clear as to the commitment. Money is not the issue; let’s first get an idea of the amounts of money that are possible. Carrington offered nothing more than tea and sympathy. Giscard and the Germans won’t help much, and the Saudis have no ideas. The security guarantee is most important. (S)

Zia stated that India would not have to be included in the treaty to meet the Pakistani requirements. (S)

Then we could go ahead and see what we can develop in the area of economic assistance. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski reiterated that we cannot move on the question of a security guarantee without the legislative process. We can legislate in a way that would permit us to again become active in the Consortium. (unclear). (S)

Ghulam Ishaq referred to the arms embargo of 1971–1975. When it was lifted no figures were specified in the action. Why can it not be done again this way. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher noted a fundamental paradox. It is hard to envision a guarantee for a weak country that will not accept help. (S)

President Zia said that there are two problems between the U.S. and Pakistan. Some form of a guarantee would give us a boost. Pakistan also asks how this would be supported. $400 million will be seen as a detraction from Pakistani security. I cannot just simply talk to people about the future. Also, we always run into the problem of Pakistan and India, but we will not insist this time. (S)

What am I supposed to tell the officers of my army? That I am getting 12 Mirages? (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that President Zia should consider this as the beginning of a process by which the United States becomes engaged in Pakistani security. Otherwise, Pakistan will be getting nothing. If Pakistan rebuffs us, we will then have to protect our own security as best we can. If our legislative process creates problems for Pakistan, then let us figure out some formula whereby we can proceed while each side states its own view. We are unable to renew the 1959 agreement in the abstract. People will wonder why we are not specifying some particular amount. (S)

The United States can, on the one hand, develop a strategy together with Pakistan, and ultimately Iran, and seek to neutralize India. Or, on the other hand, it can move to an air and naval strategy and not become involved in the Asian heartland. (S)

Ambassador Hummel added that all U.S. security agreements require the other country to take steps to strengthen itself to postpone the level at which the United States would have to become engaged with military force. It seemed to him, therefore, impossible to seek a commitment without Pakistan accepting aid to strengthen itself. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski added further that President Carter has made a major public commitment. It has become widely known what we will be asking the Congress for, and if we go back with a lesser package, people will see this as a political rebuff to President Carter. We absolutely must find a solution. If not, our strategies are based on the wrong assumptions. (S)

President Zia said he agreed with that. And he had told the United States not to go public with the $400 million figure. Pakistan now finds itself faced with a fait accompli. (S)

At this point the meeting adjourned for the day. The following morning and afternoon were taken up with travel to a refugee camp and the Khyber Pass. The sessions resumed in the evening of February 3rd. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski opened the session by pointing out that the problem was how to state the U.S.-Pakistani relationship accurately, and with political sensitivity, pointing out what can be done now, and that more is needed for the future. He tabled a proposed draft communique which he said seeks to take these characteristics into account.¹⁷ There are eight specific ways, in this document, the American side seeks to meet your concerns. It contains an explicit affirmation of the 1959 agreement by Congress; the focus is on Soviet-directed aggression; it removes the obstacles of the Glenn and Symington amendments; it is a beginning of a process (and you can see from Sadat’s experience where this sort of thing can lead); there is a military team here; and there is no limit on what they are to look into; we will try to get others to help shoulder the burden which, without legislation, we would be unable to do, it stresses the magnitude of needs, and it is labeled as “initial steps” which should help President Zia with his political problem. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that he and the Deputy Secretary had been in touch with the President who wants to move on this matter.¹⁸ Anything short of the package that the United States is offering would be a major rebuff to us and we would draw the appropriate conclusions. (S)

President Zia responded that it is not a question of money. We want to stress our needs and see best how to implement a program that will meet them. We are grateful for the American concern; we appreciate the consultations that have been held both here and in Washington. We have watched Afghanistan closely. On May 9, 1978, President Zia said he had written to President Carter on the problems posed by the Soviet role in Afghanistan,¹⁹ and was now glad to see that the United States agrees with him. Pakistan does not have military strength, and has opted for a military and diplomatic response in combination. It has opposed the invasion and called for a withdrawal. It has condemned the Soviet action. It has mobilized Third World support. It has hosted the Islamic Conference. It has taken up diplomatic contacts with India to alert them to the threat and reassure India on Pakistan’s desire for normalization while allaying their concern over American arms supply to Pakistan. It has remained close to China, but this is a limited relationship. (S)

The United States is the only answer to the Soviet threat. This is why we want to update the 1959 agreement. Our exchange of views shows agreement and common interests and concerns. Under these circumstances, your offer of Congressional reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement is acceptable, even though it falls short of what Pakistan would like. We also understand that you will try to get the Chinese to help Pakistan. (S)

Pakistan is working to improve its relationships with India. The dimension of the threat in the West is great, and therefore we feel that Congressional affirmation of the agreement could provide a deterrent. (S)

We deeply appreciate the total offer that you have made, but we must note the risks involved in our accepting it. President Carter’s statements have created great expectations, and the figure of $400 million will disappoint the Pakistani public. We must also reckon with an adverse reaction from the Islamic states. India will raise an alarm and seek more weapons from the Soviet Union. We also note that the United States has offered to supply weapons to India.²⁰ Therefore, we ask you again, do not specify any amount. Please remove the Symington amendment and then we can discuss the dimensions of our need. (S)

We appreciate your approval of what we have done with regard to Afghanistan.²¹ We are ready for a long-term relationship, and we appreciate the more flexible aid position you are taking. (S)

Referring to the paper he had tabled, specifically page 2, Dr. Brzezinski proposed one further change following the phrase “during 18 months.” He would at that point add “in the meantime, both sides will consult on the long-term needs of Pakistan.“ (S)

At this point the meeting broke temporarily so that the two sides could consult among themselves. (U)

When he returned, President Zia said that the draft statement was well-worded, and that the only change is from $400 to $500 million. Pakistan, however, does not want a price tag. Please only refer to the 1959 agreement and put no emphasis on the price or aid. The rest of the agreement is fine. (At this point he read his revisions.) (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that we seem to be moving in the right direction, and each side recognized the other’s problems. The United States has to go ahead with legislation, including aid programs. (At this point he read from his revision of the document.) We will, however, have to introduce legislation. (S)

President Zia: “No.” (U)

Dr. Brzezinski insisted that if we are going to go ahead we will have to introduce the figures. You could express appreciation, but you could also note that you are disappointed that the figure was so small. (S)

President Zia said he could say that now. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that it would depend on how it was said. (U)

President Zia said, however, that it would be better if Dr. Brzezinski simply reported the facts back to the President and called this whole thing a fact-finding mission. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked when then could we produce the legislation? (S)

President Zia replied, “After the needs have been assessed and the overall kitty had been put together.” (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher reiterated that we cannot ask for affirmation of the agreement without showing how we intend to back it up. Congress would reject this and ask whether the problem is urgent or not. (S)

President Zia said the Americans should tell Congress that Pakistan considers the word of the United States more important than any money. (S)

Ambassador Yaqub said that both sides evidently agree in substance. We agree on the 1959 agreement, the need to cooperate, the fact of sizeable economic and military requirements, there is not a quarrel over any specific amount, and the breakdown is on a secondary essentially non-substantial issue. (Yaqub said this with considerable emotion.) (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that there are two substantial elements. The first is that the people and Congress back up any commitment that is made, and secondly, we want to organize an effective consortium. (By implication, neither of these would be possible if no sum were specified in the request to Congress.) (S)

President Zia remarked that the United States is always too little and too late in what it does. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher asked what if we came to the conclusion later that $400 million was not enough? (S)

Ghulam Ishaq said that Pakistan had not yet studied the dimensions of the military requirement. Similarly, Pakistan is, at this point, going through a new assessment of its economic requirements by the IBRD. Why not do the military aspect in the same way. Without that kind of a survey your monetary figure is less convincing. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher reiterated that the time is pressing. It will be harder to get funds later. Indeed, there is a very small window of about a week or so in which we can get Congressional action. (S)

Ghulam Ishaq asked what that said about the reliability of the American commitment. (C)

At this point, once again the two sides took a break for consultation. (S)

When the meeting resumed, Dr. Brzezinski said that there were two choices. The first was to issue a revised communique (which he then read), after which the United States would submit legislation. This would be seen as first-step seed money. The sum would not be mentioned in the communique, but it would have to be specified in the legislation. The Pakistanis could then: welcome Congressional endorsement of the 1959 agreement, welcome the newly restored friendship between the United States and Pakistan, register their disappointment with the amount involved, and point out that they expect to receive more through multilateral efforts. (S)

The other possibility would be to issue an abbreviated communique involving only pages 1 and 3. There would be no reassurances or removal of the restraints on aid. There would subsequently have to be further consultations. (S)

The American side, Dr. Brzezinski said, had come to Pakistan to work out an understanding. But it has to mobilize domestic support now for this major strategic commitment. (S)

President Zia pointed out that each side has a public opinion problem and said it would be best to call the visit a fact-finding mission. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher stated his belief that the proposed statement is the best that the American side can do. We are in danger of losing historic opportunity. We have stretched our position as far as we can and it would be a shame to lose this opportunity. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that this was the case and each side would have to draw its own conclusions. (U)

President Zia complained that the meeting had bogged down in modalities. The offer of $400 million is a disgrace for the United States. (S)

President Zia again said that the United States should have consulted first with Pakistan before publicizing the figure. The Pakistanis had, in Washington, specifically asked the United States not to let the $400 million figure become public. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that we would be able to consider alternatives in the future; check out other possibilities with other countries. (S)

President Zia said that he thought the dialogue should be continued. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that the press will ask what all of this means. We will say that the legislation has been deferred and is under study pending further consultation. When asked why, we will say that further study is needed and we have left a military team behind. (S)

Deputy Secretary Christopher said that we would have to say that we were not able to reach an agreement on the terms. (S)

Responding to Dr. Brzezinski, President Zia said that additional consultations could also be mentioned, as appropriate. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that when asked when an agreement will be submitted, we would respond that it is being held for further discussion. Dr. Brzezinski asked in passing, what would happen if the United States submitted the agreement unilaterally. (S)

President Zia responded that the Pakistanis would issue a sharply critical statement, and wondered what is behind the great hurry of the United States in this matter. (S)

(Dr. Brzezinski explained once again the need for speed.) (U)

Ghulam Ishaq asked how the United States could unilaterally initiate legislation at the same time promising to consult further. Were the Pakistanis to accept the $400 million figure, they would have exposed themselves to a great danger. (S)

President Zia said in conclusion that the two sides understand each other. We agree but we fall out over modalities. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski concluded by saying that the United States wants to make its commitment to Pakistan tangible. (C)

The two sides agreed that the shortened form of the communique should be issued²² and that Dr. Brzezinski and Agha Shahi should hold a joint press conference, which they subsequently did.²³ (President Zia held his own press conference later in the evening.) (S)

Thereupon, this session concluded. This marked the end of this series of U.S.-Pakistani talks. (U)

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890015–0420. Secret; Sensitive. Dodson sent the summary record to Tarnoff under an October 28 covering memorandum. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890015–0419)
2. Regarding Pakistani concerns about “hot pursuit,” see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 182.
3. See Document 421.
4. See footnote 3, Document 422.
5. See footnote 4, Document 403.
6. See footnote 1, Document 166.
7. Not further identified. Benjamin Oehlert was Ambassador to Pakistan from August 1967 to June 1969.
8. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIX, South Asia, Document 328.
9. See footnote 3, Document 419.
10. In the interview, Kissinger said: “It is extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union would attack Pakistan over the opposition of India. The real threat will therefore develop if the Soviet Union and India cooperate. We must of course do our best to prevent this from occurring. But the greatest danger is that India may seek with Soviet cooperation to dismember its neighbor by splitting off Baluchistan and the Northwest Province and occupying Kashmir. Both India and the Soviet Union would then be surrounded by weak client states.” (“An Interview With Henry Kissinger,” Wall Street Journal, January 21, 1980, p. 18)
11. Gandhi met with Nixon on November 4 and 5, 1971. According to Kissinger’s account, Gandhi told Nixon that “Pakistan was a jerry-built structure held together by its hatred for India, which was being stoked by each new generation of Pakistani leaders. Conditions in East Pakistan reflected tendencies applicable to all of Pakistan. Neither Baluchistan nor the Northwest Frontier properly belonged to Pakistan; they too wanted and deserved greater autonomy; they should never have been part of the original settlement.” (Kissinger, White House Years, p. 881) See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 150 and 151.
12. Reference is to the President’s lengthy January 21 message to Congress and his January 23 State of the Union address.
13. See Document 406.
14. Not further identified.
15. February 11.
16. In a February 1 memorandum, Aaron informed Vance: “The President approved your recommendation to seek ten/twenty year extended repayment terms for Pakistan FMS financing loans in both FY 80 and FY 81.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 2–3/80)
17. Message WH80172 from Brzezinski’s aircraft to the Department of State, February 4, relayed the text of the draft joint communiqué. The following text in the draft did not appear in the final version of the joint communiqué: “The United States in accordance with its Constitution will take such appropriate action including the use of armed forces as may be mutually agreed upon in order to assist Pakistan. The proposed legislation will remove all current barriers to economic and military aid to Pakistan, with the result that the initially requested economic and military aid will approximate one-half billion dollars during the next 18 months.” (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, February–October 1980) For the final version of the joint statement, see footnote 22 below.
18. No record of any direct communication with Carter by Christopher or Brzezinski was found. In a February 2 memorandum, Vance informed Carter: “We have just received a cable from Chris and Zbig indicating that Zia told them this morning that the Pakistanis do not wish us to go forward with legislation containing economic and military assistance in the amounts which we have offered. Zia has also expressed concern about continuing assistance to any insurgents on the basis that this might draw fire on the Pakistanis. It is not clear whether this is still a bargaining position, but it has a ring of seriousness to it. We will know more by tomorrow morning.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 2/80) Message WH80154 from the White House to Camp David, February 2, reported on the February 2 afternoon session. See footnote 3, Document 424.
19. See Document 279.
20. When Clark Clifford met with Gandhi on January 31, he told her that the United States “was prepared” to sell arms to India (see Document 169) but no record of a U.S offer of military aid to India was found.
21. Regarding Pakistani assistance in the delivery of arms to Afghan insurgent groups, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 176.
22. The substantive portion of the final version of the February 3 joint communiqué reads: “The two nations agreed that the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and the aggression against the Muslim people of that country is a flagrant violation of international covenants and norms and a serious threat to the peace and security of Pakistan, the region, and the world. The United States reiterated that its commitment to Pakistan’s independence and security pursuant to 1959 agreement is firm and enduring. The Government of Pakistan reiterated its resolve, as stated in the 1959 agreement, that it is determined to resist aggression. President Zia-ul-Haq expressed appreciation for the visit of Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher. The American side expressed warm appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to it by the Government of Pakistan. Appropriate consultations between the two governments will continue.” (Department of State Bulletin, March 1980, p. 65)
23. In telegram 954 from Islamabad, February 4, the Embassy reported Brzezinski’s February 4 press conference at the Islamabad airport. In response to a question on the U.S. response if Pakistan’s security were threatened, Brzezinski stated: “President Carter asked Deputy Secretary Christopher and myself to come here to reaffirm the agreement of 1959. We have done so. He has asked us to come here to lay the foundations for an invigorated friendship between our two countries. We have done so. He has asked us to come here to consult with President Zia, Minister Shahi and others on the nature of the strategic dilemma that we and you confront. We have done so.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800061–0291)