Office of the Historian

220. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting1

Washington, February 27, 1980, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Afghanistan (U)

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Secretary Cyrus Vance
    • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
    • Mr. David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
    • Mr. David Mark, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

  • OSD

    • Deputy Secretary W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
    • Ambassador Robert Komer, Under Secretary for Policy

  • JCS

    • Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

  • DCI

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner
    • Mr. Chuck Cogan, Chief, Near East Division

  • Justice

    • Mr. John Shenefield, Acting Attorney General
    • Mr. Ken Bass, Counsel for Intelligence Policy

  • OMB

    • Dr. John White, Deputy Director
    • Mr. Randy Jayne, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

  • White House

    • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • Mr. David Aaron

  • NSC

    • Mr. Thomas Thornton
    • Mr. Donald Gregg

Summary of Conclusions

The SCC (I) met to give formal approval to the use of an additional [less than 1 line not declassified] for use in Afghanistan.2 This money is [Page 603] needed to carry out the program that the President had previously approved for the remainder of 1980. The funds will be matched by another country. (S)

Admiral Turner briefed the meeting on the details of the program; some signs of effectiveness are already being noticed. (S)

All member agencies agreed that the money should be provided. The only reservation noted was OMB’s concern that the amount might prove to be insufficient. (S)

Anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons remain the insurgents’ greatest need. Soviet-origin equipment is becoming very expensive, however, and SA–7s are in very short supply. It was agreed that CIA would approach Egypt to see if the Egyptians could purchase Yugoslav-built SA–7s and then pass them on to us. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan should also be asked to seek to obtain SA–7s on our behalf from Algeria and possibly other countries with large stocks. (S)

CIA was also asked to try to increase its intelligence take from the insurgents. (S)

  1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–020, Minutes—SCC 1980. Secret; Sensitive. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.↩
  2. In a memorandum, February 29, Brzezinski notified Turner that Carter approved the SCC(I) recommendation to use an additional [text not declassified] for the Afghan program. (Ibid.)↩