Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

337. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, April 10, 1979, 1140Z

4206. Subject: Discussion With President Zia. Ref: State 85585.²

1. (S) Entire text; protect FGI.

2. Summary: In hour-long meeting April 9 with President Zia, I presented USG views and proposals as stated in reftel. Zia found comments relating to security questions “positive” and “reassuring” and said he would react more fully in a few days following consultation with his Cabinet. He reacted with vehemence to U.S. announcement of aid cut-off, and denied Pakistan had nuclear program directed toward weapons;³ he accused U.S. of engineering international campaign against Pakistan and timing it to take advantage of Pakistan’s internal problems. Zia asserted that any change in Pak nuclear activities would have to await installation of civilian government after November elections, but then agreed that there could be room for further discussions on basis of “new ideas” adumbrated in para 10 reftel.⁴

3. Zia was clearly angry and hurt by abruptness of USG announcement on assistance cut-off. Exchanges were heated at some points, but overall Zia appeared to be reassured by evidence that U.S. seeks to separate in so far as feasible nuclear issue from efforts to provide other support to meet threat from Afghan situation. End summary.

4. I met with President Zia on afternoon of April 9 for hour-long session. Constable accompanied me; Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz and MFA notetaker participated.

5. I led off presentation with rather full explanation of how Department press briefing on Pak nuclear program and assistance cut-off had come about,⁵ emphasizing the necessity of responding to press queries which were building up following press stories in India, Manchester Guardian, and German TV program. Expressing regret that timing had worked out as it had, I concluded saying: “Now that both sides have spoken for the public record, we hope we can minimize further public controversy and carry out our discussion in private.”

6. I then proceeded slowly, carefully and verbatim through points in paras 1 to 13 in reftel. Only point I added was in para 2a, dealing with need for internal cohesion and stability in Pakistan, saying we noted with satisfaction Zia’s announcement of elections for national and provincial assemblies on November 17. Zia jotted down salient points as I read from my instructions.

7. Zia’s response began with statement that it was reassuring that not everything in our relationship is linked to our differences on nuclear issues. He then launched into lengthy and emotional criticism of U.S. attitudes on Pak nuclear program. Zia first said our intelligence was faulty, based on unreliable source⁶ (septel).⁷ He said U.S. has assumed Pakistan is making a bomb and our journalists have dubbed it a “Muslim” bomb. “I assure you once again,” he said, “all this is totally wrong. Pakistan is carrying out a research program dedicated to peaceful purposes.” He then reviewed the GOP efforts since 60s to limit nuclear proliferation, citing South Asia Nuclear Free Zone proposals, suggestion for nuclear-free zone in Indian Ocean, proposals for reciprocal inspection with India. He lamented at length discrimination against Pakistan as compared to U.S. treatment of India, Israel, South Africa, and Brazil.

8. At this point Zia became somewhat agitated and accused U.S. of initiating and orchestrating world-wide campaign against Pakistan. He asserted that it was no coincidence that Desai letter arrived shortly before DepSec Christopher’s visit.⁸ “What U.S. journalists have been told is totally wrong, and an attempt to fabricate that is not worthy of a great country like the U.S. The present debate is unfortunate and uncalled for.”⁹

9. Zia then said that the Martial Law Administration (MLA) can do some difficult things but it “cannot compromise Pakistan.” MLA cannot accept unilateral inspection; “I can give personal guarantee of our peaceful intentions,¹⁰ but I cannot turn my back on programs previous government has undertaken in this field. . . . Let the U.S. wait six months until an elected government comes into power. Maybe a political government can take a different stand.”

10. Zia concluded this portion by noting that he had sought to accommodate U.S. views by leaving CENTO in a dignified way that would not harm U.S. interests. “I could have been flamboyant about it,” in the style of others (i.e. Bhutto); but now U.S. cuts off aid in the most dramatic manner against “little” Pakistan which is some degree dependent on U.S. assistance, thereby “taking advantage of our internal situation.”

11. Having got this off his chest, Zia then turned to substance of my remarks, noting GOP appreciation for 24-hour response to Pakistan’s request for clarification of validity of ’59 bilateral in view of Soviet demarche.¹¹ He said he would call urgent Cabinet meeting to discuss substance of USG proposals, including visit of high-level mission, ship visits, and possible U.S. demarche to Soviets. On last point, Zia said he was pleased that Pakistan still has some friend that could deliver such a demarche, and that it would be reassuring if it were undertaken.¹² On the possibility of additional economic assistance, Zia noted that it was badly needed and would be very helpful in dealing with massive development requirements in Baluchistan. However, if such assistance is to be linked to nuclear question, then U.S. should wait six months for elected government before making its proposals.¹³

12. Zia said he would welcome discussions with high-level mission, subject to his consultations with Cabinet.

13. Zia then talked briefly about Pak policy on Afghan refugees, reaffirming GOP decision to provide only humanitarian assistance and nothing more. “Without a strong hand on my back (read U.S. support), I can’t take extravagant actions on my own.” He noted, however, that some organizations in Pakistan, such as Jamaat-i-Islami, had connections with refugee groups. Zia said these organizations and some foreign countries were supplying large sums of money to refugee groups and had, in the process, driven up ammunition prices for obsolete 303 Enfield rifles from 1 rupee per round to 200 rupees. Zia also said that there had been three instances in which GOP had had to stop pilfering of Pak Army ammunition for sale to refugee groups.

14. Zia then recounted Soviet protest and Pak response (Islamabad 3713)¹⁴ adding that Ambassador Yaqub had also responded in recent meeting with Kosygin.¹⁵ Zia asserted that Pakistan would deal harshly with any Afghan incursions into Pak tribal territory, but GOP could not handle any large-scale Soviet-backed attacks. Zia then lamented the legacy of the Chinese attack on Vietnam, saying that while the Chinese may have taught the Vietnamese a lesson, the Soviets may now respond by “teaching Pakistan a lesson.”¹⁶

15. Zia concluded this portion by expressing his “deep gratitude”¹⁷ to President Carter for assurances on 1959 bilateral and said he looked forward to useful discussions, irrespective of nuclear question.¹⁸

16. Shahnawaz then intervened to say that segregation of nuclear and security problems was a “very positive point”¹⁹ and showed that door is not “totally closed.” He continued with complaint that Hayat Mehdi had not been given notice of aid cut-off and that timing of announcement was seen as sign of displeasure over Bhutto execution. I corrected the record at this point, pointing out that Mehdi had been given our press guidance which announced winding down of aid.²⁰ I strongly denied that USG had generated publicity, or that USG had orchestrated anti-Pak campaign. I assured him that USG did not stimulate Desai letter or publicity in Indian or European press. I noted that other governments have their own sources of information about Pak nuclear activities and their own concerns about these.

17. I then referred back to some of Zia’s earlier remarks. I took sharp issue with charge of discriminatory treatment of Pakistan and rehearsed again for Zia the valid reasons for differences in our approach to nuclear activities of India and Pakistan. I concluded by reiterating what Under Secretary Newsom had told Amb. Sultan Khan (State 87127)²¹ that under terms of Nuclear Export Control Act we would ultimately be prohibited from exports of enriched uranium to India if latter did not accept adequate safeguards on all its facilities.

18. I then said I was personally disappointed, and knew my government would also be, to learn that Zia was apparently ruling out further nuclear discussions during his tenure.²² We had hoped to explore ways that Pakistan’s concerns over nuclear danger might be met, and to consider whether some freeze²³ on existing Pak activity might be arranged while further discussions take place. I re-read to Zia para 10 of my instructions (on working with other countries to reduce nuclear threat) and noted we were not seeking categorical answers at this stage but some flexibility on part of GOP so that we could seek to put a cap on regional activities that would lead to proliferation.²⁴

19. This portion was interrupted at several points by somewhat acrimonious exchanges with Zia and Shahnawaz, with both vigorously protesting that Pakistan did not have the capability to produce enriched uranium. Zia at one point asked, “Who is enriching uranium?”,²⁵ to which I replied: “You are, Mr. President, and you have no peaceful use for enriched uranium”. Zia then responded, “You say we are; we say we’re not.”²⁶ He said Pakistan is carrying out a research program like “any other country,” but “I can assure you Pakistan is not in a position to enrich uranium”.²⁷ Shahnawaz added that U.S. with its intelligence resources must know that Pakistan cannot produce a weapon, and that Pakistan does not have enough electric power resources to enrich uranium. He said that while no GOP spokesman can publicly say what Pakistan does or does not have, it should nevertheless be apparent that Pakistan cannot achieve a nuclear option.

20. Zia concluded on more conciliatory note by saying that my remarks on possible discussion of regional proliferation problems was “a very positive step” and that Pakistan would be prepared for further discussions along these lines.²⁸

21. Finally, I advised Zia that we were still looking forward to negotiating a $40 million Title III P.L. 480 agreement with Pakistan which would have favorable developmental aspects from the use of the proceeds and would also provide a basis for multi-year concessional sales of wheat and vegoil.

22. I will send comments on conversation and recommendations by septel.²⁹

Hummel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P–14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan IV. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, Oxman wrote: “WC, SO.”
2. Telegram 85585 to Islamabad, April 6, provided Hummel with instructions for his meeting with Zia, which included an offer to make a démarche to the Soviet Union, as well as to send U.S. warships to the Indian Ocean. (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, January–July 1979) The instructions reflected the points developed in the April 5 meeting in Washington (see Document 336). See also footnote 5 below, and footnote 3, Document 339.
3. Oxman underlined the words “denied Pakistan had nuclear program directed toward weapons.”
4. Oxman drew a bracket in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. Paragraph 10 of telegram 85585 to Islamabad, April 6, reads: “Finally, we would be willing to work with you and other countries, both within and without the region, to seek to ensure that you will not be threatened by the development of nuclear weapons by others in your region. In this connection we welcome your thoughts as to the kind of arrangements Pakistan would feel meet its security concerns in this respect.” See footnote 2 above.
5. See footnote 2, Document 335.
6. Oxman underlined the words “our intelligence was faulty based on unreliable source.”
7. In telegram 4207 from Islamabad, April 10, the Embassy reported the portions of Hummel and Zia’s meeting that dealt with intelligence matters. Regarding the source of U.S. information on Pakistan’s nuclear program: “Zia said we were basing our information on a poor source if we believed what we were told by our man in Karachi whom the GOP had arrested.” Hummel responded that information on Pakistan’s nuclear activities came from many sources, and noted that “a principal source of intelligence was from procurement activities of the GOP in several Western European countries—activities which were known to us and to several other governments.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Tin: 980643000018, Box 13, Islamabad 1971–1979)
8. See Document 325. Regarding Desai’s letter, see footnote 4, Document 143.
9. Oxman drew a bracket in the margin to the right of this paragraph.
10. Oxman underlined the words “personal guarantee,” next to which in the right-hand margin he drew a question mark. In an April 11 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski reported Hummel’s discussion with Zia. In the left-hand margin of the memorandum, next to a sentence that reads: “He gave his ‛personal guarantees’ of ‛peaceful intentions,’ but said he cannot accept unilateral inspection,” Carter drew an arrow from the word “but,” underneath which he wrote: “We want international inspection, not unilateral.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 18, 4/7/1979–4/12/1979)
11. See Document 332.
12. Oxman underlined the words “would be reassuring if it were undertaken.”
13. Oxman drew a bracket in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
14. See Document 332.
15. Oxman underlined the words “Ambassador Yaqub” and drew a line from the word “Kosygin” to the bottom of the page and wrote: “Yes, we know.”
16. Oxman underlined the words “teaching Pakistan a lesson.”
17. Oxman underlined the words “deep gratitude.”
18. Oxman underlined the words “irrespective of nuclear question.”
19. Oxman underlined the words “very positive point.”
20. See footnote 5, Document 335.
21. See Document 335.
22. Oxman underlined the words “that Zia was apparently ruling out further nuclear discussions during his tenure.”
23. Oxman underlined the word “freeze.”
24. Oxman drew a bracket in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
25. Oxman underlined the question “Who is enriching uranium?” and drew a bracket in the right-hand margin.
26. Oxman drew a bracket in the left-hand margin next to the two preceding sentences. He also underlined the words “You say we are; we say we’re not” and drew a line from this phrase to the bottom of the page and wrote: “Surely we should be able to put an end to this puerile shadow-boxing.”
27. Oxman underlined the words “is not in a position to enrich uranium.”
28. Oxman underlined the words “would be prepared for further discussions along these lines.”
29. Telegram 4215 from Islamabad, April 10, transmitted Hummel’s comments on his April 9 meeting with Zia. Hummel concluded: “Zia was genuinely taken aback by vigor of U.S. response to Pakistan’s enrichment program and is concerned about a weakening of his own position domestically. The coincidence of internal tensions over Bhutto execution, the threat from Sovs/Afghans, and the now-widespread publicity of U.S. aid cut-off all put unusual pressures on Zia and his government. At the same time, many Pakistanis, unaware of the details of secret Pak enrichment activity or its purpose, can be expected to be very resentful of ‛U.S. pressures’ at a time when Pakistan needs international support.” Hummel recommended further high-level talks. (Department of State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, David D. Newsom Subject Files, Lot 81D154, Box 15, Pakistan, January–July 1979)