338. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
4344. Subject: Discussions With President Zia. Ref: (A) Islamabad 4215;2 (B) Islamabad 4206.3
1. (S) Entire text: Protect FGI.
2. Summary: President Zia called me to his home April 12 to respond to proposals I had placed before him on April 9. Zia appreciated USG’s “positive, cooperative and substantial” proposals. He asked for a rain check on demarche to the Soviets; preferred to postpone question of additional ship visits;4 welcomed further intelligence exchanges;5 agreed (but without enthusiasm) to further discussions on nuclear problems, and asked that Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi [Page 801] and a small politico-military team consult in Washington April 24–27 under ’59 bilateral in lieu of U.S. official mission here. Zia also spoke of immediate concern over possible Afghan raid against refugee camps and said in this even Pakistan would retaliate.
3. Zia’s response reflects (a) satisfaction over apparent U.S. support; (b) desire to explore further the practical dimension of that support; (c) his hope to evade further confrontation over the nuclear issue; and (d) concern that certain steps, such as demarche and ship visits, if taken prior to further exploration of our support, would aggravate the Soviets and complicate Pakistan’s entry into the NAM to be decided in early June. In short, Zia wants to maintain maximum flexibility until he learns how far we are really prepared to go.
4. I recommend that we accept Shahi and a team in Washington April 24–27, or propose a later date if April dates are not convenient.6 End summary.
[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P–14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan IV. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. In the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, Oxman wrote: “WC, SAO—any reply?”↩
- See footnote 29, Document 337.↩
- See Document 337.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 337.↩
- See Document 339.↩
- At the end of telegram, Hummel commented: “It is evident that Paks are no longer as agitated about the Afghan/Sov threat as they were previously, although they expect some further troubles with both. It is also clear that Paks intend to explore how far they can stretch our security assurances (and arms sales) without giving way on their nuclear programs. Whether further consultations are held in Pakistan or in Washington, we will want to continue exploration of ways to deflect, freeze, or terminate the enrichment programs; it is likely that the Paks will remain adamant in refusing to accept the validity of our information on enrichment and will keep up probing pressure on the subject of US security support.”↩