Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, March 28, 1979, 1200Z

3713. Subject: Soviet Demarche on Alleged GOP Assistance to Afghan Dissidents: GOP Requests US Clarification of 1959 Bilateral.

1. (S) Entire text. FGI throughout.

2. Summary: On March 28 GOP Advisor on Foreign Affairs Agha Shahi passed to me substance of a strongly worded Soviet demarche which was made by the Soviet Ambassador to President Zia ul-Haq March 26. In the demarche, the Soviets accuse the GOP of “connivance” in the activities of the Afghan dissidents against the Kabul regime, and say that they “cannot remain indifferent” to armed attacks on a country with which they are allied by treaty.

3. Shahi also read me Zia’s reply, in which the President strongly denied the Soviet accusation, and challenged Moscow to make the Kabul government show more restraint so that the refugees—who were fleeing “repression”—would no longer be a problem. Zia also told the Soviet Ambassador that Afghan hostility toward Pakistan would not be tolerated, and that the next DRA plane to violate Pak airspace “would be shot down.”

4. Shahi said that the GOP takes the Soviet demarche “very seriously” and asked that we “clarify fully” the USG position on our 1959 bilateral agreement. End summary.

5. Agha Shahi called me to the MFA mid-day March 28 to “inform” the USG about a Soviet demarche delivered by Soviet Ambassador Azimov to President Zia on March 26. Shahi read carefully from the demarche, which began by referring to the Soviet role in “trying to promote the normalization of Pak-Afghan relations,” and to President Zia’s recent statements that the GOP wants neighborly relations with all states.

6. The Soviet note then went on to say that “groups hostile to the Democratic Government of Afghanistan (DRA) had settled in Pakistan,” and that “armed gangs of saboteurs and terrorists were penetrating into Afghanistan.” The Soviet note described these groups as “counter-revolutionaries,” who “freely roamed up and down the Pak-Afghan border,” and were on the attack because of their opposition to “the reforms” now being carried out in Afghanistan by the DRA. The note accuses the GOP of “connivance” in this anti-DRA activity, and says such action could lead to “severe aggravation in Pak-Afghan relations.”

7. The note goes on to say that the “Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to such developments,” especially when “aimed at a country with which the Soviet Union has a treaty of friendship which it values.” Moscow “will not allow” Afghanistan to “become the object of attack no matter what the source.”

8. The Soviet note concludes by saying that the USSR is delivering this message “in a frank and friendly manner,” and that Moscow would “not like to believe that the use of Pakistani territory” for dissident activity “goes on with your knowledge.” The note says that the GOP should consider the demarche with “all seriousness which this question deserves.”

9. Shahi then read from what I presume is a written summary of President Zia’s reply to Ambassador Azimov. According to Shahi, Zia told the Soviet Ambassador that:

—He “strongly rejected” the Soviet accusation about the GOP’s alleged connivance with anti-DRA dissidents; and that,

—The GOP has “scrupulously remained tied” to its policy of “non-intervention,” and has “done everything possible to keep the refugees from engaging in anti-DRA activities.”

10. Zia told Azimov that to try to keep the Afghan refugees under control, the GOP has established two refugee comaps, one at Warsak and the other at Tarbela, and that Azimov could visit either of them at any time to satisfy himself that no guerrilla training or other military activity is taking place. Zia said that there are now 35,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan and that they are arriving at the rate of 5,000 per month. The GOP, according to Zia, has been doing the best it can to keep the groups under control, and has warned Pakistani politicians not to make statements that will incite refugee activity, or be construed as anti-Afghan. Zia said that the GOP has ordered the refugee groups to cease holding press conferences, and that the GOP has provided “no arms, no training, and no financial support, other than humanitarian aid” to the refugees.

11. The President told the Soviet Ambassador that the real root of the refugee problem is in the “repression carried out against the Afghan population by the DRA”. Zia told Azimov that Moscow should “impress upon Kabul” the need to avoid creating “the conditions that cause the exodus.” According to Zia, Islamabad would be willing to cooperate with Kabul in preventing the entry of refugees. (When I queried Shahi about this later, he said that Zia meant that, if the Afghans close their border, the Paks would cooperate. Shahi did not think this a “very realistic proposition” because the border is so porous.)

12. On a government-to-government level, Zia said, he would continue to take “all the steps within his power” to see that “no hostile acts against the DRA originated in Pakistan.” He said, however, that the Taraki government in Kabul is becoming increasingly aggressive, and cited as examples the recent shelling of two villages in Pakistan, and the “three dozen” violations of Pakistani airspace by DRA planes. One violation occurred less than six weeks ago, when a DRA plane penetrated “thirty miles” into Pakistan. Zia said that he had “so far” ordered his forces not to shoot, and that he has contented himself with protests to Kabul, but he said that the next DRA aircraft to violate Pak airspace “would be shot down.”

13. Zia concluded by noting that he was affronted to be accused of complicity in the “half-hearted attempts by the Afghan dissidents” to overthrow the Kabul regime, and that, if the “GOP was really hostile to the DRA” it could make “life difficult” for the Taraki government. Zia decried the “substantial campaign of false allegations against the GOP” carried on by the Soviet media. The Soviet demarche, Zia said, “is stronger and more explicit” than anything the GOP has heard from the DRA, and that Moscow’s invocation of the USSR–DRA treaty will “only encourage Afghanistan to persist in its hostile attitude” toward Pakistan.

14. Shahi said that the GOP believes this demarche came from the “highest levels in Moscow” and that it “perhaps” reflects Soviet Premier Kosygin’s personal views. Shahi said that the GOP sees Kosygin’s hand behind the recent Pravda and Izvestia articles,² and that the GOP has a report that Kosygin told Indian FonMin Vajpayee in Delhi that Pakistan is behind all of the dissident activity in Afghanistan.³

15. Shahi told me that the GOP is taking the Soviet demarche “very seriously” and is not treating it as an “empty threat or bluff.” Shahi reasons that Moscow is “nursing its anger” over the GOP’s decision to ban Soviet overflights to Vietnam, and Pakistan’s subsequent refusal to succumb to Soviet pressure at the risk of harming its relations with China. Shahi noted that Moscow has suffered a “setback” in the Sino-Vietnam conflict and “could be expected” to seek an opportunity to “reestablish its credibility as a superpower.”

16. The Advisor said that the GOP labors with a set of contradictions in the matter. The “brutal oppression” of Afghans has caused “real unhappiness” in Pakistan and elsewhere. In fact, Shahi said, when he was in Tehran the Ayatollah Khomeini “asked me to convey a message to the DRA” about its repression of “religious people.” Shahi said that he told Khomeini that such a message might “drive the DRA to even more repression,” but the GOP delivered Khomeini’s message to the Afghan Ambassador in Islamabad anyway. Shahi said he also made a direct appeal to Afghan FonMin Amin to stop oppressing Muslims. Shahi said that, as expected, the appeals have “incensed the Afghans,” who are having a hard time maintaining control over the country, and now—with both Iran and Pakistan having risked Soviet wrath—Moscow has stepped into the breach.

17. Shahi said that it is in this context that the GOP “seeks a clarification” of USG policy in relation to the 1959 bilateral. Shahi said that both DepSec Christopher and Assistant Secretary Saunders have told the Paks that the bilateral remains in force,⁴ although Shahi said that the DepSec had said that the treaty is “twenty years old and needs a new scope of definition.”⁵ I told Shahi that the bilateral indeed remains in force, and that any “new definitions” mentioned by the DepSec were in the nature of expanding economic assistance to Pakistan (not covered in the bilateral), as a reflection of our desire to be more help to the GOP. I also reminded Shahi of my call on FonSec Shahnawaz, in which I presented the Department Spokesman’s comments that we would regard external involvement in Afghanistan’s internal problems as a serious matter with the potential of heightening tensions and destabilizing the situation in the entire region.⁶

18. Shahi said that a clarification was very important to the GOP at this time because “if we have to deal with this threat alone we will take one policy”, but “if we feel the U.S. is behind us we can be courteous but firm” in a response to pressure from Moscow and the DRA. Shahi said the military situation is “not academic” because Saudi Arabia has asked Pakistan for military manpower, and, while the GOP can provide training and maintenance personnel now, “if they want more to counter Soviet moves in the Yemen”, then the GOP will have to gauge carefully its own military situation.

19. When I asked Shahi what concrete Soviet action the GOP fears, he said that there is a real concern that “KGB agents” will begin to work in Baluchistan, and this, combined with the “incitement of ethnics” already happening in Iran under Soviet tutelage, could make Pakistan a “target of opportunity for the Soviets”. Baluchistan is an even more likely target, Shahi maintained, because Baluch leaders—“such as Bizenjo”—are already “pro-Soviet.”

20. Shahi agreed that one reason for the Soviet demarche may be that things are getting out of hand in Afghanistan, and he suggested that Moscow may be preparing Communist and other international opinion for an intervention along the lines of “Hungary or Czechoslovakia.”

21. I told Shahi that I understood the GOP’s concerns and appreciated the seriousness of their request for clarification. I said that I would report our conversation fully to Washington.

22. The Advisor said that he would see the Chinese Ambassador evening of March 28 to deliver the same message and that Pak Ambassadors in Beijing, Washington, and Moscow have already cabled full reports. Amb Yaqub has been instructed to reiterate Zia’s response to Kosygin, whom Yaqub had already asked to see.

23. I am sending recommendations on an appropriate response to GOP by septel.⁷

24. Recommend Dept repeat this message to Am Embassies Beijing, Jidda, Kabul, London, Moscow, New Delhi and Tehran.

Constable

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2662. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 6717 from Moscow, March 19, the Embassy reported that the March 19 edition of Pravda “carries authoritative article on foreign—particularly Pakistani—support for various sorts of subversive activities directed against Afghan Government. Egypt, China, Iran, and ‛some’ Western countries are also criticized in this regard.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790127–0582) According to telegram 3313 from Islamabad, March 20, a “BBC Moscow reporter recapped an Izvestia article which repeated Pravda’s earlier criticism of the Government of Pakistan for its support of Afghan exile activities, repeated also the allegation of Chinese assistance in this effort and added an explicit criticism of the US and the UK for their support of these activities.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790128–1086)
3. Kosygin visited New Delhi March 13–15.
4. Christopher addressed the issue in his March 2 discussion with Zia. See footnote 8, Document 330. In a November 3, 1978, discussion with Yaqub Khan, Saunders confirmed the agreement remained in force. See footnote 7, Document 313.
5. No record of Christopher’s specific comment was found.
6. Constable met with Shahnawaz on March 25. (Telegram 3508 from Islamabad, March 25; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790138–0455) Telegram 72878 to multiple posts, March 23, transmitted Department Spokesman Hodding Carter’s March 23 statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0457)
7. In telegram 3714 from Islamabad, March 28, the Embassy recommended that the United States should “inform GOP that we see 1959 bilateral as precisely intended to provide for Pakistan’s security against aggression by a Communist or Communist-dominated power—a definition which includes both the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.” The Embassy argued that a linkage between the 1959 agreement and the nuclear issue should be avoided. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850040–2669) In telegram 77843 to Islamabad, March 29, the Department directed the Embassy to inform Shahi that “we consider the 1959 bilateral agreement to be in force, and in this context, we will want to continue to consult closely on the Afghan situation and Soviet activities.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2697)