143. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
8488. Subject: South Asia Nuclear Problem. Reftel: State 119247.2
1. (S)–Entire text.
2. Summary: I met today separately with FonMin Vajpayee and the PM’s Principal Secretary, V. Shankar, to explore further what initiatives India might take or join vis-a-vis the Pak nuclear threat. I turned up no positive leads, but Shankar did suggest that a Carter-Desai meeting might be determinative, and that it might occur following the PM’s attendance at the NAM’s Havana Summit September 2–7. End summary.
3. My meeting with FonMin Vajpayee was accomplished in the relatively relaxed, give-and-take manner advised in reftel, but it opened no doors toward a resolution of the Pak nuclear problem. On a bilateral agreement backed up only by national means of inspection, Vajpayee took the position that Pakistan’s general suspiciousness of India precluded any such step. Until Pakistan’s basic attitude toward India changes and it comes to accept the fact that India’s intentions toward Pakistan are peaceful and non-threatening, he said, a bilateral agreement would mean nothing, and it would also be hard to sell to the Indian people. When I suggested that a step by India in Pakistan’s direction in the form of the offer of a mutual non-development, non-use pact might be just the sort of thing that could help to change Pakistani attitudes, he expressed disbelief. We talked then about the PRC, nuclear weapons free zones, and the Tlatelolco model.3 The slight opening of a door which he seemed to signal in Washington was tightly closed today. A two-tier arrangement involved unacceptable discrimination. India could never accept the concept of a South Asian [Page 388] nuclear free zone in which the PRC was either excluded or accorded a favored position.
4. Vajpayee gave me the feeling that he genuinely shares our concern about the dangers inherent in Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear explosives capability not only for the region but for non-proliferation much more broadly. But he seems to see no practical, or politically acceptable way for India to deal with it. It also seems clear that he is determined not to get out ahead of PM Desai on these issues.
5. I was pleased that he dissociated himself during our conversation from what have become common lines of argument in the Indian press—namely, (A) that Pakistan could never have moved so far toward a nuclear-weapons capability without the connivance of one or more of the Western nations, and (B) that the U.S. is playing up the Pakistan menace solely to increase the pressure on India to accept full-scope safeguards. His meetings with the President and Secretary Vance did good service in those respects.
6. I arranged to call on V. Shankar at the same time that I sought an appointment with Vajpayee largely to cover my flank in case the PM or his office should become curious as to why I was calling on the FonMin on nuclear matters which they deem to fall within the PM’s prerogative. On the Pakistan nuclear threat, Shankar said the PM rejects both the idea of a bilateral agreement with Pakistan and any nuclear free zone concept. The one thing that might change his mind, Shankar volunteered, was personal discussion with President Carter. He went on to suggest that PM could readily arrange to stop in Washington on his way back from Havana, following NAM meetings there in early September. At a later point in our conversation, Shankar said that “a more meaningful approach” from General Zia might also loosen up the PM’s attitude. When I asked what that meant, he said an approach that had more credibility than the letter in which Zia had denied any but peaceful nuclear intentions.4 Shankar then opined, however, that Zia was probably in no position politically to curb Pak nuclear ambitions.
[Page 389]7. Shankar is very concerned that if Pakistan goes nuclear, political pressures within India to do likewise will become intense despite Morarji’s determination to resist them. He was perhaps, then, grasping at a straw—or thinking wishfully—when he proposed that a meeting with President Carter might alter the PM’s attitude on the problem posed by Pakistan. It is, however, a possibility that we should, in my judgment, try to develop. There is no doubt that the PM attaches a very special value on his relationship with the President. Quite possibly even the President will not be able to change his mind about dealing with Pakistan on this issue, but if anyone can, it will be he.
8. Added benefits of a Carter-Desai meeting at the time proposed are (A) that the President could get Morarji’s first-hand assessment of the Havana Summit and its implications for the future; and (B) the two leaders could confer together on how to protect the broader bilateral Indo-US relationship in the imminent event of the end of U.S. supplies for Tarapur. I need not point out, I am sure, that our grace period for licensing will be ending within a week of the close of the Havana Summit and that the survival of good Indo-US relations is going to take determined efforts at the highest levels to overcome the traumas to Indian, and perhaps also American, public opinion occasioned, respectively, by the termination of our Tarapur supply and final confirmation of India’s unwillingness to accept full-scope safeguards.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2606. Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information to Islamabad, London, Beijing, and Moscow.↩
- Telegram 119247 to New Delhi, May 11, instructed Goheen to discuss South Asian nuclear matters with Vajpayee as a follow-up to Vajpayee’s April 25 meeting with Vance, because “in spite of a fairly unpromising prognosis, we believe we should pursue our private discussions with the Indians as part of a multilateral effort to deal with the Pakistan nuclear problem.” The telegram noted that in the meeting with Vance, “Vajpayee indicated some flexibility in India’s attitude toward a regional nuclear arrangement, provided China could somehow be included.” (See Document 140.) Goheen was instructed to “feel free to respond to Vajpayee’s suggestions in a manner that promotes the exploration of ideas.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790213–0819)↩
- See footnote 5, Document 87.↩
- According to telegram 3827 from Islamabad, April 1, the Islamabad press was reporting that Zia’s letter, a reply to a letter from Desai, reassured Desai that Pakistan had no intention of acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. Reportedly Zia suggested that South Asian states should issue an “internationally binding joint declaration renouncing the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, and he called on India to support the South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SANWFZ).” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790150–0260) According to Indian press reports on March 9, Desai’s letter expressed “concern over reported Pak efforts to develop nuclear weapons.” (Telegram 4094 from New Delhi, March 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790113–0425)↩