Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

333. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, March 28, 1979, 2:45–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• PRC on Pakistan: Minutes (C)

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary
  • Amb. Gerard Smith, Special Representative of the President for Non-Proliferation Matters
  • Amb. Arthur Hummel, Ambassador to Pakistan
  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

• Defense

  • David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for Internat. Security Affairs
  • Cdr. Ronald P. Zwart

• Energy

  • Holsey Handyside, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Internat. Programs

• OMB

  • Randy Jayne, Associate Director for Security & Internat. Affairs

• ACDA

  • Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director
  • Charles Van Doren, Assistant Director for Non-Proliferation

• JCS

  • Lt. Gen. William Smith

• CIA

  • Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
  • John Despres

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron
  • Henry Owen

• NSC

  • Thomas Thornton
  • Jessica Mathews

The meeting was preceded by a fifteen-minute session attended only by the principals of the agencies.²

Christopher: All of us are aware of the Pakistani enrichment program. It has already gotten some attention in the press in India and in the UK. We have undertaken a sequenced program of compliance with the Symington Amendment; we have undertaken selective consultations with Congress; and have briefed Secretary General Eklund of the IAEA.³ We have several letters ready for the President’s signature, awaiting the outcome of this meeting.

We will follow today an agenda along these lines: 1. Cutoff of supplies to Pakistan; 2. a positive program of inducements if that is felt desirable; 3. a survey of possible effective sanctions; 4. an approach involving India and Pakistan in a regional agreement; and 5. the question of exposing the program to public view. I do not mean to de-emphasize our requirements in the nuclear area at the expense of our security interests. These will come up in the course of discussion. The telegrams that we have received from Islamabad this morning (concerning Soviet demarche to Pakistan on alleged Pakistani support of Afghan insurgence and the Pakistani request for clarification of our obligations under the 1959 agreement) add both to the complexity of the problem and perhaps offer an opportunity.⁴ The Pakistanis responded firmly but do want clarification from us. Let us turn first to the question of cut-off of supplies to the Pakistani nuclear program.

Gerard Smith: We have sent word out to all known sources of equipment for the Pakistani enrichment program and they are cooperating with us.⁵ It is difficult however to control dual-purpose items short of a complete embargo. We can slow up the Pakistani program but we cannot abort it.

Despres: We have examined all the possibilities for impeding the Pakistani program and acted upon those that seem to have promise. Further efforts are likely to have only marginal impact. At most we can perhaps aggravate the Pakistanis’ technical difficulties.

Christopher: Do we need anything more to ensure full compliance, such as an inter-agency group?

Gerard Smith: I have talked with Pickering and he thinks things are well in train.

Christopher: We all agree that this is an extremely important effort and we should redouble those efforts if it will serve any purpose. How have our allies reacted?

Gerard Smith: They are doing the best they can. The Swiss seem to be having some problems but the French, British and Germans are going all out and the Swedes are helping also.

Mathews: The main problem seems to be with governments trying to control the activities of foreign-owned subsidiaries.

Gerard Smith: The effect of getting this program into the public view will probably help. I am surprised that this has not happened to a greater extent.

Christopher: Let us turn to positive inducements to Pakistan to suspend their nuclear program. There seem to be many variables but also many problems, for instance the effect on India and the precedent for blackmail that this would set. Also the Paks may be so determined that anything we do might not help. When I was in Islamabad I told them that the 1959 treaty was in force.⁶ Now they are back again questioning us about it. We should work up a very careful message to them to confirm that we still support the treaty.

Newsom: To clarify a bit, the 1959 treaty is legally based on the Middle East Resolution and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Might the Soviet demarche provide an opportunity for us to review the security situation with the Pakistanis and point out to them the futility of a nuclear capability vis-a-vis the Soviets?

Aaron: This is extremely important. Would it be helpful for the carrier that is now off Socotra to make a port call at Karachi? Would that be reassuring to the Pakistanis?

Christopher: How does the group relate this question of the treaty to the nuclear option? The way Dave Newsom did? (No response.)

Newsom: The next step is to lay out before us the extensive military requirements in connection with reassuring the Pakistanis. If we start down this road and discourage them from a nuclear option it will mean requests from them for military equipment which will cause problems with the Indians and here domestically.

William Smith: They will still want to have a nuclear capability for dealing with India. Nonetheless I think this is worth trying.

Keeny: But if they go ahead with their nuclear program that will preclude assistance from us.

Aaron: At least it offers us an opportunity to approach the question from a different angle. We mustn’t detract from our commitment to them.

Christopher: There seems to be a new mood in Pakistan from the time I was there, at least as far as I can see from these new telegrams. They played down the importance of US aid to me.

Hummel: The mood is probably different but there are the same issues in their minds and the same requests will surface: Bilateral agreement, perhaps a friendship treaty and new US commitment.

Gerard Smith: Congress will no doubt be intrigued with the idea of implementing the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1979!

Aaron: It is important how we make the connection between reassurance and the nuclear question. We should tell them clearly that the commitment stands but what we can do for them in specific terms is another matter that depends on the outcome of the nuclear matter.

Gerard Smith: Will our commitment to them persist?

Aaron: That decision has not been made.

William Smith: That is to some extent a question of timing. Now the commitment does exist. We will have to see if it changes in the light of events later.

Newsom: I did not mean we should draw back, but set the discussion of it aside. We should start with an intelligence and security briefing and lead from that into a discussion of the realities of their situation. We cannot fully respond to them until the nuclear situation is straightened out.

Aaron: We have interests in Pakistan over and above non-proliferation in the region, as important as that may be. We should be very straight-forward in reassuring them. If they want to have a follow-up meeting with us on more detailed matters then we can use that opportunity to show them the problems inherent in their nuclear program.

Thornton: What they are asking though is not a reaffirmation of the treaty but an expansion of it.

William Smith: Let’s not quibble with them now when they need help and let us not exert too much linkage at this point.

Hummel: Reaffirming the 1959 treaty as such will simply get derisive restatement from them of the need to expand it. They will ask us what we intend to do.

Christopher: We can use the conversation as an opportunity to get back into a dialogue with them and reopen the discussion which is now stalled.

Hummel: I agree that we should not expect too much.

Christopher: How fast should we reply to them?

Newsom: We should send an affirmative holding response and then prepare a message of instruction for Hummel in more detail. We should do this within a week.

Christopher: We will send some immediate message but not at this time for the President because of the Bhutto problem. We will work on the message for Hummel to carry back with him.

Keeny: But the Pakistanis will want more than mere reaffirmation.

McGiffert: The Pakistanis are looking to see how real our commitment is and simple reaffirmation of the agreement will not help.

Newsom: Constable recommends that we tell them that we see the Soviet and Afghan threats as relevant in terms of the treaty—i.e. a threat from a Communist-dominated country. We would however need some Congressional consultation for that.

Christopher: Do we want to say at this point that Afghanistan is a Communist power? We will have to study that issue closely. (Referring to Section 620(f) of the FAA.)⁷

McGiffert: Couldn’t we expand the agreement for instance to include nuclear aggression from non-Communist states? Some think piece on this subject might be useful.

Christopher: We might need to set up a working group on this Pakistani question.

William Smith: Expanding the terms of the 1959 commitment is a dubious undertaking as is the naming of specific countries.

Newsom: I was involved in the drawing up of the 1959 security agreements and we went to great pains to avoid naming specific countries.

Christopher: I would want to give a lot of thought to the question of including Afghanistan.

Aaron: We should address this policy question ourselves of how far we intend to support them in helping the Afghan insurgency, and not pass it off to a working group.

Newsom: We have not supported the Afghan insurgency and apparently the Pakistanis have not either.

Gerard Smith: We have to be clear that we are not giving them a green light to support the Afghan insurgency.

Newsom: Would it be useful to remind the Soviets of our 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan? (No answer.)

Aaron: The Pakistanis certainly have not kept the Afghan guerrillas from operating across the border. They will want to know whether we support that level of their involvement, and we should give them an answer. Will we help them if they get into trouble? Are we indifferent to what happens? Should they seal the Afghan border? Would the 1959 agreement apply then?

Keeny: Do you want to go on record in writing about all of that? The Soviets may just be building a paper trail to justify their own intervention in Afghanistan as a response to foreign attacks on Afghanistan.

William Smith: The Soviets probably have a legitimate complaint. Should we put ourselves in the position of offering to defend Pakistan against that? Can the Pakistanis close the border anyway?

Carlucci: No, they could not close the border but they are certainly not impeding the activities of the Afghan insurgents.

Hummel: All of this discussion refers to the short-term period. In the longer run, if Taraki is destabilized Soviet troops might enter into Afghanistan up to the border of Pakistan. What would we do then?

McGiffert: When Harold Brown was in the Middle East, we told them that we saw the US role as protecting them against the Soviets, rather than against regional threats.⁸ The Pakistanis certainly can handle the Afghans; we should make the same point to them.

Christopher: Let us not try to formulate an answer here. We will draft a telegram of response and clear it around.

Aaron: Hummel should have instructions on our attitude towards the insurgency.

Christopher: Let us now turn to the question of sanctions and pressures. We have sent over draft letters to the European leaders and these should go forward for the President’s signature. I do not think anything else is appropriate here; we have already invoked the Symington Amendment.

Owen: Do these letters tell the Europeans what we are doing about aid?

Christopher: I do not believe they do. (Copies of the letters were produced and shown to have a passing reference to this.)

Owen: We should set this forth to them both in the spirit of candor and to enlist their assistance.⁹

Christopher: I agree. Are there any other ideas? What about approaching the Saudis, if money is coming to the Pakistanis from them to support their nuclear plant?

Despres: The Saudis are supporting it only indirectly in that they provide money generally to the Pakistanis and it is of course fungible.

Christopher: The Saudis showed no interest in pursuing this subject when I talked to them in Riyadh.¹⁰

Aaron: We have a lot on our plate with the Saudis, let’s not overload it.

Hummel: I don’t think it’s a good idea to ask other countries to cut off aid, at least at this point.

Owen: The Germans would be quite sensitive to our point of view, more so than would be the French.

Christopher: The best thing is to tell the allies what we are doing and then let them draw their own conclusions about what they should do.

Owen: Let’s consult with the Germans on this at the next opportunity.

Christopher: We do not want to get into the position of organizing an international conspiracy of nations to harass the Pakistanis.

Owen: No, I just mean to talk the problem over with them.

Aaron: In talking to them we should spell out our full range of concerns, not just the issue of proliferation. We should also talk about security and stability in the area.

Christopher: Turning to the next item, do we think that an Indo-Pakistani agreement is possible?

Newsom: We have examined this in some detail and have some ideas to build on. Zia has offered mutual safeguards and inspections and Desai sometime ago made his non-nuclear pledge. We should start our consultations with the Pakistanis and see what Zia is willing to do. Then we could go to the Indians. There are however several problems: 1. The situation in India has changed quite a bit since Desai made this statement and he is now under much greater pressure. 2. Our own nuclear problems with India have grown as a result of the Tarapur problem. 3. The Indians are concerned about the Chinese nuclear program and this makes it difficult for them to come to a bilateral agreement with the Pakistanis. The chances of success are pretty small but they are worth exploring.

Gerard Smith: As an interim step why don’t we try to do something about ensuring continued supply for Tarapur, for instance by putting the Indians in the EURATOM category and continue to supply them as long as they are negotiating the safeguards question in good faith; we could share our national means of verification to make it easier for them to accept the idea of joint inspection; we could encourage the Pakistanis to slow down the tempo of construction of their reprocessing and enrichment facilities to correspond to economic requirements. This could string these out for fifteen years or longer; we could help the Pakistanis on the construction of nuclear power stations. We should try first to get a non-use declaration, move them to IAEA inspections and then with luck to adherence to the NPT.

Newsom: There is also the question of the South Asia nuclear weapons free zone that will come up. This could make difficulties for us in terms of transit of our ships through the area.

William Smith: That will be a problem but we should be able to handle it.

Christopher: We also want to be careful not to jar our relations with India.

Newsom: Should the British or perhaps some prominent international individual take the lead in suggesting these things rather than have us do it with all of the problems that that entails?

Gerard Smith: We also should relate this to the question of security assurances.

Aaron: Much of the things that you suggest depend not just on India and Pakistan but also our ability to be more flexible on non-proliferation issues.

Keeny: Why are we concerned about involving India; should we not approach Desai early on in this matter?

Christopher: Desai is under very great pressure at home on the nuclear issue.¹¹ Toleration of a Pakistani nuclear program could be devastating for him politically.

Keeny: I think we have to move in parallel with Desai. Are we not talking about something that would delay an approach to the Indians for a matter of months?

Newsom: One thing we have to get across to the Indians is our estimate of how far away the Pakistanis are from a nuclear explosive capability.

Hummel: The chances of getting all of this to work are very poor. What Pakistan really wants is to have equal treatment with India. That would mean freezing the Indian program also.

McGiffert: We probably all agree that this approach will fail but want to go ahead with it anyway. We should ask ourselves whether it perhaps will be harmful to our larger interests. I do not think it will.

Christopher: Let me summarize: First we will tell the Pakistanis to slow down their program to correspond to economic needs; second we will seek to get a non-use/non-production pledge from both India and Pakistan; and third we will seek to get other regional states to sign on to the agreement.

Gerard Smith: All of this needs to be worked out in very great detail.

Keeny: Our approach to Desai in a letter should be on the high ground, stressing his responsibility and opportunity as an international statesman. He is the key to our success as regards India.

Christopher: We have a letter to Desai; you will need to redraft it.

Newsom: Before we write to Desai we have to know what we are going to do about Pakistan.

Thornton: We cannot wait too long; Desai gets nervous when he does not get a quick reply to his letters.

Newsom: I agree. The letter that we send however should not be very specific.¹²

Christopher: The next item is the question of exposing the Pakistani program to public view.

This was effective in the case of South Africa but Pakistan is not an international pariah as South Africa is. The publicity is going to come by itself without us doing anything. There is not much more that we can or should do.

Newsom: We have to consider how the non-aligned nations will react if we reveal the Pakistani activities. This might be quite counterproductive if it looks like we are pressuring the Pakistanis.

Carlucci: I agree. It might be seen as pressuring the Pakistanis unduly and backfire on us.

Owen: [2 lines not declassified]

Hummel: No, the Pakistanis see their problem as being with India.

Newsom: This might however have considerable impact on the Saudis, who could then put pressure on the Pakistanis.

Owen: We have talked a lot about this today but we have barely scratched the surface of this critical issue. Should we not set up a small group of people, chosen for their expertise, not because of their Agency affiliation, to look for some far out alternatives, [less than 1 line not declassified] and report back to us?

Christopher: The idea has merit. Are there any objections? (No objections were raised.)

Aaron: But isn’t this just what the State Department has done in the paper that we have in front of us?¹³ It is time that we ourselves address these difficult questions.

Owen: Certainly, we shouldn’t hold up any decisions that we have taken here today. But it would also be useful to have a group examine some more adventurous possibilities. I am not offering a rationale for delay.

Newsom: Maybe it would be a good idea to get a group together somewhere outside the normal places of meeting where we would be undisturbed, for an all day meeting.

Christopher: Let’s consider this further. We can have a small group set up to report back to us on what can be done to keep Pakistan from achieving a nuclear capability. Let me now summarize what I think we have come up with: 1. We will continue and intensify our efforts to work with the suppliers. 2. We shall send an intermediate response to the Pakistani question about the 1959 agreement. 3. We will develop more detailed instructions for Hummel to take back.¹⁴ 4. We shall send letters for the President to sign to the European leaders and also an improved letter to Desai. We will also have conversations on this with the Germans at the next opportunity. 5. We will develop a fuller approach on the question of a possible Indo-Pakistani agreement and coordinate this with the UK. 6. It is not a productive idea to publicize the Pakistani program at this time. The working group will continue to focus on ways to keep Pakistan from a nuclear explosive capability and report back to us. It will consider some far out options and relate these to broader security concerns.

Gerard Smith: What about approaching the Soviets? I think we should.

Hummel: I do not think we should at this juncture in our relations with the Soviets and their relations with the Pakistanis. I would not put it past them to go immediately to the Pakistanis and tell them of the approach.

Mathews: We need a rapid response in preparing this report on ways to frustrate the Pakistani nuclear capability.

Keeny: We will also have to bring the Indians into the picture.

Christopher: I agree with Hummel about the Soviets; we should not approach them at this time.

Thereupon the meeting ended.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 74, PRC 099, 3/28/79, Pakistan. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, National Security Council Meetings, Box 100, NSC Meetings: Summaries of Conclusions, 3/1978–6/1979. Secret.
2. No record was found of this meeting.
3. In telegram 2940 from Vienna, March 27, the Embassy transmitted a summary of the meeting with Eklund to brief him on U.S. concern over the Pakistani program. The Embassy reported that Eklund “felt implications of Pak activities are very serious—even more for NPT regime than for peaceful uses of nuclear Power.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0152)
4. See Document 332 and footnote 6 thereto.
5. See footnote 4, Document 327.
6. See footnote 8, Document 330.
7. Section 620 (f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibited giving assistance to Communist countries. (P.L. 87–195)
8. Brown visited the Middle East in early February. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Documents 19 and 20.
9. On April 8, identical letters from Carter were sent to Schmidt, Giscard, Callaghan, Trudeau, and Ohira, informing them of the U.S. cutoff of aid to Pakistan because of concern over its nuclear program. (Telegram 87132 to Bonn, April 7; telegram 87133 to Paris, April 8; telegram 87134 to London, April 8; telegram 87135 to Ottawa, April 8; and telegram 87136, to Tokyo, April 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2188, P850011–0426, P840125–1930, P840142–2672, P850050–1856, respectively)
10. Christopher and Brzezinski visited Riyadh March 17–18. (Telegram 2323 from Jidda, March 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790132–0002) No record was found of their discussion with Saudi officials regarding Pakistan.
11. See Documents 130 and 131.
12. Carter wrote to Desai on April 5. See Document 133.
13. Not found.
14. See Document 336.