Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

130. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, February 28, 1979, 1951Z

3416. For Secretary From Christopher. White House for Brzezinski. Subject: Meeting With P.M. Desai.

When Bob Goheen and I met with Desai for 45 minutes at 7:30 p.m., we found him spirited and full of talk. He has been defending himself today against allegations that he is taking a U.S. line on various issues, and he gave us his best non-aligned defense.

1. I complimented him on his balanced approach to Indochina (it was revealed today that he has urged the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia) and I told him that I knew President Carter would be pleased in light of his comments to me last Saturday.² He countered that the two situations were unrelated and not comparable, with the Chinese far more at fault and the Vietnamese having been wrong but in a good cause. He finally agreed that the two adventures, whether or not related, posed a dangerous threat of escalation. He implied but did not say that he had counseled restraint on the Soviets but he said they would not long stand by and watch Vietnam punished.

2. Desai urged that SALT be “clinched” as soon as possible. He reiterated that the US-Soviet relationship is the most important, and strongly in need of bolstering. He said President Carter and Brezhnev should meet promptly, but doubted that Brezhnev could travel to the United States. He indicated that Brezhnev’s condition may not permit him to fly.

3. Although Desai described it as a disagreement among friends, Desai gave us a good working over on the nuclear supply issue. He added the Framatome sale to the usual litany of discriminations.³ The nuclear issue is topic no. 1 in the local press, and he is being pressed to take increasingly harsh positions to defend himself (today he said that of course he would not permit inspections in India by another country). I think we can keep the issue from boiling over for a few weeks, but not for long.

4. On Pakistan, he said he met with President Zia at Kenyatta’s funeral and tried to warm up the relationship.⁴ He feels he made no progress, especially since Pakistan appears hell bent on the nuclear option. I told him the President hoped he would make an extra effort to develop a closer relationship in light of India’s strong position in the region. He gave us the usual treatment on arms sales to the Paks and we gave him the usual answers.⁵

5. Like almost everyone here, Desai is deeply worried over the risk of escalation in Indochina. He wonders how China can back off from what he regards as a foolish and high risk endeavor. It is no help that Vajpayee was in Peking when the attack started, but it is the substance of the dangerous situation that concerns him most.⁶

6. Desai’s respect and affection for President Carter will carry him through specific disappointments, but his testy and feisty mood tonight was a good reminder that he is a friend but not an ally.

Goheen

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128–1809. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. In his February 24 memorandum for the record (see footnote 5, Document 129), Christopher recorded Carter’s instructions to him: “Try to obtain from the Prime Minister or Vajpayee the nature of assurances that might have been given with respect to the scope and time limit of the Chinese action.” In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, Christopher wrote: “This just with Vajpayee.” Christopher also noted: “The President indicated that I should encourage the Prime Minister to move toward a balanced reaction with respect to the fighting in Indo-China.” Christopher underlined the words “balanced reaction” and, in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, wrote: “Yes! No cop outs for NAM leaders.”
3. The French reactors sold to China would be engineered and built by Framatome. See footnote 7, Document 121.
4. See footnote 7, Document 112.
5. In his February 24 memorandum for the record, Christopher noted: “The President indicated that I should urge Prime Minister Desai to take the initiative in seeking a closer relationship with Pakistan. The President said that even though the Indians may feel that President Zia is not in a strong position, that should not prevent them from taking initiatives toward further conciliation.” In the right-hand margin next to this paragraph, Christopher wrote: “A theme with one and all—privately.”
6. See footnote 7, Document 124. According to his February 24 memorandum for the record, Christopher “explained to the President the adverse Indian reaction to the commencement of the China attack at the time that Vajpayee was in Peking, and he said he understood that this would cause apprehension among the Indians.”