Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

133. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Desai¹

Washington, April 5, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter of February 10.² Since it arrived, there have been several developments of great significance for our shared interests, and Warren Christopher has reported to me on his talks with you and with members of your Government.³ In this letter I would like to focus on several specific issues.

First, however, let me say how pleased I was that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concurred in our recommendation and approved the provision of 16.8 tons of fuel for Tarapur.⁴ On March 28, the Executive Branch forwarded to the Commission our favorable recommendation on the next application for 19.6 tons of fuel. I will do all that I properly can to ensure rapid approval.

I appreciate your candor in raising the Pakistani nuclear problem with me and in sharing information available to you. Pakistan is clearly engaged in a significant effort to build a uranium enrichment plant which would give it a capability of developing nuclear explosives. Our best assessment is that it will be several years before Pakistan will be able to produce enough material for a nuclear explosive device, rather than the six months cited in your Government’s analysis.

We have been very active in seeking to forestall the Pakistani program. We have talked to all the countries exporting sensitive nuclear equipment, urging them to enforce existing export controls and to apply stricter ones where necessary. We have reviewed our own procedures as well. While the response from supplier nations has been good, we must face the fact that at best these efforts will probably only delay Pakistan’s program.

I do not believe that the Pakistani program demonstrates the ineffectiveness of a safeguards and inspection program. On the contrary, it is the absence of safeguards that has made Pakistan’s clandestine effort easier. As you know, Pakistan has repeatedly expressed its willingness to accept safeguards which are also acceptable to India. Whether, in fact, it would do so has never been tested.

We have the entire Pakistani nuclear issue under review and will be in touch with you, with the Pakistanis, and with others in the near future to discuss further how the problem can be dealt with in ways that contribute to the stability of South Asia and to the overall goal of non-proliferation. I would be very grateful if you have any suggestions that you could share with me. The positions that you have taken on nuclear weapons and explosives encourage me in the belief that this difficult question can be solved.

I understand and sympathize with the problems you confront. Placing limits on national flexibility as you have done requires the courage of principle. I face similar problems with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. But we are trying our utmost to do our share in this common endeavor. I am striving to complete this important agreement in the very near future and to obtain its ratification by our Congress. No other objective will receive more of my personal effort and determination than assuring this central contribution to arms control and global peace. We also continue to work toward a Comprehensive Test Ban and will be concentrating more intensively on this matter once a SALT Treaty is reached.

Another major issue that concerns us both is the situation in Afghanistan. I am deeply troubled by the growing scope of Soviet involvement there and have been angered by Soviet allegations that the United States is involved in stimulating the opposition to the Afghan regime. I can assure you that these allegations are false. Based on the information available to us, I also do not believe that the Pakistanis or the Iranians have been involved in any significant way. The uprisings in Afghanistan apparently reflect the discontent of large segments of the Afghan people, particularly their concern that an atheistic government will restrict their freedom of religion.

Reiteration of allegations of foreign involvement, which the Soviets must know are untrue, leads me to the conclusion that they are rationalizing their own involvement and, more disturbingly, laying the propaganda groundwork for a much more extensive insertion of Soviet military power. We have called on the Soviets to desist and to allow the Afghans to settle their own internal affairs. I hope that you will be making the same point to them. I share your goal of keeping external forces out of South Asia. The actions and statements of the Soviets are incompatible with this objective and with the behavior that should be expected from great powers, as you so eloquently set forth at the beginning of your letter.

The barely veiled threats that the Soviets are making to Pakistan have raised legitimate security concerns in Islamabad. Those of us who wish Pakistan well should consider how these concerns (which also affect Pakistan’s nuclear aspirations) can best be alleviated.

I agree with you that sophisticated military equipment is not the answer to all of Pakistan’s security concerns. At the same time, however, if I may be completely candid, I do not believe that simply telling Pakistan to improve its relations with Afghanistan is a relevant or adequate response to the situation that has emerged. Nor can long-term internal reforms, desirable though they may be, alleviate urgent short-term security concerns. It is critical that we discuss these questions in a straightforward manner, lest we inadvertently create problems for each other. Foreign Minister Vajpayee’s visit should give us an opportunity for further explorations of each other’s views.⁵

You will recall that when I was flying back from Cairo on March 14, I asked Ambassador Goheen to brief you on the results of my visit to the Middle East and to express my firm conviction that the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty represents major progress towards the achievement of one comprehensive peace settlement that we envisioned in the Camp David accords.⁶ I know that the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty will be criticized by some, but I also know you will understand that this treaty is the indispensable first step on the long and arduous path toward peace in the Middle East. The reactions of other nations in the region may well pose difficult challenges to us. I hope that we may count on your support in the months ahead as new relationships are built in the region and as we move closer to the comprehensive peace settlement that we all desire.

Just as I was completing this letter, your letter of March 24 arrived.⁷ It raises several important issues that I will want to respond to in detail. I do not want to delay sending this, however, so I will be in further touch with you shortly on Southeast Asia and the other matters that you raise.

Sincerely,⁸

Jimmy Carter

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 93, India: Presidential Correspondence: 1–5/79. No classification marking.
2. See Document 126.
3. See Documents 129–131.
4. The NRC approved the license on March 23.
5. See Document 138.
6. Telegram 62315 to multiple posts, March 14, instructed the Ambassador or Chargé of each receiving post to deliver an oral message from Carter that described the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty during Carter’s trip to the Middle East March 7–13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0927)
7. Desai’s March 24 letter to Carter addressed India’s relations with the Soviet Union and China, as well as various international and regional issues. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890026–0261)
8. Carter handwrote a postscript at the end of the letter: “P.S. It would be very gratifying to see you and General Zia or other top officials of India and Pakistan begin direct discussions of problem issues. Why not? J.C.” At the top of the first page of the letter, Inderfurth wrote: “ZB, See the President’s P.S. It is the best P.S. I have seen in two years. Rick.” Brzezinski wrote beneath Inderfurth’s note: “We talked about it. ZB.”