182. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi1

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

I want to thank you for your thoughtful letter of March 12.2 As you point out, we must stay in touch on matters that concern our two countries. We must also be candid with one another in order to avoid misunderstandings and reconcile our sometimes differing perceptions of the serious problems that face the world.

Since I wrote to you about Tarapur in January,3 officials of our two countries have been examining ways to maintain Indo-US cooperation in the nuclear field. After careful personal consideration, I have decided to move ahead with the two pending license applications.4 Specifically, I intend to issue an Executive Order authorizing the first export—covered by the license application now pending before the NRC (XSNM–1379)—and I have instructed the Executive Branch to recommend to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that it give favorable consideration to the second pending application (XSNM–1569).

There may be significant opposition to these actions in Congress. The law provides that Congress can override my Executive Order. As a leader experienced in the ways of democratic government, you will readily understand that I had to weigh this political risk when considering my decision. I have concluded that the risk is worth taking. I want to do everything I reasonably can to strengthen US ties with an India that under your leadership has developed a renewed sense of self-confidence and stability. I have accordingly directed members of my senior staff to conduct a vigorous effort to persuade concerned Mem [Page 479] bers of Congress to allow the exports to go forward. I am hopeful that these efforts will succeed.

As you know, nuclear non-proliferation has been and continues to be a primary concern of my Administration, and we have developed our policies accordingly. I am convinced that our two countries must continue our dialogue on this crucial subject as we look to the future. I trust that approval of these exports will permit us to continue that dialogue in an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

I appreciated the thoughtful exposition of your views on Afghanistan. It is reassuring to learn that we agree that the Soviet Union should withdraw its troops. It now appears, however, that the Soviet Union intends to maintain its troop presence in Afghanistan indefinitely, which has grave implications for South and Southwest Asia.

Since I am anxious to prevent any misunderstanding between us, I want to set the record straight concerning the Soviet claim that actions by the United States were in some way responsible for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. I can assure you in the strongest terms that my country has taken no action that any reasonable person could describe as a provocation for the Soviet move. We have consistently advocated an independent, non-aligned Afghanistan, free of all outside interference. The fact is that the Afghan people themselves reject the Soviet presence and a Soviet-imposed regime.

India, as the strongest state in the region, can play an important role in efforts to resolve the problem the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created. Our exchanges thus far through diplomatic channels as well as through personal contacts such as those of Clark Clifford, Governor Harriman and Secretary Gonsalves—have been helpful in ensuring that we were fully informed of one another’s views. I hope that we can continue to stay in close touch as events unfold.

In your letter of March 12 you voiced your government’s concern over the possible supply of military assistance to Pakistan in the wake of the Afghan developments. We recognize your apprehensions and want to assure you again that any military assistance we offer Pakistan is intended to meet that country’s legitimate needs in the face of the threat to regional security created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This will remain our policy.

I want to share with you my thoughts on our recent effort to secure the release of our hostages in Tehran.5 You are aware of the carefully measured steps the United States has taken to convince the Iranian authorities that everyone’s best interests are served by a prompt resolu [Page 480] tion of the hostage crisis. We have exercised extraordinary restraint in a clearly intolerable situation, and for many weeks this winter we worked through diplomatic and other channels to find a solution. The Iranians have never made any reciprocal gesture that would have permitted a resolution of this crisis.

In recent weeks I became convinced that the lives of the hostages were being increasingly threatened by domestic turmoil and the gradual unraveling of authority in Iran. In addition, we had no assurance that the Iranian parliament would move quickly or positively to end the crisis. I felt an obligation to seek to remove this source of tension and danger in the world. If our plan had succeeded, the international mood today would be quite different.

Our planned operation was a humanitarian effort, designed solely to rescue our citizens from illegal imprisonment. It was not a military action directed against Iran or the Iranian people. I want to assure you in the strongest terms that the United States will not rest until our people have been released from captivity and returned to their loved ones. We will continue to seek a resolution of the crisis through peaceful and diplomatic means. I hope that we will have your understanding and support in these efforts.

I value highly our friendship with India. I hope that a continuing frank exchange of views will reinforce a relationship based on trust and goodwill. I was particularly touched by your expression of personal greetings to me, my wife and my mother. They join me in sending you and your family our warmest wishes.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Trips File, Box 151, (Vice President’s Trip To Yugoslavia For Tito’s Funeral, 5/6–8/1980). No classification marking.
  2. See Document 175.
  3. See Document 166.
  4. See Document 181.
  5. The failed attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Tehran, Operation Eagle Claw, was launched on April 24.