183. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research1
(U) INDIA IN ASIA: CAUTION IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
(C) Summary
Indira Gandhi returned to power at the beginning of this year confronted by a major foreign policy crisis involving neighboring states. Evidence suggests that she is still groping for policies that will reconcile India’s contradictory foreign policy interests. In the meantime, it is unlikely that India will assume the dominant regional role that it might hold in responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Gandhi’s major international concern is defusing the Afghan crisis. To date, her government has adopted two general approaches to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It has:
—sought to limit the opportunities of superpower confrontation by simultaneously calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and opposing the introduction of Western arms into Pakistan and other Indian Ocean littoral states; and
—attempted to establish a consensus among regional and non-aligned states that the Afghan crisis should be settled politically.
New Delhi has not yet taken any initiatives that specifically address the issue of withdrawal. This hesitation appears to stem from:
—uncertainty over which superpower’s actions represent the greater long-range security danger (i.e., the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan or the potential of a countering coalescence of US-Chinese-Pakistani interests);
—a sense that any initiative would be premature until the Soviets conclude that the security situation on their southern frontier permits them to withdraw; and
—fears that an Indian initiative would damage Indo-Soviet ties.
Yet, New Delhi recognizes that the Soviet troops in Afghanistan are the catalysts for superpower confrontation. The Indians are particularly concerned that an extended occupation will make more likely the feared [Page 482] coalescing of US-Chinese-Pakistani interests. (The Soviets stand to gain from such fears in that they tend to strengthen Indo-Soviet ties.) There is evidence that Gandhi is becoming increasingly irritated at the Soviet refusal to consider some conciliatory gesture that might lay the groundwork for a lessening of tension. She seems equally concerned that Moscow is not factoring into its decisions Indian national interests.
Should Moscow attempt to destabilize either Pakistan or Iran, Indian vital interests would be directly threatened. Gandhi would then be confronted with three options:
—taking the lead on a political resolution;
—directly pressuring the Soviets to limit their action by moving closer to China and the US, as well as by reducing New Delhi’s dependence on Moscow, particularly for Soviet sophisticated arms imports; and
—accommodating to the changed balance of power and working out the most favorable arrangements possible with Moscow.
Under these circumstances, we could expect a major Indian policy debate at the highest levels among sets of advisers who hold different geopolitical views. It is difficult to determine at this time which view would prevail, though it seems reasonable to predict that Gandhi will try to prevent a situation that would result in a shifting of the Asian balance of power in the direction of either superpower. In the interim, she can be expected to support moves that reduce the chances for military confrontation along Asia’s volatile southern tier. She can also be expected to support those advisers calling for the modernization of the military to deter potential threats to India’s security.
[Omitted here is the body of the report.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 4–6/80. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by Walter Andersen and approved by George Harris, both in the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia. Thornton sent the report to Brzezinski under a May 19 covering memorandum, in which he wrote: “This entire paper is really worth reading; it gives an excellent analysis of how India sees itself in the current Asian context. If you don’t have time for the whole thing, take a look at the summary.” A stamped notation indicates that Brzezinski saw Thornton’s memorandum; an unknown hand wrote: “5/20/80” beneath the stamped notation. (Ibid.)↩