69. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

2531. San Jose for Ambassador Young. Dept please pass to Sec Vance immediate. Subject: Namibia: First Day of Western Five Talks With SWAPO. Refs: A. USUN 2487;2 B. USUN 2516.3

1. Summary. First day of Western Five talks with SWAPO consisted primarily of: (1) Western Five presentation of three-part statement, per reftels; (2) SWAPO opening presentation which consisted essentially of reiteration of past SWAPO public statements; and (3) discussion of withdrawal of SAG troops. In course of this discussion, Nujoma accepted concept of phased withdrawal, stated that withdrawal would have to be completed several weeks prior to election day, and agreed [Page 173] that, given adequate neutralization of SAG troops by UN observers, electoral process (including campaigning) could coincide with the withdrawal process. Nujoma also agreed that ceasefire could be first step in withdrawal procedure. He insisted, however, that process of phased withdrawal of SAG troops coincide also with phased introduction of UN troops. End summary.

2. First session of Western Five talks with SWAPO took place August 9 [8] from 1000 to 1145. Session consisted of Western Five presentation of three-part statement, per reftels.

3. Second session took place August 8 from 1500 to 1730. Atmosphere was calm and business-like, as was case in first session. SWAPO President was first speaker of afternoon session, and, following opening remarks, he proceeded to read paper containing SWAPO’s proposals for a negotiated settlement in Namibia (see para 8). Both remarks and paper essentially reiterated past SWAPO public statements. Primary points made by Nujoma during opening remarks and subsequent comments were: “(1) Single biggest obstacle in way of negotiated settlement is presence of SAG troops in Namibia. (2) Role of UN Special Representative must be more clearly defined; SWAPO certainly will not accept appointment of Administrator General by SAG. (3) Western Five must recognize total distrust which SWAPO feels for SAG. (4) Insincerity of SAG is evidenced by fact that SAG continues to give public support to Turnhalle individuals. (5) SAG creation of tribal armies is nothing but ground-laying for eventual Namibia civil war.

4. Following Nujoma’s remarks and reading of paper, discussion ensured centering around issue of withdrawal of SAG troops. In course of discussions, Nujoma accepted concept of phased withdrawal (over period of perhaps seven months), stated that withdrawal would have to be completed several weeks prior to election day, and agreed that, given adequate neutralization of SAG troops by UN observers, electoral process (including campaigning) could coincide with the withdrawal process. Nujoma also agreed that ceasefire could be first step in withdrawal procedure. He insisted, however, that process of phased withdrawal of SAG troops coincide also with phased introduction of UN troops.

5. In an attempt to further delineate SWAPO’s position, Amb. McHenry then rasied question of whether SWAPO would be willing to allow even token SAG force, under UN supervision, to remain in Namibia until and beyond election day. McHenry’s view was that token SAG force would allow Vorster to maintain validity of SAG juridical position and would underline SAG participation in political process. Nujoma reiterated his position that all SAG troops must be out of Namibia several weeks prior to election day.

6. Second session adjourned with understanding that third session would consist of further comments on question of withdrawal and [Page 174] then discussion of transitional administrative arrangements. Fourth session would concern political prisoners.

7. Comment: Western Five decided to confront largest obstacle first by discussing withdrawal. SWAPO revealed some flexibility and willingness to talk seriously, which resulted in some important understandings being achieved. End comment.

8. Following is text of paper read by SWAPO entitled “SWAPO’s proposals for a negotiated settlement in Namibia”.

Quote.

SWAPO’s Proposals for a Negotiated Settlement in Namibia

Introduction

Since the beginning of the initiative by the Five Western members of the Security Council towards a solution, acceptable to both the Namibian people and the world community, SWAPO has been closely following, through briefs, the developments concerning the talks between the Five and South Africa.

It is our considered opinion, however, that to date nothing substantial has been achieved which would warrant optimism on our part. If anything, the developments thus far have confirmed our grave doubts about South Africa’s sincerity and readiness to end her occupation of Namibia.

With specific reference to the second round of talks between the Five and the South Africa Government,4 SWAPO finds that agreements contained in the package resulting from the talks constitute a negation of Resolution 385 and, hence, are totally unacceptable to us.

For instance, the agreement concerning the so-called Administrator General has nothing to do with Resolution 385; and the very fact that South Africa has gone ahead with the appointment of the so-called Administrator-General without reference to the UN is a clear indication that the whole exercise is being deliberately conducted outside the framework of Resolution 385.

Furthermore, the calculated coining of a new concept of UN “involvement” as opposed to UN supervision and control is another clear indication that there is an attempt to evade UN’s full and explicit role in the resolution of the conflict.

As far as SWAPO is concerned, the agreement between the Five and South Africa do not indicate any sincere readiness, on the part of South Africa, to release Namibian political prisoners whom South Africa has imprisoned solely because they opposed her illegal and [Page 175] oppressive occupation of our country. On the contrary, the package talks about a panel of jurists to determine who the political prisoners are, as if the South African Government did not know who they are. This idea of a panel of jurists is irrelevant and therefore totally unacceptable.

While discussions are being entered into between SWAPO and the Five acting on their own behalf or on behalf of South Africa, certain principles must be settled and South Africa made to pronouce hereself clearly on them. These principles are as follows:

1. Territorial integrity of Namibia

South Africa must publicly announce in categorical terms that she will fully respect and observe the territorial integrity of Namibia.

2. Withdrawal of armed forces

South Africa must undertake publicy to withdraw of all her armed forces from Namibia as a pre-condition to the holding of elections.

3. Free election

South Africa must unreservedly accept the principle of free elections in Namibia based on universal adult suffrage.

4. Unimpeded progress to genuine independence

South Africa must clearly state her acceptance of complete and unconditional independence for Namibia and undertake to do nothing that will impede the progress or complicate the road to genuine independence.

5. Respect and preservation of the public property of Namibia

South Africa must commit herself to safeguarding all public property of Namibia including Namibia’s treasury and reserves so that the same will be handed over to an independent Namibia. South Africa must undertake not to sabotage, destroy or remove from Namibia any such property.

6. Respect for sovereignty of independent Namibia

South Africa must publicy commit herself to respecting the sovereignty of independent Namibia and undertake not to do anything that will undermine or derogate from such sovereignty.

Withdrawal mechanics

Upon South Africa publicy committing herself to the principles above, talks will then be held between SWAPO, UN and South Africa on the mechanics and modalities involved in the achievement of independence.

A. Withdrawal of armed force

After South Africa has publicly undertaken to withdraw all her armed forces from Namibia, a logistical programme for such withdrawal will be discussed.

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SWAPO appreciates the fact that such withdrawal can reasonably not take place over night and, that in order to create a climate of peace leading to peaceful transistion, and to ensure confidence among all the Namibian people, particularly between whites and blacks where today a racial conflict and hatred exist promoted deliberately under the discriminatory laws of South Africa, such withdrawal should be inter-changeably phased out, that is, the United Nations peace-keeping force taking over the positions of the withdrawing South African armed forces. This process should start immediately and should not take more than three months from the date of agreement on the withdrawal of all South African armed forces.

During this withdrawal period, the UN moves its administrative machinery into the country to take over the administration and public security and embarks on the organization for elections.

B. Elections

SWAPO commits itself to fair, genuine and democratic elections under U.N. supervision and control.

SWAPO’s position is that it is not necessary to hold election twice before independence, i.e., first to elect a constituent assembly and then to elect an independence parliament. This process would be confusing, expensive and time consuming. Of course, SWAPO sees the need for certain constitutional issues to be settled before independence in order that independence elections can be based on such settled issues, but such process is long over due.

SWAPO maintains that this can be achieved by a meeting to be attended by SWAPO, South Africa and U.N. Here, too, SWAPO should be free to bring in anyone as part of its delegation. SWAPO leaders in detention in Namibia or South Africa whose presence is requested by SWAPO should be free from detention and allowed to attend.

It goes without saying that such election should take place after the conditions on withdrawal of the armed forces as stipulated above have been fulfilled.

SWAPO is of the view that if such elections are to be genuine, free, fair and democratic the whole process for electioneering campaign and the holding of the election itself should start one month after the completion of the withdrawal of all South African armed forces and that the electioneering process should not exceed eight months.

C. U.N. Peace-keeping Force

In order to ensure U.N. supervision and control of elections, SWAPO proposes that there should be a U.N. peace-keeping force in Namibia.

D. Size of the U.N. Peace-keeping Force

In the view of SWAPO, it is not necessary for the United Nations to raise a force of the same number as the South African armed forces, [Page 177] i.e., about 50,000; for, in conditions of peace such a number of troops is not necessary and, indeed, has never at any time been justified. South Africa was forced to station such an inordinately large numbers of troops for the purpose of terrorizing and suppressing the people. The required size of the United Nations peace-keeping force must be sufficiently large to ensure effective control of the transitional arrangements.

SWAPO would willingly take part in discussions of the United Nations as to the financing and composition of the United Nations force. Unquote

Leonard
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770285–0986. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, Pretoria, and San Jose. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, and Maputo.
  2. In telegram 2487 from USUN, August 4, the Mission transmitted the draft text of talking points for the SWAPO talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770280–0488)
  3. In telegram 2516 from USUN, August 6, the Mission transmitted the revised text of talking points for the SWAPO talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770282–0226)
  4. The second round of talks took place June 8–10. See Documents 5860.