58. Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State1

931. Subject: Namibia Talks: Second Session. Ref: Cape Town 0924.2

1. Summary: Vorster participated throughout all of the afternoon session first day of talks. He said our rejection of SAG’s version of a Transitional Administrative Authority meant an impasse, since he was committed to it. Later, however, Botha told us that SAG prepared to scrap idea of Turnhalle participation in TAA in favor of an interim authority formed and headed by an “administrator-general” appointed by SA State President. Other subjects discussed during afternoon were UN involvement, Walvis Bay, political prisoners, and repeal of discriminatory legislation. End summary.

2. Transitional Administrative Authority (TAA): Prime Minister Vorster led off the afternoon session of today’s (June 8) talks.3 In long discourse he said he failed to understand our rejection of SAG’s proposed role for Turnhalle in the TAA. He said, “If you shoot them down, I see no solution to the problem of South West Africa at all.” If we did not accept Turnhalle majority in TAA membership, he would either pull South Africa out of Namibia “straight away” or accept the Turnhalle constitution (“and take my chances with the international community”).

3. Contact Group members responded to the effect that we had made it clear all along and would make it clear again that a TAA which was merely Turnhalle by another name would be unacceptable internationally. Vorster stated that he did not agree with our position and that he did not believe it would be worthwhile to continue at this time to carry on with this aspect of our discussion on Namibian issue. However, later in discussion Vorster read to the group a preliminary draft of legislation which would enable the State President to establish a central administrative authority, provide for additional local governments and remove Walvis Bay from its administrative relationship to [Page 140] Namibia. Vorster stated that he would provide copies of the legislation to Contact Group members prior to its submission to Parliament.

4. After we had discussed other matters (paras 7 through 12 below) and were about to adjourn for the day, FonMin Botha, who 15 minutes earlier had excused himself, returned with another bit of drama: “Gentlemen, there has been a new development.” He said SAG could not accept a TAA consisting of more than 17 members (11 of whom would be from Turnhalle). However, it was “just possible” that Turnhalle representatives (some of whom are in Cape Town and have been conferring with SAG) might agree to release Vorster from his commitment to establish an interim authority composed largely of Turnhalle people. If this happened, SA State President would appoint an administrator-general who would form an interim authority.

5. Botha asked that we not breathe a hint of this to anyone, including press, Turnhalle reps, or anyone who SA acquainted with latter. After we had agreed, Botha and Fourie said that at some point the SAG would have to tell the public that Turnhalle-based TAA had not been instituted because CG had rejected it. We voiced no objection to this.

6. Comment: It was obvious to all present that this about-face had been carefully staged, and was put into play when it was clear we would not agree to what SAG wanted regarding the TAA. To avoid impasse on question of composition of TAA, and to save face, Vorster and company have decided upon formula involving a “release” of Vorster’s commitment to Turnhalle and a switch to an administrator-general who would assume many governing powers now in hands of SAG. This presumably, in their view, would meet with our and UN’s approval. We, of course, will not commit ourselves on this and, moreover, will seek further details tomorrow (e.g., would administrator-general have an advisory council and, if so, what would be its composition?).

7. Nature of UN involvement: McHenry made presentation on nature of UN involvement, using talking points based on corresponding language in Contact Group’s terms of reference. Vorster’s initial reaction was that this raised new issues which he would want to discuss with his colleagues. By way of example, he noted that description of composition of commission of jurists varied from that contained in summary points of agreement and disagreement prepared at end of April meeting.4 His recollection of earlier document was that there would be equal number of jurists from South Africa and from outside, with chairman being member of outside group and having casting [Page 141] vote in case of tie. New presentation suggested that the five-member commission would have two South Africans and three outsiders.

8. CG members pointed out that if there is an apparent difference in the descriptive language, no change in the original concept was intended. The only other question on UN involvement raised by Vorster was whether the CG could give him some idea of the number of people that would be involved in the UN presence. McHenry declined to give any figure, noting that UN SYG would have to decide on the basis of operational requirements.

9. Walvis Bay. After Vorster read to group the draft of proposed legislation enabling the State President to provide for administration of Namibia, we noted that it explicitly excluded Walvis Bay and that, as the Prime Minister had acknowledged in numerous speeches, the question of Walvis Bay was sure to be a subject of future controversy. We specifically did not wish to get into the legal factors involved but felt it necessary to flag an issue sure to be controversial. Vorster reacted immediately and negatively. If the group wanted South Africa to give up Walvis Bay, then the talks might as well cease. He recited history of Walvis Bay, noted that it was not a part of the mandate. Botha added that UN itself had called for respect of former colonial boundaries. Was the group also going to raise the question of the Orange River which, he said, was entirely in South Africa? Following Vorster and Botha presentations we repeated again that the SAG had itself acknowledged that there would be claims on Walvis Bay and that while we did not wish to discuss the question, we did not wish our silence to indicate that we were unaware of an issue bound to raise a controversy. Issue was then dropped.

10. Political prisoners. McHenry reviewed briefly the previous Cape Town discussions of political prisoners, noting that the Prime Minister had undertaken to provide his views on the release of political prisoners and, in the event of disputes, the submission of cases to the proposed interna[Page 142]tional commission of jurists appointed by the UN SYG.5 He also stated that in support of our view that all Namibians should be free to participate in the political process, we had raised the matter of detained elsewhere with those governments (Tanzania and Zambia); however, we would not accept or characterize our actions as a “deal” or “linkage”. Vorster responded by stating his agreement to release Namibian detainees held by South Africa provided, and it was a proviso he repeated several times, Namibians detained elsewhere were also released. He also agreed to submit to the proposed international commission of jurists individual cases where there was disagreement over whether the individual’s act was “political” or “criminal”.

11. Murray (UK) suggested that South Africa should not wait until the formation of the commission to begin the release of political prisoners. Vorster did not take up this point (though we intend to raise it again) and he and Botha went into an obviously planned reading of list of charges about Namibians held in Zambia and Tanzania. The paper from which they read had earlier been delivered to Contact Group Embassies by Prof. Mburumba Kerina, former Namibian exile now head of Namibian “foundation” widely believed to be funded by SAG.6

12. Repeal of discriminatory and restrictive laws: Vorster said this question should pose no problem because Turnhalle delegates want repeal of discriminatory laws and will be in position to request under the enabling legislation. McHenry noted that in addition to discriminatory laws there is other legislation (e.g. terrorism act) which could work to restrict the electoral process. He asked whether these would also cease to apply. Vorster responded that laws against terrorism are not discriminatory but in the end conceded that the TAA will have authority to ask for repeal of any laws applicable in SWA. McHenry observed that while the TAA may have freedom to make such request, the State President reserves ultimate right of decision and there may be categories of laws (e.g. in jurisdictional areas reserved to SAG) which he may exclude. Vorster’s response was that it would be “inconceivable” that the State President would not do what TAA asks. Furthermore, if there are problems, the matter could always be taken up with the SAG. McHenry noted this is complicated subject which CG members would want to consider further among themselves before returning to discussion with SAG.

13. Vorster then asked that we discuss the question of a phased withdrawal. We, however, preferred to defer this matter until next session (we wanted to carefully prepare our talking points before getting into this). Vorster agreed, but asked us not to adjourn until Botha returned to the meeting. Moments later he did and presented us with his “new development.” Our next meeting is scheduled for 11 a.m. tomorrow.

Bowdler
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770204–0764. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, Ottawa, Maputo, Paris, Pretoria, and USUN. Sent for information to London.
  2. In telegram 924 from Cape Town, June 8, the Consulate reported on the opening session of the Namibia talks. The talks broke down over the composition of the Transitional Administrative Authority (TAA), which Botha insisted could be dominated by Turnhalle representatives. The Contact Group rejected the idea. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770204–0240)
  3. See footnote 2 above.
  4. See Document 54.
  5. See Document 55.
  6. Paper not found.