70. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
2545. Georgetown for Ambassador Young. Dept please pass to Sec Vance. Subject: Namibia: Second Day of Western Five Talks With SWAPO—Afternoon Session. Ref: USUN 2534.2
1. Summary: Fourth session of Western Five talks with SWAPO took place pm August 9. Discussions centered around two items: 1) relationship between Administrator-General and UN Special Representative, and 2) concept of panel of jurists to decide disputes as to who are political prisoners. With regard to first item, SWAPO accepted proposal for a Special Representative who would have effective veto [Page 178] power over Administrator-General. SWAPO also agreed that, while Special Representative’s veto power could for political reasons be described in terminology less offensive to South African Government, such veto power would have to be recognized by all parties concerned. SWAPO further stated that, given Special Representative’s veto power, SWAPO would withdraw its opposition to appointment of Administrator-General by South Africans. With regard to panel of jurists, SWAPO agreed that mechanism is needed to review cases of political prisoners, but rejected concept of independent panel of jurists in favor of placing this responsibility in hands of legal section of Special Representative’s staff. Second day of talks began with SWAPO’s disavowal of seeming agreements of first day. (Reftel) It remains to be seen whether tomorrow will begin with disavowal of seeming agreements of today. End Summary.
2. Afternoon session of second day of Western Five talks with SWAPO took place August 9 from 1600 to 1830. Because SWAPO had asked that further talk about troop withdrawals be deferred until the Five could present more specific ideas on scope and timing. Discussions centered around two other items: 1) relationship between Administrator-General and Special Representative; and 2) concept of panel of jurists.
3. With regard to relationship between Adminstrator-General and Special Representative, SWAPO expressed its need to know exact powers of Special Representative. SWAPO asked specifically what the Five meant by their statement that the Special Representative would have to be “satisfied” as to fairness of political process. The Five responded that power of the Special Representative, as understood by the Five and by South Africa, amounts to an effective veto. However, use of the words “veto” or “approval” is for political reasons offensive to the South African Government; therefore, the Five have described the Special Representative’s role in terms of “satisfaction”. The change in terminology does not result in change in meaning. SWAPO accepted concept of a Special Representative who would have effective veto power over Administrator-General. SWAPO stressed that, while the Special Representative’s veto power could for political reasons be described in terminology less offensive to the South African Government, such veto power would have to be recognized by all parties concerned.
4. Given SWAPO’s acceptance of Special Representative with effective veto power over Administrator-General, Ambassador McHenry questioned whether such power did not make SWAPO’s stated opposition to a South African Administrator-General irrelevant. SWAPO agreed that, given veto power, they would withdraw their opposition to appointment of Administrator-General by South Africa.
[Page 179]5. With regard to concept of panel of jurists, SWAPO accepted that a mechanism would be needed to establish status of prisoners as political or criminal; however, SWAPO could not accept panel, as such. SWAPO suggested that legal section of the Special Representative’s staff be given responsibility of deciding these cases. SWAPO’s opposition to panel is based on presence of South Africans on panel and on past unfortunate experience with another independent international panel, the International Court of Justice (which in 1966 declined to rule on merits of charges brought against South Africa for its continued occupation of South West Africa). After stating their arguments in support of panel, Five agreed to consider proposal of SWAPO.
6. Comment: Discussions on particular points have been extensive and at times difficult, but we believe they have been useful in clarifying for SWAPO the basic approach of Western Five, as well as proposals that have emerged from our talks with South Africa. It is too early to know SWAPO’s final attitude toward any individual items or to package as a whole. Morning session today (reftel) began with SWAPO’s disavowal of seeming agreements of yesterday. It remains to be seen whether tomorrow will begin with disavowal of seeming agreements of today.3 End comment.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770287–0420. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, Georgetown, London, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, and Maputo.↩
- In telegram 2534 from USUN, August 9, the Mission reported on the August 9 morning session with SWAPO, noting that Nujoma changed his position regarding the withdrawal of South African troops. During the August 8 session (see Document 69), SWAPO agreed to allow troops to withdraw during the UN-sponsored transitional period before independence. At this meeting, Nujoma insisted that “South African troops would have to be totally withdrawn before SWAPO would risk taking any part in political process.” Nujoma also outlined a scenario for the UN takeover of Namibia that included a meeting of SWAPO, SAG, UN and/or Western Five Representatives to work out a timetable for South African troop withdrawal; a general cease-fire; departure of South African troops over a three month period and their replacement by UN troops; UN control of civil and military administration of Namibia; and free elections under UN auspices to choose a new government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770286–0785)↩
- In telegram 2555 from USUN, August 10, the Mission reported on the morning session of talks with SWAPO, which was largely devoted to the issue of Namibian prisoners and a possible timetable for the transitional period. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770288–0743) In telegram 2560 from USUN, August 11, the Mission reported on the August 10 afternoon session, which focused on SWAPO’s reaction to the illustrative timetable presented by the Five that morning. Nujoma suggested alterations which the Mission believed would make the timetable less acceptable to the South African Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770289–0011)↩